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I. INTRODUCTION
The summary jury trial is a beneficial federal court-annexed settlement device
-- but its use and effectiveness is being threatened. Although the summary jury
trial was created nearly fourteen years ago, uncertainties remain today about the
authority for its use and other basic issues, and have resulted in time-consuming,
costly litigation, as well as informal challenges and criticism. Federal judges and
magistrate judges have voiced their concerns about these issues, and it is near the
end of a Congressionally-imposed experimental period designed to find ways to
reduce cost and delay in the federal courts. The time to remedy the situation is
now.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1995/iss2/1
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Until fairly recently it was generally assumed that the primary function of
judges was to decide cases.2 It is only in the last decade or so that courts have

viewed substantial involvement in facilitating settlement as a primary function of
the judge and that the notion of 'the managerial judge' has entered the judicial
vocabulary? And the burgeoning caseloads in many courts, particularly urban

ones, have created increasing pressure for judges to process more expeditiously
their swelling dockets.'
The subject of settlement has assumed a new importance as a result of The
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 ("The Civil Justice Reform Act" or "Act"), 5 in
which Congress created an experimental period designed to find ways to reduce
cost and delay in the federal litigation system.6 One portion of the Act required
each federal judicial district to set up an Advisory Committee to develop a plan
dealing with congestion and delay, including appropriate consideration of
alternatives to adjudication. The summary jury trial is an important device

2.
STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL, DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND
OTHER PROCESSES 243 (2d ed. 1992).

3. Id. (citing Judith Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HAPV. L. REV. 374 (1982)).
4. Id.; see also Proposed Civil Justice Reform Legislation: Agenda for Civil Justice Reform in
America, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 979, 980 (1992) [hereinafter Memorandum]:
America has become a litigious society. In 1989 nearly 18 million new civil cases
were filed in the state and federal courts. This amounts to one lawsuit for every ten
adults. In the federal courts alone, the number of lawsuits filed each year has almost
tripled in the last thirty years -- from approximately 90,000 in 1960 to more than 250,000
in 1990.
This dramatic growth in litigation carries with it very high costs for the U.S.
economy.
A recent article in Forbes estimates that individuals, businesses and
governments spend more than $80 billion a year on direct litigation costs and higher
insurance premiums, and a total of up to $300 billion indirectly, including the cost of
efforts to avoid liability.
Id.
5. GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 243; see Patrick Johnston, Civil Justice Reform: Juggling
Between Politics and Perfection, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 833, 835 (1994) (referring to the passage of
the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990). The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 comprises Title I of the
Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat 5089-98 (1990) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1988 & Supp. 1992)) [hereinafter The Civil Justice Reform Act or
Act]. Johnston, at 835 n.9.
6. See Johnston, supra note 5, at 835.
7.
GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 243; see also Johnston, supra note 5, at 833. The background
of the Act was described as follows:
The CJRA followed, in large part, from the work of a task force ("Brookings task
force") convened by the Brookings Institution and the Foundation for Change at the
request of Senator Joseph Biden. In 1988, Senator Biden prompted the Brookings task
force to "develop a set of recommendations to alleviate the problems of excessive cost and
delay" in civil litigation. The membership of the task force was selected to provide a
broad spectrum of authorities representing the competing interests in the civil justice
system ....
After discussing and debating reform proposals over a nine month period, the
Brookings task force produced a lengthy set of recommendations for reducing costs and
delays in federal civil litigation. The recommendations addressed three broad aspects of
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designed to achieve that goal and is specifically mentioned in the Act.8 The Act
also requires that by the end of 1995, the Judicial Conference must report to

federal civil litigation: procedure, judicial resources, and the activities of attorneys and
clients that affect cost and delay. The majority of the recommendations concerned
changes in procedure, i.e., steps that courts and judges could take to reduce cost and delay
in civil litigation. Through its recommendations for procedural reform, the Brookings task
force hoped to provide participants in the civil justice system with the "proper incentives"
to minimize cost and delay.
Less than six months after the Brookings task force issued its report, Senator Biden
introduced his initial version of the CJRA in the Senate on January 25, 1990. Senator
Biden's bill relied heavily on the procedural recommendations of the Brookings task
force. Although both the House of Representatives and the Senate made amendments to
the CJRA before adopting it, the CJRA never shifted its focus from the reduction of cost
and delay in the federal courts.
The first recommendation of the Brookings task force called for a statute requiring
each district court to develop and adopt a formal plan to reduce cost and delay in civil
litigation. Similarly, at the heart of the CJRA lies the requirement that each district court
implement a "civil justice expense and delay reduction plan" by December 1, 1993. The
stated purpose of this requirement is "to facilitate deliberate adjudication of civil cases on
the merits, monitor discovery, improve litigation management, and ensure just, speedy,
and inexpensive resolutions of civil disputes." Despite this broadly stated purpose, the
Act concentrates on only two of the announced goals -- the reduction of cost and delay.
Id.at 837-41 (footnotes omitted).
It should be noted that:
[aifter adoption of a Plan, the CJRA requires repeated annual assessments by each
district court, in conjunction with its advisory group. Moreover, these annual assessments
must be conducted "with a view to determining appropriate additional actions that may
be taken by the court to reduce cost and delay in civil litigation and to improve the
litigation management practices of the court."
Id. at 843 (footnotes omitted).
In addition, "[t]he most significant practical restriction on judicial discretion is the Act's
requirement that advisory groups and courts contemplate adoption of the specific methods of litigation
management and cost and delay reduction set forth in the CJRA. First, the Act requires consideration
of six identified 'principles and guidelines of litigation management and cost and delay reduction."'
Id. One of these six principles includes court-authorized reference of cases to SJTs. See The Civil
Justice Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(6) (1988); see also Shelby F. Grubbs, A Brief Survey of Court
Annexed ADR: Where We Are & Where We Are Going, TENN. B. J. 20, 23 (Jan.-Feb. 1994). The
author states: "Without doubt, the greatest impetus to the development of ADR in the history of the
federal system is the enactment of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990." Id.
8.
The Civil Justice Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(6) (1988). Section 473(a)(6) of the Act
provides:
(a) In formulating the provisions of its civil justice expense and delay reduction plan, each
United States district court, in conjunction with an advisory group appointed under section
478 of this title, shall consider and may include the following principles and guidelines
of litigation management and cost and delay reduction:
(6) authorization to refer appropriate cases to alternative dispute resolution programs that (A) have been designated for use in district court; or
(B) the court may make available, including mediation, minitrial and summary jury
trial.
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Congress it's assessment of the results of the diverse experience of the district
courts in their efforts. 9
Quite aside from issues of congestion and delay, judges are increasingly
becoming aware of the advantages in certain cases of using ADR techniques to

provide more satisfactory outcomes than are possible through litigation.10 Thus

for many judges the question is no longer whether to encourage settlement but
The Senate Report for P.L. 101-650, The Judicial
how best to do so."
Improvements Act of 1990 (which includes the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990)
notes that the last fifteen years have witnessed the burgeoning use of dispute
resolution techniques other than formal adjudication by courts.' 2
One settlement technique used with growing frequency in the federal courts
is the summary jury trial ("SJT").' 3 Briefly stated, in a SJT, both sides present

See Johnston, supra note 5, at 847-48:
As part of the pilot program study, the Judicial Conference must provide a report to
Congress by the end of 1995. The report must include an assessment of the extent to
which cost and delay have been reduced as a result of the program. In addition, the
report must compare the experiences of the pilot districts with the experiences of ten
"comparable" districts for which adoption of the Act's principles of cost and delay
reduction had been "discretionary." Perhaps most importantly, the pilot program report
also must contain a recommendation as to whether some or all of the district courts should
be required to include in their Plans the Act's principles of cost and delay reduction. If
the Judicial Conference does not recommend an expansion of the pilot program's
requirements, the Conference must identify "alternative, more efficient cost and delay
reduction programs" for implementation.
Senator Biden accurately described the practical effect of the pilot program in
prompting the adoption of the Act's principles of cost and delay reduction. In advocating
passage of the CJRA to the Senate, Senator Biden stated: "Within a set number of years,
then, this legislation insures that one of two things will occur. Either the six principles
of litigation management and cost and delay reduction that Congress has specified in this
legislation will be part of district court plans nationwide, or some other program, that has
been shown to be demonstrably better, will be in place. One way or the other, the
situation is bound to improve."
Id. (footnotes omitted).
The Act itself expires on December 1, 1997, and will not bind district courts after that date. Id.
at 835 n.10 (referring to § 103(a), 104 Stat at 5096).
10. GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 243.
11. Id.
12. S. REP. No. 416, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802,
6831.
13. See Thomas D. Lambros, The FederalRules of Civil Procedure:A New AdversarialModel
for a New Era, 50 U. PrrT. L. REV. 789, 802 (1989) [hereinafter New Adversarial Model] (in which
Judge Lambros estimated that at least 100 federal and state judges had deployed the SJT in the
resolution of approximately 1,000 disputes).
The use of summary jury trials in state courts, where it is less prevalent, is not addressed herein.
However, many of the same concerns and proposed solutions would apply in that system as well. See,
e.g., Nibert v. BancOhio Nat'l Bank, No. CA 86-05-012, 1987 WL 10359, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr.
27, 1987).
See also N.D. OF OHIo R. 7, ch. 6. The United States District Court for the Northern District
of Ohio also uses a device called a "summary bench trial" in which, obviously, a judge is the
decisionmaker rather than a jury. Id. (This variation is beyond the scope of this article.).
9.
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a summary of their evidence to an actual jury. The jury deliberates and then
renders an advisory verdict which becomes the basis for settlement discussions
between the parties. 4
The SJT was created in 1980 by the Honorable Thomas D. Lambros of the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio." In September
1984, the Judicial Conference of the United States passed a resolution recognizing
the usefulness of the SJT in resolving prolonged civil litigation.' 6 As of 1987,
the summary jury trial had been used in an estimated sixty-five federal district
courts." And it was specifically included in the Civil Justice Reform Act of
1990 as one of the tools federal courts now have at their disposal. 8
The SJT's intended time and cost reductions have been realized on many
occasions,' 9 but during nearly fourteen years of use, a number of basic
uncertainties have threatened its use and effectiveness. The challenges to the SJT
can be organized into five primary issues. First, the authority for SJTs in general
is uncertain and no authority appears to exist for mandating participation in a SJT.
Second, no authority exists for summoning jurors from the regular jury pool to
serve as SJT jurors. Third, uncertainty exists concerning the right of access to
SJTs by the press and public. Fourth, uncertainty exists regarding the
confidentiality, and future use, of SJT information and verdicts. Fifth, uncertainty
exists about the appropriateness of, and the authority for, awarding sanctions in the
SJT context.2"
These issues are fundamental to the use of the SJT. The time and cost
involved in such litigation and criticism are clearly inconsistent with the purpose
of this device. Indeed, those who do attempt to raise SJT issues in a particular
lawsuit often must resort to extraordinary measures to do so -- thus increasing the

See also N.D. OF OKLA. R. 16.3(1). The United States District Court for the Northern District
of Oklahoma also uses a device called an "executive summary jury trial," which it describes as a
summary jury trial where chief executive officers of corporate parties participate as part of a threejudge trial panel. Id. (Again, this variation is beyond the scope of this article.).
14.
See Thomas D. Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial andOtherAlternativeMethods ofDispute
Resolution: A Report to the Judicial Conference of the United States Committee on the Operation of
the Jury System 9-10 (Jan. 1990) [hereinafter Report to the JudicialConference].
15.
See Thomas D. Lambros, The Judge's Role in Fostering Voluntary Settlements, 29 VILL. L.
REV. 1363, 1373 (1983-84).
16.

REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNrrED STATES 88

(Sept. 1984). The September 1984 resolution passed by the Judicial Conference of the United States
read as follows: "RESOLVED, that the Judicial Conference endorses the experimental use of summary
jury trials as a potentially effective means of promoting the fair and equitable settlement of potentially
lengthy civil jury cases." Id.
17. See Paul Marcotte, Summary Jury Trials Touted, A.B.A. J. 27 (Apr. 1987).
18. See The Civil Justice Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(6) (1988).
19. See discussion infra part II.B (concerning the benefits of SJTs).
20. See Ann E. Woodley, Strengthening the Summary Jury Trial: A Proposal to Increase Its
Effectiveness and Encourage Uniformity In Its Use (1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
Professor Woodley, The University of Akron School of Law) (addressing other issues affecting the use
and effectiveness of SJTs).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1995/iss2/1
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time and cost involved. 21 To avoid jeopardizing the continued use of this
beneficial settlement device, 2 this article discusses proposed solutions to these

basic uncertainties.
As part of the justification for the proposed solutions, this Article offers a
unique perspective on the SJT device.23 In addition to a review of the pertinent
litigated cases and the scholarly articles on the subject, input on the issues raised

by the use of SJTs has been obtained from those persons who actually conduct
them: federal district court judges and federal magistrate judges from across the
country. Lengthy surveys were submitted to these federal district court judges and

21.
See In re NLO, Inc., 5 F.3d 154, 159 (6th Cir. 1993). The district court ordered a SJT over
the defendant's objections and then refused to certify the issue for an interlocutory appeal under 28
U.S.C. § 1292. Id. at 155. The defendant filed a petition for mandamus in the Sixth Circuit. Id. In
evaluating the first guideline from In re Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d 300, 304 (6th Cir.
1984) (regarding whether mandamus is appropriate), "(1) The party seeking the writ has no other
adequate means, such as direct appeal, to attain the relief desired," the Sixth Circuit stated:
A direct appeal of the order to participate in a summary jury trial will never be
possible; a final decision on the merits would necessarily take place after such a
proceeding had already occurred.
One possible alternative would be for defendants to refuse to participate in the
summary jury trial and risk being held in contempt; the criminal contempt order could
then be appealed to this court. But the purpose of criminal contempt is punitive; it
vindicates the authority of the court.
In re NLO, 5 F.3d at 156, 159 (citation omitted).
22. See discussion infra part II.B (concerning the benefits of SJTs).
23. See Molly M. McNamara, Summary Jury Trials: Is There Authority For FederalJudges to
Impanel Summary Jurors?, 27 VAL. U. L REV. 461, 475 n.102 (1993) (noting that to date, no
comprehensive study has been conducted on this procedure); see also explanation of survey conducted
for this article infra note 24. While the survey responses from federal judges across the country which
are analyzed in this article may not qualify as a comprehensive study, they certainly offer more insight
into the actual process than has been available thus far.
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federal magistrate judges,24 and the responses received contribute significantly to
the discussion below.25
While these problems could be addressed in a number of ways, what is
critical now is that they be resolved. Therefore, the proposed federal summary
jury trial statute included herein explicitly authorizes federal district courts to

conduct SJTs and to mandate participation in them, authorizes courts to summon
SJT jurors pursuant to the regular process, provides that the SJT is a confidential
process to which the public and press have no access (unless the parties otherwise
agree), clarifies the confidentiality and future use of SJT verdicts and information,
and explicitly provides for sanctions for misuse of the process.26 These statutory
proposals stem, in part, from suggestions made by the judges and magistrate
judges contributing to this effort, from local court rules currently in use, from case
law, and from other scholars. 27 And, obviously, this proposed statute is directed
to those legislative decisionmakers who could ensure its implementation in the
federal court system. If adopted by Congress, the proposed summary jury trial
statute will add clarity to the process so that summary jury trials can achieve the

24. Ann E. Woodley, CompilationofJudicialResponses to ProfessorAnnE. Woodley's Survey
on Summary Jury Trials (Spring 1994) (unpublished survey) [hereinafter JudicialSurvey Responses].
(A 40-question survey was sent to all of the chief judges of the United States District Courts along
with a cover letter asking them to pass copies of the survey on to all of their colleagues (including both
district court judges and magistrate judges). A separate mailing of the survey was also made to all of
the district court judges and magistrate judges in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio, since the SJT's creator, Judge Lambros, is a judge in that district Responses were
received from 57 district court judges and magistrate judges from 25 states, including Alabama, Alaska,
Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan,
Nebraska, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee,
Texas, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. These responses were updated, where necessary, in the
Spring of 1994.)
Twenty-one of the responding judges indicated that they have conducted SJTs, 33 indicated that
they have not, and I stated that Judge Lambros conducted one for him. Id., Question 1, at l. Judges
from the Middle District of Alabama, the Northern District of Alabama, the Southern District of
Florida, and the District of Hawaii who stated that they have not conducted any SJTs added that they
were also speaking for all of their colleagues in those districts. Id.
The surveyed judges who have conducted SJTs have conducted anywhere between one and sixty
of them. Id., Question 7, at 10.
25. Ann E. Woodley, Compilation of Attorney Responses to Professor Woodley's Survey on
Summary Jury Trials (Spring 1994) (unpublished survey) [hereinafter Attorney Survey Responses]. (A
similar 28-question survey on this subject was sent to the head litigation partner at the 100 largest law
firms in Cleveland and Akron, Ohio that list litigation in their Martindale,Hubbell entry. Although
fewer than ten lawyers responded to this survey, their views have been included where appropriate.).
26. See infra part IV.
27. Note, however, that the scholars have offered, at best, piecemeal approaches to the problem
of sustaining the SJT. And although this article too is not entirely comprehensive, it addresses the
most basic problems. See also Woodley, supra note 20 (responding to remaining concerns not
addressed in this article).
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result that was intended by their creation: the reduction of the time and cost
involved in litigation by fostering settlement. 28
The discussion below is divided into four parts. Part II is a background
section describing the summary jury trial process and its intended benefits, as well
as briefly identifying the five litigated issues and basic uncertainties discussed
here. Part III describes the five litigated issues and basic uncertainties in detail,
describes how judges have attempted to deal with them, and discusses potential
solutions. Part IV contains specific statutory language embodying the proposed
solutions. And, finally, Part V offers a brief conclusion.
II. BACKGROUND
By way of background, this article will briefly describe the summary jury
trial process and its benefits, as well as the litigated issues and basic uncertainties
challenging the use and effectiveness of this unique settlement device.
A. The Summary Jury Trial Process
As noted in the Senate Report to The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, the
SJT was borne out of a need to develop a settlement alternative that preserved the
involvement of a jury in the decisionmaking process. 29 The Report added that
a SJT recognizes that often the only bar to settlement of a case is a difference of
opinion on how a jury will perceive evidence presented at trial.3 However, it
is clearly a settlement tool which neither limits or expands the rights of the parties
involved."
A SJT is generally used in a case after discovery is complete and no motions
are pending.32 The process has been described as follows:
In a summary jury proceeding, attorneys present abbreviated arguments
to jurors who render an informal verdict that guides the settlement of
the case. Normally, six mock jurors are chosen after a brief voir dire
conducted by the court. Following short opening statements, all
evidence is presented in the form of a descriptive summary to the mock
jury through the parties' attorneys. Live witnesses do not testify, and

28. Johnston, supra note 5, at 848. The legislative history of the Civil Justice Reform Act of
1990 "indicates that Congress pursued judicial reform on its own through the CJRA because of a
perception that the courts could not effectively use their powers under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to reduce cost and delay." Id.
29.
S. Rep. No. 416, supra note 12, at 1.
30. Id.
31.
See Jones-Hailey v. Corporation of TVA, 660 F. Supp. 551, 553 (E.D. Tenn. 1987) (quoting
Thomas D. Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial, 103 F.R.D. 461, 469 (1984)). The court held that
TVA's participation in a summary jury trial was not a constructive consent by TVA to a jury trial. Id.
32. Report to the Judicial Conference, supra note 14, at 12.
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evidentiary objections are discouraged. Thus, some of the evidence
disclosed to the mock jury might be inadmissible at a real trial."
Following counsels' presentations, the jury is given an abbreviated charge and
then retires to deliberate. The jury then returns a "verdict." To emphasize the
purely settlement function of the exercise, the mock jury is often asked to assess
damages even if it finds no liability. "Also, the court and jurors join the attorneys
and parties after the 'verdict' is returned in an informal discussion of the strengths
and weaknesses of each side's case.""
Elements of the process omitted from the above description include: either
a judge or magistrate judge may preside at the SJT;35 the SJT jury panel is drawn
from the pool in the same manner as is a regular petit jury;36 the jury is told that
the case is being presented in an abbreviated form, but usually is unaware before
it deliberates that its verdict is merely advisory;37 and clients or officers of clients
with authority to negotiate a settlement are normally required to attend the
summary jury trial.38 Obviously, if settlement discussions fail, the case will be
tried. The entire process usually lasts less than one day,39 but can take up to
several days.40
The SJT is designed to facilitate settlement by providing what is hoped to be
a reasonably accurate forecast of the outcome of the trial, and, in fact, the Sixth

33.
Id.
See Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 854 F.2d 900, 904 (6th Cir. 1988).
34.
35.
Thomas D. Lambros & Thomas H. Shunk, The Summary Jury Trial, 29 CLEv. ST. L. REv.
43, 47 (1980). From this point on in this article the term "judge" will refer to both United States
District Court Judges and United States Magistrate Judges.
See Lambros & Shunk, supra note 35, at 47.
36.
See McNamara, supra note 23, at 471-72. The author writes:
37.
Commentators disagree about whether potential jurors should be told of the
nonbinding nature of the SJT proceeding. According to Judge Lambros' model, the judge
tells the potential jurors about "the nature of the summary trial" with an emphasis on "the
difference between the summary trial and a trial on the merits." Most commonly, the
jurors are not told about the nonbinding nature of the SJT verdict until after they have
already returned what they were led to believe would be a binding verdict. One
commentator has expressed concern that telling the jurors of the nonbinding nature of SJT
will lead jurors to decide the case less carefully and thus compromise public confidence
in the legal system.
Id.(footnotes omitted).
See Stephen W. Myers & Howard Armstrong, Court tests summary jury trial: Two judges try
the 'cutting edge' venture, THE MARICOPA LAWYER June 1990, at I (Maricopa County, Ariz.). Some
courts make SJT verdicts binding if all of the counsel consent in advance. Id. In addition, some courts
are trying a hybrid of sorts. Id. In "high-low" binding verdict cases, the plaintiff agrees to have his
award limited to a given high figure, if there is a plaintiff's verdict, in return for a defense promise
that it will pay a given low figure, even if there is a defense verdict Id. The parties really are asking
the jury to determine the award amount between the high and low figures. Id.
38. Report to the Judicial Conference, supra note 14, at 13.
39. See S. REP. No. 416, supra note 12, at 29 (quoting from Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial
-- An Alternative Method of Resolving Disputes, 69 JUDIcATURE 286, 286 (Feb.-Mar. 1986)).
See JudicialSurvey Responses, supra note 24, Question 10, at 13-14.
40.
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Circuit has referred to it as a highly reliable predictor of the likely trial
outcome. 4'
When the surveyed judges who have conducted SJTs were asked to describe
the basic SJT procedure they have used, the responses revealed some variations in
the amount of time alloted for the attorneys' presentations. 2 The estimates
provided by the judges varied from 30 minutes per attorney4 3 to 6-8 hours per
side, with4 the most common time period being between an hour and 1 1/2 hours
per side.1
The surveyed judges' procedures also varied somewhat in the structure of the
presentation. For instance, one judge indicated that he has parties combine
opening statements and closing arguments in their presentations and then gives
plaintiffs limited rebuttal time; another judge has parties give opening statements,
a summary of each case, closing arguments and then final arguments; and another
judge has the parties address the jury twice: the first such address combining the
opening statement and the presentation of evidence, with the second address being
the closing argument.45
In addition, if the case turns on the credibility of the parties, at least one
surveyed judge allows full direct and cross-examination of the parties and/or the
showing of videotaped depositions during the SJT.46 Another surveyed judge
noted that in proper cases it may be an appropriate device for the testing
credibility of a few main witnesses.47
Other judges vary in what they require prior to the start of the SJT, one
requiring a pre-SJT agreement on exhibits and statements of fact; one requiring
testimony and summaries to be agreed upon in advance; and one making
evidentiary rulings in advance.48 Finally, two other variations in the procedure
used are that at least one judge selects the same number of jurors as a "real" trial
will have; and another tells the jury in advance that the SJT is only advisory.49
Most of the procedures used by the surveyed judges are in writing.5" More
than half of these judges use the Lambros procedure, and most of the remaining
ones appear in local court orders or rules.5'

41.
See Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 854 F.2d 900, 904 (6th Cir. 1988).
42. See JudicialSurvey Responses, supra note 24, Question 10, at 13-14.
43. Id., Question 10, at 13. One of the judges who gives each attorney a total of 30 minutes
for his or her presentation stated that he had been willing to give this much time to each of the 12
attorneys involved in a particular SJT he conducted. Id.
44. Id., Question 10, at 13-14.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 14.
47. Id., Question 3a, at 5.
48. Id., Question 10, at 13-14.
49. Id. at 13.
50. Id., Question 11, at 15. Twelve of the judges responding to this question said that their SJT
procedures were in writing, and six of the judges said that they were not. Id.
51. Id.
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B. The Benefits of STs
There are a number of intended benefits in using summary jury trials, which
despite the litigated issues and basic uncertainties, appear to be borne out.52 The
responding judges had an overwhelmingly favorable view of SJTs.53 The Senate
Report to the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 noted that while the data is not
yet complete, studies of various ADR programs have shown generally favorable

52.

See McNamara, supra note 23, at 49 1:
While there is a lack of express authority for using potential petit jurors as summary
jurors, it is clear that the SIT process has enjoyed a great deal of success. Both judges
and attorneys who have participated in SJT find it to be beneficial. Even attorneys who
were initially skeptical of the procedure -- and reluctant to use it -- have found SJT to be
successful and beneficial.
Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
53. See Judicial Survey Responses, supra note 24, Question 3, at 4-6; Question 3a, at 4-5;
Question 8, at 11; Question 9, at 12; Question 15, at 20; Question 21, at 27-28; Question 22, at 29-31;
Question 29, at 44-45; and Question 40, at 69-70. (One judge (#34) wrote in his cover letter that "The
summary jury trial is in my view the finest advance in the federal trial system in the last decade."); see
also Attorney Survey Responses, supranote 25, Question If, at 3; Question lg, at 3; Question 5, at 7;
and Question 27, at 20.
When judges who had conducted SiTs were asked if they have been generally satisfied, partly
satisfied or dissatisfied with the process, most identified themselves as "generally satisfied," a few said
that they were "extremely satisfied" or "greatly satisfied" and a few said they were "partly satisfied."
Judicial Survey Responses, supra note 24, Question 3, at 4. No judge identified himself as
"dissatisfied." Id. One judge stated that he had insufficient experience to form an opinion (since he
has only done one SJT), but he added that it does seem to pitch parties toward settlement Id.
In response to the question as to whether summary jury trials should ever be used in federal
courts, an overwhelming majority responded in the affirmative. Id., Question 21, at 27-28. Twentyfive out of the thirty-two judges responding to this question answered yes. Id. These judges also
provided numerous reasons for their positive views, all of which are mentioned below. Id.
When the judges were asked whether they would conduct another SJT in the future, nearly all
of them responded in the affirmative. Id, Question 15, at 20. Nineteen of the twenty-one judges
responding to this question answered yes. Id.
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5
and
results.54 The public in general has a positive view of ADR mechanisms,
56
well.
as
SJT
the
of
courts and commentators have extolled the virtues
As previously mentioned, the primary benefit of a SJT is the saving of the
time and cost involved in a lengthy trial (and appeal) if the process results in the
settlement of the case.5" However, even if the case does not settle and it goes
on to trial, the SJT process itself yields other benefits.58

54. S. REP. No. 416, supra note 12, at 1. "'Experience to date provides solid justification for
allowing individual federal courts to institute ADR techniques in ways that best suit the preferences
of bench, bar and interested publics.' [Quoting Fed. Cts. Study Comm. 101st Cong., 2d Sess. Report,
83]. The Committee strongly agrees with this assessment." Id.
See Grubbs, supra note 7, at 25, where the author stated:
55.
Although there is, as yet, little empirical data demonstrating that ADR does, in fact,
result in a speedier, more expeditious, and less expensive resolution of civil disputes, there
is no question that the public, and particularly the business community, thinks it does.
Under the auspices of the Center for Public Resources, more than 500 of the country's
largest corporations have signed a pledge obligating them to explore ADR to resolve
disputes with other signatories.
Id (footnotes omitted).
He added that most recently the Center for Public Resources has sponsored a program to secure
a pledge from leading law firms to designate lawyers who will be knowledgeable about ADR and
"when appropriate" discuss such procedures with clients. Id. at 30 n.29 (citing A. DiResta, Law Firms
Adopt Policy Requiring Their Litigators to Explore ADR with Clients, LrTGATION NEWS 3 (Feb.
1993)).
56. See McNamara, supra note 23 at 461, 491. See also Day v. NLO, Inc., 147 F.R.D. 148
(S.D. Ohio 1993), vacated on other grounds, In re NLO, Inc., 5 F.3d 154 (6th Cir. 1993). In Day,
the court stated: "Crowded dockets, the increasing expense of litigation, and the trauma of trial for the
parties have forced the courts to develop innovative techniques to settle cases. One method this Court
has used with great success is the summary jury trial." Id. at 150.
57. See Judicial Survey Responses, supra note 24, Question 3a, at 4-5; see also Memorandum,
supra note 4, at 992:
The primary advantage of alternative dispute resolution is that it allows parties to
avoid the time and expense of formal court proceedings. Unfortunately, this benefit may
not be adequately publicized. Lawyers, business leaders, and government officials should
take the initiative in disseminating the important message that ADR achieves justice.
Id.
In the President's Council on Competitiveness' report, "Agenda for Civil Justice Reform in
America," the recommendation is that before a contest would be set for trial, the parties would attend
a mandatory conference to identify the areas in controversy. Id. At this conference, the parties would
be given the opportunity to resolve their claims through a variety of alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms, including early neutral evaluation, mediation, arbitration, minitrial, and summary jury
trial. Id. Note, however, that the recommendation does not suggest that parties be required to
participate in any particular ADR mechanism. Id. (proposed legislation has not, as yet, been adopted
by Congress.) See also McNamara, supra note 23, at 491-92 (main reason expressed for success of
SJT is that parties receive opinion of jury without time and expense of lengthy jury trial) (footnote
omitted).
58. See infra part II.B.2.
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1. The Settlement of Cases
Although statistics on the success of SJTs are somewhat sparse,59 the
available information indicates a fairly high chance of settlement. First, the
creator of the process, Judge Lambros, reports extremely high success rates.60 In
fact, the Senate Report on The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 quotes Judge
Lambros as saying that a full jury trial after a SJT is "almost always unnecessary
because the procedure fosters settlement of the dispute.",61 Second, the surveyed
judges who have conducted SJTs also reported an impressively high ratio of SJTs
to settlements. 62 The settlement figures for the Western District of Oklahoma

59.

See McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43, 49 (E.D. Ky. 1988). The court wrote:
It is true that to date we have only unscientific anecdotal evidence of the effectiveness
of summary jury trials. But not everything in life can be scientifically verified. I have
only unscientific anecdotal evidence that Hawaii is more beautiful than Covington
[Kentucky], but I intend to expend a considerable sum to go there as soon as I get the
chance.

Id.
60. See New AdversarialModel, supra note 13, at 800, where Judge Lambros reported:
Between 1983 and 1986, of 150 cases that were assigned by me to summary jury trial,
62 settled prior to the commencement of the procedure. Of 88 SJTs conducted, 82
ultimately resulted in settlements. Over 90% of the cases assigned to SIT settled. In
addition to the savings generated to individual litigants by avoiding a protracted jury trial,
the success rate of the SJT has had a significant effect on the use of the jury, and related
costs. As I described in my Report to the Judicial Conference of the United States,
Committee on the Operation of the Jury System, the savings aspects of SJT with respect
to the costs of jury service are substantial.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
Judge Lambros then described his calculation of the jury service savings and concluded:
My research indicated a savings associated with the processing of 60 Summary Jury Trials
of $90,730.00, or roughly $1,512.17 per case. This savings was based on not requiring
jurors to serve the total average number of days for a full jury trial plus the reduced
number of potential jurors initially required for voir dire.
Id.at 800-01 (footnotes omitted).
61.
S.REP. No. 416, supra note 12, at 28 (quoting from Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial -An Alternative Method of Resolving Disputes, 69 JUDICATURE 286 (1986)).
62. See JudicialSurvey Responses, supra note 24, Question 8, at 11. According to those judges,
the number of cases in which SJTs were used that settled after the SJT and before or during trial were
as follows: 30 (of33); 1 (of 1); 80% (of 27); 4 (of 5); 1 (of2); 10 (of 10); 4 (of4); 28 or 29 (of30);
all of them (of 10-15); 2 (of 2); 5 (of 6); 2 (of 2); 43 (of 53); 1 (of I); 1 (of 1);and 0 (of 1). Id.
(Although the pool of reporting judges is not statistically significant, it is quite likely that those judges
who have conducted the most SJTs and/or have the highest interest in the process were the ones who
responded.); see also Attorney Survey Responses, supra note 25, Question If,
at 3. Of those cases in
which the surveyed attorneys participated in SJTs, slightly more than half of them settled before or
during the subsequent trial. Id.(Again, however, this was an extremely small sample.)
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and the Western District of Michigan are impressive as well.63 Finally, there are
some reported individual examples of success.64
While the fact of settlement alone is beneficial to the litigants and the court
system, since SJTs are often used in cases where the trial time would be quite
lengthy, settlements after SJTs also oftenresult in significanttime and cost savings. 6

63. DONOVAN LEISURE NEWTON & IRVINE ADR PRACTICE BOOK 40 (John H. Wilkinson, Esq.
ed., Cum. Supp. 1992):
In the Western District of Oklahoma, 187 cases were referred to summary jury trial
between early 1983 and December 1989. Of those, 70 settled before the summary jury
trial was conducted. Of the remaining 117 cases, 79 settled prior to trial. For a more
complete account of the summary jury trial program in the Western District of Oklahoma,
see 8 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIGATION 83 (May 1990).
In federal court in the Western District of Michigan, almost 70 summary jury trials
have been held since 1983. Of these cases, 75 percent settled before the summary jury
trial; of the remainder, all but 2 settled before trial. 4 INSIDE LITIGATION 12 (Apr. 1990).
Id.
See also S. REP. No. 416, supra note 12, at 29. The Senate Report to The Judicial
Improvements Act of 1990 confirms the above statistics from the Western District of Michigan and
notes that Judge Enslen of that district stated that the mere scheduling of a summary jury trial results
in settlement before the scheduled summary jury trial date in 75 percent of the cases. Id.(quoting from
Enslen Written Statement, at 31-32).
64. See, e.g., Day v. NLO, Inc., 147 F.R.D. 148 (S.D. Ohio 1993), vacated on other grounds,
In re NLO, Inc., 5 F.3d 154 (6th Cir. 1995) (where the court described a successful summary jury trial
in an earlier case involving the same defendant and the same factual circumstances). The case involved
the Feed Materials Production Center ("FMPC") located in Fernald, Ohio, at which defendant National
Lead of Ohio, NLO was involved in certain aspects of developing and manufacturing nuclear weapons
for our country's armed services. Id.at 150. The court explained:
In a previous case, the residents around the FMPC brought suit alleging that NLO had
exposed them to radiation and other hazardous materials. In re Femald, Case No. C- 1-85149 (S.D. Ohio) (J. Spiegel). The residents claimed that they suffered emotional distress,
personal injury, and property damage by virtue of being a neighbor of the FMPC. The
Defendants in that case steadfastly refused to discuss settlement. In light of the prospect
of a lengthy and complex trial on the merits, this Court decided to hold a summary jury
trial in an effort to promote settlement. The Defendants argued in that case that the
proceeding should have been closed to the public. As will be discussed in more detail
later in this Order, we disagreed with the Defendants' argument and opened the summary
jury trial to the public. Following the summary jury trial, the two parties settled the In
re Femald case for $78 million.
Id.
65. See JudicialSurvey Responses, supra note 24, Question 3a, at 4. One surveyed judge
commented that two SJTs taking one and a half days each ended up saving a total of eight to nine
weeks of estimated trial time. Id.Another judge commented that a SJT had saved about two months
of complicated jury trial sessions. Id, Question 15, at 20; see also DONOVAN LEISURE, supranote 63,
at 39, describing a case where a significant amount of money was saved:
Texas Utilities Co. v. Santa Fe Industries, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 44 (D.N.M. 1985),
involved an antitrust challenge to a long-term agreement whereby Texas Utilities Co.
leased approximately 300 million tons of coal in New Mexico from Santa Fe Industries.
The damage claim was $250 million before trebling. The parties had spent approximately
$60 million on discovery since 1981, and it was estimated that trial and appellate costs
would be in the neighborhood of $200 million. Following a two-day summary jury trial,
however, the case settled on the basis of a new long-term agreement for the lease of the
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There are several reasons why summary jury trials can be, and usually are,
successful in stimulating such settlements. First, many judges consider them to
be fairly reliable predictors of trial results (and this view has been communicated
to lawyers practicing before them). Judge Lambros has clearly reached this
conclusion and has explained it in terms of how juries reach decisions.6 6 One of
Lambros' explanations as to why SJT verdicts are reliable and the decision-making
process of jurors is as follows:
The summary jury trial is an alternative that is intended for cases in
which settlement cannot be achieved because the parties have differing
perceptions of how the jury will evaluate the evidence. It brings the
facts of a case to life, and it isolates the key issues involved therein..
. the litigants are able to make an informed assessment of the strengths
and weaknesses of their respective positions.
Most jurors, however, reach their verdicts deductively; they
immediately latch onto a few fundamental premises and fit the facts
they perceive over the course of the trial to these premises. Most jurors
strive to reach verdicts which do not conflict strongly with cognitions
in place at the beginning of trial. Through careful inquiry into the
cognitions of the members of the advisory jury, counsel can use the
summary jury trial experience to predict a future reaction by a jury at
All participants should recognize that another jury
the actual trial ....

same amount of coal on less restrictive terms.
Judge West (W.D.Okla.) handled the summary jury trial in the New Mexico federal
court at the invitation of the Chief Judge of the New Mexico court. Judge West has
conducted 117 summary jury trials in his district. For a more complete account of this
summary jury trial, see 4 Alternative Dispute Resolution Report (BNA) 2 (Apr. 26, 1990).
Id.
See alsoMcKay, 120 F.R.D. at 49, where the court wrote (in a section entitled "Some Personal
Observations" at the end of the opinion):
In my own experience summary jury trials have netted me a savings in time of about
60 days and I have only used the procedure five times. It settled two of these cases that

were set for 30-day trials. It is true that I cannot prove scientifically that the cases would
not have settled anyway but my experience tells me they would not [citing footnote 191.

I do know that but for my making summary jury trials mandatory in these cases, they
would not have occurred. I know also that the attorney who objected to the first summary
jury trial he was required to participate in is now the biggest local fan of the procedure.
In the case at bar I am gambling a five-day summary jury trial against a six-week real
trial. Six to one is pretty good odds.

Id.
The court added:
I also don't know if other cases moved "up the queue" or not. In fact, I used the time

saved to work six days a week instead of seven for awhile, perhaps saving me from a
heart attack. This, too, was a benefit to the system. (At least I think so, although you
could probably find a few dissenters among the members of the local bar.). ...

Id. at 49, n.19.
66. See New AdversarialModel, supra note 13, at 799.
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would probably return a similar verdict if the case were to go to

trial.67
The surveyed judges' responses support this conclusion as well. When the
surveyed judges were asked whether they thought a SJT was a reliable indicator

of what the actual trial verdict would be, an overwhelming majority of the
responding judges stated that it was generally reliable. 68 This conclusion was
based on their own experience, or that of Judge Lambros, or that of other judges
they had heard about, or statistics. 69 They indicated that the evidence is the
same, the lawyers "have their best shot," and that the jury for the actual trial will
be drawn from the same source and in the same manner as the SJT jury.7" One
judge simply referred to a SJT as a "yardstick to measure settlements." 7' There
were a number of qualifications stated, however.7
When the surveyed judges who have conducted SJTs were asked whether, in
those cases that were tried after the completion of a SJT, the trial verdict differed

67. Id.at 799-800 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added); see also Report to JudicialConference,
supra note 14, at 9-10. Judge Lambros explained the reliability of SJT verdicts in yet another way:
The SJT can be an effective predictive process for ascertaining probability of results.
It is my perception that the sole bar to settlement in many cases is the uncertainty of how
a jury might perceive liability and damages. Such uncertainty often arises, for example,
in cases involving a "reasonableness" standard of liability, such as in negligence litigation.
No amount ofjurisprudential refinement of the standard of liability can aid the resolution
of such cases. Parties' positions during settlement negotiations in cases of this type are
based on an analysis of similar cases within the experience of counsel as to juries'
determinations of liability and findings of damages. Such comparison is usually of little
value, however, as parties tend to aimlessly grope toward some notion of a likely damage
award figure upon which to base their negotiating positions. The parties and the Court
may become frustrated in cases, especially where neither party wants to fully try the case
on the merits and the only roadblock to a meaningful settlement is the uncertainty of how
a jury might perceive liability and damages.
The half-day proceeding is designed to provide a "no-risk" method by which the
parties may obtain the perception of six jurors on the merits of their case without a large
investment of time or money ....

After preparation and presentation of the case at a SJT, the possibility of settlement
becomes much more real to both sides. Unreasonable demands and offers are reevaluated,
and mutually agreeable compromises are worked out in light of the jury's findings.
Id.
68. See Judicial Survey Responses, supra note 24, Question 29, at 44-45 (Twenty-one judges
said yes, five said no, and four others were unsure or did not have enough experience to reach a
definitive conclusion.).
69. Id.
70. Id, Question 29, at 44.
71. Id., Question 3a, at 4.
72. Id., Question 29, at 44-45. Some of the qualifications included: if the parties are given
sufficient time to adequately summarize their version of the case; if the parties have all actively
participated in good faith; it depends on the caliber of the attorneys; and there might be a difference
based upon the demeanor of live witnesses before a regular jury. Id.
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judges stated that they were
significantly from the SJT verdict, most of the
73
verdicts.
SJT
the
as
same
the
or
with
consistent
Comments by judges in reported cases and in information supplied to
attorneys by judges supports this conclusion about the reliability of SJT verdicts
as well. For example, the Sixth Circuit has referred to the SJT as a highly reliable
predictor of the likely trial outcome. 4 And in a case decided by Judge Lambros,
Caldwell v. Ohio Power Co.," he noted that the summary jury trial verdict in the
case had been for plaintiff in the amount of $2.5 million, while the actual trial
verdict was for plaintiff in the amount of $2.2 million. 6 Judge Lambros referred
7
to these verdicts as being "remarkably consistent" with each other. In addition,
one surveyed magistrate judge distributes an SJT information sheet to attorneys
listing "Accuracy of the result" as one of the advantages of the process and
explaining his conclusion.7"
Second, SJTs can stimulate settlements because the process often satisfies a
psychological need of the parties and/or their counsel for an in-court confrontation,
particularly since it involves a real jury.79 Judge Lanbros has written that the

73. Id., Question 9, at 12; see also Attorney Survey Responses, supranote 25, Question 1g, at
3. When the (few) surveyed attorneys who have participated in SJTs were asked whether, in those
cases that were tried after the SJT was completed, the trial verdict differed significantly from the SJT
verdict, most of them indicated that there were some significant differences. Id.
74. See Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co., 854 F.2d at 904.
75. 710 F. Supp. 194 (N.D. Ohio 1989).
76. Id.at 196, 202.
77. Id. at 202.
78. In responding to Question 10 of the judicial survey (regarding the basic SJT procedure used),
one responding magistrate judge (D. Neb.) attached a copy of the SJT information sheet he wrote to
distribute to lawyers. On that sheet he lists "Accuracy of the result" as one of the advantages of the
process, and includes the following explanation: "In those cases which have not settled following a
summary jury trial, but have instead gone to a 'real' trial, the actual verdicts following days of
testimony are remarkably similar to the verdicts of the summary juries." JudicialSurvey Responses at
supra note 24, at 5-6 n.2.
And in footnote two, page six, of the information sheet, the magistrate wrote:
For example, an article in the National Law Journal (6-10-85) points out two cases
as examples: a) A Chicago anti-trust case: SJT -- $27 million; Verdict (after a 7-week
trial) -- $24 million; b) Oklahoma fed. dist. court: SJT -- $219 thousand; Verdict (after
trial) -- ("within $10,000"). Consistency in defense verdicts was noted as well. Other
literature also appears to support this conclusion.
Id. at 6 n.2.
79. McKay, 12 F.R.D. at 50. District Judge Bertelsman explained:
[Tihe summary jury trial gives the parties a taste of the courtroom and satisfies their
When emotions run high,
psychological need for a confrontation with each other ....
whether between parties or attorneys, cases may not settle even when a cost-benefit
analysis says they should. A summary jury trial can provide a therapeutic release of this
emotion at the expenditure of three days of the court's time instead of three weeks. After
the emotions have been released the parties are more likely rationally to do the costbenefit analysis, and the case may then settle.
Id.
See also Myers & Armstrong, supra note 36 at 16. Attorney Barry Fish of Lewis and Roca, a
law firm in Phoenix, Arizona, and Superior Court Judges Daniel E. Nastro and Barry C. Schneider
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SJT works, among other reasons, because the parties "derive the satisfaction of
having their story heard."8 One surveyed judge wrote that a SJT satisfies the
psychological need of parties to ventilate pent-up emotions, and another stated that
it appears to give parties their day in court.8' And in the above-mentioned SJT
information sheet distributed by a surveyed magistrate judge, "Day in Court" is
listed as one of the advantages.82
Third, a SJT allows a party and his or her lawyer to see how a real jury will
view the case, which may alter their perceptions of it and lead to settlement.83
Judge Lambros has reported that SJTs work because the parties are generally more
receptive to settlement after they observe juror reactions to conflicting evidence
and sense the strengths and weaknesses of their respective cases.84 One surveyed
judge commented that summary jury trials should be used in federal courts because
they provide economical resolution of cases and they are philosophically satisfying
to the parties -- primarily because of their faith in the fairness of the jury

system.85

were quoted as stating that they think the summary jury trial will leave the parties feeling better about
their case and the judicial system than does mandatory arbitration, for example, because they get to
see and hear their case presented to a jury. Id. "One of the critical points here, whether it's small,
medium or large, is that the litigant, the parties, I think, really do feel they've had their day in court
before a jury of their peers," Fish said. Id."I think it's important that it's a jury and not a judge, and
I think that parties like to hear their counsel argue the very best their case can be and they're impressed
by it." Id.
80. See New AdversarialModel, supra note 13, at 799.
81. JudicialSurvey Responses, supra note 24, Question 3a, at 4-5.
82.
Supra note 78. In this SIT information sheet, the surveyed magistrate judge (D. Neb.)
describes the "Day in Court" advantage. Id. at 5. He states:
This technique gives the litigants an opportunity to air their grievances in a courtroom
before a judge and jury, and in a proceeding with all of the "trappings" of a real trial save
the actual presentation of testimony. As during a real trial, the parties must confront, both
rationally and emotionally, their opponent's case against them. The proceeding may raise
their anxieties because their previous negotiating positions will likely either be confirmed
or totally undermined by the verdict. The verdict is the considered judgment of six
impartial citizens selected in the same fashion as a real jury. Unless the proceeding is
somehow fatally flawed, there is little to justify speculation that repeating the drama for
real will yield significantly different results. Thus, parties may be in a better frame of
mind to settle the case after having subjected it to a summary proceeding.
Id.
83. JudicialSurvey Responses, supra note 24, Question 3a, at 4. One judge specifically stated
that he was able to get a couple of tough cases settled when the plaintiffs' presentation did not impress
the jury as much as plaintiffs felt it would. Id.; see also Question 21, at 27; Question 22, at 29; see
also Attorney Survey Responses, supra note 25, Question 2a, at 5 (Several attorneys stated that they
are generally or partly satisfied with the process because it gives them a feel for how a jury relates to
the facts.).
84. See New AdversarialModel, supranote 13, at 799.
85. Judicial Survey Responses, supranote 24, Question 21, at 27.
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Fourth, a SJT gives the parties a chance to see the costs and emotional stress
of an actual trial, as well as seeing the other side's case first hand.86 One judge

wrote that a SJT serves as a process of "reality therapy" for both attorneys and
clients."7
Finally, it provides one more step in the litigation process that acts as an
incentive to settle so that it can be avoided.8" One judge stated that even the
suggestion of a SJT has helped settle cases.89

2. Benefits of the Process Apart From Settlement
Even if a case does not settle after a SJT has been conducted it still yields
certain benefits. First, the process forces the parties to prepare for trial and may
make the actual trial more efficient.9" The court in Arabian American Oil Co.
v. Scarfione9' described this benefit as follows:
Even if the summary procedures do not culminate in settlement of the
case, the value of the summary trial in crystallizing the issues and the
proof is immeasurable to the later binding trial, to which all parties
come more fully prepared and rehearsed in their roles and the trial
procedure.92
Second (particularly since the lawyers discuss the process with the jurors at
the end of the SJT), it provides an opportunity for the lawyers and parties to learn
what a real jury views as the strengths and weaknesses of their case, as well as

McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 50. District Judge Bertelsman stated:
Summary jury trials also give the clients a chance realistically to appraise the cost and
emotional stress of an actual trial and require them to sit and listen to the other side's case
and see how a jury reacts to it. The summary jury trial may be the client's first
opportunity to look at the other side of the case first hand rather than through his or her
attorney. The attorney is often not in a position to give the client an objective view of
the merits. After all, he was hired as a gladiator not a diplomat.

86.

Id.
See also JudicialSurvey Responses, supranote 24, Question 3a, at 4-5 (One judge also noted
that a SJT lets a party compare their counsel with opposing counsel.).
87. Judicial Survey Responses, supra note 24, Question 3a, at 5.
88. See New AdversarialModel, supra note 13, at 799. Judge Lambros wrote:
The summary jury trial produces the same tensions present immediately prior to jury
trial. The shadow of an approaching summary jury trial will intensify the parties' efforts
toward settlement. Because clients and key figures with settlement authority are required
to attend the summary jury trial, the procedure is particularly effective where the legal
labyrinth begins to tax the patience of the litigants involved.
Id.
89. JudicialSurvey Responses, supra note 24, Question 40, at 69.
90. Id., Question 3a, at 4-5.
119 F.R.D. 448 (M.D. Fla. 1988).
91.
92. Id. at 449.
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perceived strategic errors. 93 Stated another way, it offers "a unique opportunity
to 'practice"' the case.94
C. Identification of the LitigatedIssues
and the Basic Uncertainties
Despite the benefits of the SJT process described above, however, serious
issues have arisen that threaten its continued use and effectiveness. The problems
mentioned by the surveyed judges,95 as well as those raised by scholarly
criticism, and those litigated in the courts, appear to fall into two categories: basic
issues threatening the use and effectiveness of the SJT, and other existing and
potential issues, which, while still important, merely impact upon it.96
As stated above, five basic issues threaten the future existence of the SJT.
The first issue is that, despite congressional legislation mentioning summary jury
trials and a recent amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") 16,"
the authority for conducting SJTs remains uncertain and there appears to be no
authority for mandating participation in a SJT over the parties' objections. The
second issue is that while courts regularly summon SJT jurors from their regular
jury pools, no actual rule or statute authorizes such a practice. The third issue is
whether SJTs should be treated as regular trials in terms of access to them by the
press and the public, or whether they should be treated as analogous to
confidential settlement discussions, as at least one court has held. 98 The fourth
issue is whether any information or strategies (not otherwise admissible) revealed
during the SJT process, or the SJT verdict itself, should be allowed to be used or
referred to in the actual trial or for any other purpose. For example, a SJT may
force a party to prematurely reveal his trial strategy or may be used by opposing
counsel merely as an additional discovery device. Finally, the fifth issue is about
whether sanctions should be applied to attorneys who violate SJT rules and, if so,
what the authority for such sanctions might be. Except for the fourth issue, these

93.
See JudicialSurvey Responses, supranote 24, Question 3a, at 4-5; see also Attorney Survey
Responses, supra note 25, Question 5, at 7 (one surveyed attorney wrote that he would participate in
a SIT voluntarily in the future since it cannot hurt and may even lead to settlement or a good read of
the trial strategy of opposing counsel).
94. See McNamara, supra note 23, at 492.
95.
See JudicialSurvey Responses, supra note 24, Question 21, at 28. In responding to the
question as to whether summary jury trials should ever be used in federal courts, some surveyed judges

responded negatively, expressing some general concerns about SJTs. Id. In responding to the question
as to the reasons why they have only been partly satisfied with the SIT process, judges described a

number of problems. Id. Question 3b, at 5-6.
96. Woodley, supra note 20 (discussing potential issues impacting upon the use of the SIT).
97. See The Civil Justice Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(6) (1988), and Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 16(c)(9), amended December 1, 1993.
98.
See Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co.. 854 F.2d at 904.
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issues (and others) were addressed in the survey sent to the federal district court
judges and magistrate judges. 99

III. ISSUES THREATENING THE USE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF SJTs
AND THE PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
The discussion below will address the issues threatening the use and
effectiveness of SJTs, and will propose solutions to them. Specifically, the
discussion will focus upon the need to clarify the authority for SJTs and create
authority for mandated participation in them, the need to create authority for
summoning SJT jurors, and the need to clarify the issues of access to SJTs, the
confidentiality and future use of SJT information and verdicts, and the general
appropriateness of, and the authority for, sanctions in the SJT context.
A. UncertaintyAbout the Authority for STs
and Lack of Authority for
Mandated Participationin Them
Despite the passage of The Civil Justice Reform Act, and the December 1,
1993 amendment to FRCP 16,'0 the authority for SJTs remains uncertain.
There is no direct, clear, uncontradicted authority for mandating participation in
them.
The United States Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of authority for
SJTs, and the lower courts that have considered it in passing have provided no
consistent guidance for trial court judges and practicing lawyers. Although a
number of law review articles have considered the issue of mandatory use of
SJTs, ' none have directly or completely addressed the more fundamental
question of whether SJTs, mandatory or consensual, are authorized under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, local federal district court rules, or the inherent
powers of the court. Nor do any of these articles make specific recommendations
with respect to creating or clarifying the authority for use of summary jury trials.
While the issue of mandated participation has received a fair amount of
attention in the courts, the results have been mixed. The Court has not ruled on
the issue, only one case has been decided since the passage of the Act and no
cases have been decided since the December 1, 1993 FRCP amendments. In
addition, most of the scholarly input on this issue, mentioned above, occurredprior
to the recent legislation and rule changes.
The discussion below includes a summary of the legal challenges to these
issues, a description of what judges have relied on as authority for SJTs and for
mandated participation of them, an analysis of the effect on these issues of the

99. See JudicialSurvey Responses, supra note 24, Questions 1-40, at 1-71.
100.
See discussion infra parts III.A. (c) and II.A.2(c) regarding legislative and rule changes.
101.
See discussion infra part III.A.2.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1995/iss2/1

22

Woodley: Woodley: Saving the Summary Jury Trial:
19951

Saving The Summary Jury Trial

passage of the Act and the FRCP amendments, and an argument for the need to
clarify the authority for SJTs and to create clear authority for mandating
participation in them.
1. Uncertain Authority for SJTs in General
For a number of years after the SJT was created, parties and federal district
court judges alike seem to have assumed that the federal courts had the authority
to conduct SJTs.
In 1984, the SJT's creator, Judge Lambros, explained to the Judicial
Conference his views on the basis for authorizing SJTs. In his 1984 report to the
Judicial Conference on the SJT, he explained that, in light of FRCP 1, the SJT
was within the court's pretrial powers pursuant to FRCP 16(a)(1), (5), (c)(1 1), and
the court's inherent power to manage and control its docket." 2 Judge Lambros
also wrote that the use of a SJT is consistent with FRCP 39(c) (re: advisory juries)
in any
and FRCP 83 (providing that district courts may regulate their practice
0 3
manner not inconsistent with the federal rules of civil procedure).1
(a) Legal Challenges
The few courts that have considered the issue of general authority for SJTs
have done so in passing. For example, in 1986, in Fraley by Fraley v. Lake
Winnepesaukah, Inc., ' the district court directed counsel for the parties to
confer and report to the court their interest in a SJT.' °5 The court stated that
pursuant to FRCP 16(c)(7), it would hear from counsel as to whether a SJT would
help in the disposition of this case.'0 6 No other discussion of the court's
authority for conducting this process was included.

102. Report to the Judicial Conference, supra note 14, at 10. Judge Lambros continued to
explain, as follows:
Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that the Rules, "shall be
construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." Rule
16(a), concerning pretrial activities, states, "In any action, the court may in its discretion
direct the attorneys for the parties and any unrepresented parties to appear before it for
a conference or conferences before trial for such purposes as (1) expediting the disposition
of the action . . . and (5) facilitating the settlement of the case."
Furthermore, the Rules recommend that settlement be discussed, as well as potential
alternatives to trial. Newly adopted Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(7) and (11) provide that "[t]he
participants at any conference under this rule may consider and take action with respect
to ... (7) the possibility of settlement or the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve the
dispute . . . and (11) such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action."
Id. at 10-11 (citations omitted).
103. Id. at 11.
104. 631 F. Supp. 160 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
105. Id.at 163.
106. Id.
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In 1988, several court decisions were issued that touched on the issue. In
Strandell v. Jackson County, °7 a Seventh Circuit decision, the general issue of
authority for SJTs was raised, but the court only decided that litigants may refuse
to participate in a SJT when ordered to do so by a district court judge.1 8 And
in that same year, three lower courts in other circuits"0 9 reached the opposite
conclusion on this narrow issue, which is discussed more fully below." 0
And in Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. v. General Electric Co.,"' another
1988 decision, the Sixth Circuit indicated, in dicta, that SJTs were authorized
either under Rule 16 or as a matter of the court's inherent power to manage its
cases. 1 2 The precise issue on appeal in that case was whether the first
amendment right of access attaches to the summary jury proceeding in this case,
In the course of its
and the appellate court concluded that it does not.'
discussion, the court did indicate the above-mentioned authority for SJTs," 4 but
this conclusion was not necessary to its opinion, and the issue had not been raised
below.
As stated above, the United States Supreme Court has not ruled on either the
issue of the authority for consensual SJTs or the issue of whether participation in
SJTs can be mandated.
(b) What Judges Have Relied Upon
When the surveyed judges were asked under what authority they have
conducted SJTs, the responses varied. These responses included reliance upon
local court rules or court orders, FRCP 16 and 39(c), the inherent power of the
court, and consent by the parties, as authority for conducting SJTs. "' Several
surveyed judges also indicated that they thought The Civil Justice Reform Act
authorized their use." 6
First, a number of the surveyed judges stated that the authority for conducting
SJTs was based upon local rule, or court order, in their districts."' While some
local rules were adopted prior to the passage of The Civil Justice Reform Act, the

107.

838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1988).

108.
Id.
109.
SeeArabian Am. OilCo. v. Scarfone, 119 F.R.D. 448 (M.D. Fla. 1988); McKay v. Ashland
Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1988); Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis v. Carey-Canada, Inc.,
123 F.R.D. 603 (D. Minn. 1988).
110.
See infra discussion in part III.A.2.(a).
111.
854 F.2d 900 (6th Cir. 1988).
112.
Id. at 903 n.4 (citing Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962) and Thomas D.
Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial A Report to the Judicial Conference of the United States, 103
F.R.D. 461, 469 (1984)).

113.

Id. at 902-03; see infra part III.C. for a more complete discussion of this case.

114.

Id. at 903 n.4.

115.

See JudicialSurvey Responses, supra note 24, Question 4, at 7.
Id.; see also discussion infra part IIA. 1(c) (regarding the effect ofthe passage of The Civil

116.

Justice Reform Act on this issue).
117. See JudicialSurvey Responses, supra note 24, Question 4, at 7.
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impetus provided by that act has led additional district courts to adopt local rules - or include provisions in their Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plans - with respect to SJTs. In creating these rules or provisions, the district courts

have tended to take one of two approaches: adopting a rule (or provision in their
Civil Justice and Delay Reduction Plan, pursuant to The Civil Justice Reform Act)

that merely allows SITs to take place and not specifying the circumstances, rules

or procedures for such an occurrence," 8 or adopting a rule specifically setting
forth in detail how and when SJTs will be conducted. 19
Second, some of the surveyed judges relied upon FRCP 16, and some
specifically mentioned subsections (a)(1), (5), and (c)(l1) (which is now
(c)(16)). 2
Federal Rule 16 provides, in pertinent part: "(a) Pretrial
Conferences, Objectives. In any action, the court may in its discretion direct the
attorneys for the parties and any unrepresented parties to appear before it for a
conference or conferences before trial for such purposes as (1) expediting the
disposition of the action;.... (5) facilitating the settlement of the case. ,2I
Other potentially relevant portions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16, as
amended on December 1, 1993, include:
(c) Subjects for Consideration at Pretrial Conferences. At any
conference under this rule consideration may be given, and the court

may take appropriate action, with respect to...

118. See N.D. ALA.PLAN, § IV.A; S.D. CAL. R. 37.1(f); D. CONN. R.36; CENT.D. ILL R. 1.4
(re: magistrate judges); S.D. ILL R. 34; N.D. IND. R. 53.2; S.D. IND. R. 16.1(d)(2)(J) (parties must
discuss the possibility of ADR in their Case Management Plan); D. KAN. R. 214; E.D. KY. R. 23;
W.D. KY. R. 23; E.D. LA. PLAN, Art. 4; M.D. LA. PLAN, Art. 4; W.D. LA. PLAN, § II.B.4 (parties
must discuss possibility with court at settlement conference); N.D. Miss. PLAN, § 5; S.D. MIss. PLAN,
§ 5; W.D. Mo. EARLY ASSESSMENT PROGRAM, § VII.B.5; D. NEV. R. 185; S.D. OHIO R. 53.1; N.D.
OKLA. R. 16.3(I); W.D. OKLA. R. 17(J); M.D. PA. R. 1010; W.D. TENN. R. 15(c); E.D. TEXAS PLAN,
Pt. 1, Art. 6(7); S.D. TEX. R. 20(B); W.D. TEX. R. CV-88(h). (The local rules of the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio used to include such a rule (17.02). But, Judge
Lambros did provide S-T participants with a copy of his HANDBOOK AND RULEs OF THE COURT FOR
SUMMARY JURY TRIAL PROCEEDINGS. On December 13, 1991, however, the Northern District of Ohio
adopted a Differentiated Case Management Plan. The local rules promulgated pursuant to that plan
contain fairly detailed provisions for both summary jury trials and summary bench trials. See Rules
7:5.1 through 7:6.3).
119. See D. MAss. R. 16.4(C)(3); W.D. MICa. R. 44; N.D. OHIO R. 7:1.1-7:5.3; M.D. TENN.
R.602; W.D. WASH. R. CR 39.1(e); CocansE COUNTY, ARIZ. SUPEI CT. R. 12; N.C. SuPER. CT. R.
23; N.C. DIST. CT. R. 23; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-576.1 (Miche 1988); WYO. R. CIr. P. 40; MINN.
STAT. § 604.11 (1992) (medical malpractice) (all authorizing SJTs); MICH. SUP. CT. ADMIN. ORDER
1988-2; N.H. SUPER. CT. R. 171; TEx. CODE § 154.026 (1987); WIS. CODE § 802.12 (1994) (all
authorizing SJTs and providing some details in their statutes or rules).
120. See JudicialSurvey Responses, supra note 24, Question 4, at 7. One judge suggested that
he had conducted SJTs under the authority of district court judges in Connecticut and the
recommendation of the U. S. Judicial Conference. Id.Attached to this judge's response was a copy
of the District of Connecticut's description of the SIT procedure. Id. Section III of this document
provides that a SIT is within a district court's pretrial power under Rule 16 in the inherent power to
control its docket. Id.
121.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a)(1), (5).
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(9) settlement and the use of special procedures to assist in
resolving the dispute when authorized by statute or local rule;...
(12) the need for adopting special procedures for managing
potentially difficult or protracted actions that may involve complex
issues, multiple parties, difficult legal questions, or unusual proof
problems; ... and
(16) such other matters as may facilitate the just, speedy, and
inexpensive disposition of the action.' 22
At least one of the attorneys for each party participating in any conference
before trial shall have authority to enter into stipulations and to make admissions
regarding all matters that the participants may reasonably anticipate may be
discussed. If appropriate, the court may require that a party or its representative
be present or reasonably available by telephone in order to consider possible
settlement of the dispute." '23
In addition, as mentioned above, Judge Lambros has relied upon Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 39(c) as a source of authority. 24 Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 39(c) provides:
(c) Advisory Jury and Trial by Consent. In all actions not triable of
right by a jury the court upon motion or of its own initiative may try
any issue with an advisory jury or, except in actions against the United
States when a statute of the United States provides for trial without a
jury, the court, with the consent of both parties, may order a trial with
a jury whose verdict has the same effect as if trial by jury had been a
matter of right. 2 '
The surveyed judges have also relied (or think they would rely) upon what they
refer to as the court's inherent power (to manage its own docket or to settle cases),
or the supervisory power of the court to administer its own docket, as authority
for conducting SJTs.'26
Other judges frankly acknowledged the lack of specific authority for SJTs but
had conducted them based upon their own decision, or the lack of objections from
the parties,127or the specific consent of the parties or counsel, or based upon
"cajoling.',

122. Cf FED, R. Civ. P. 1. Of course, this subsection mirrors the language of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 1, which states, in pertinent part: "These rules.., shall be construed and administered
to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." Id.

123. See FED. R. CIv. P. 16(c)(9), (12), (16). See also FED. R. CiV. P. 16(f), providing, inter
alia, for sanctions for parties' failure to obey a scheduling or pretrial order or to appear at a scheduling
or pretrial conference.
124. Report to the Judicial Conference, supra note 14, at 11.
125. FED. R. Crv. P. 39(c) (1937).
126.

See JudicialSurvey Responses, supra note 24, Question 4, at 7.

127.

Id. Question 4,at 7.
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Finally, as noted above, severaijudges commented that they thought the issue
was settled now by virtue of the passage of The Civil Justice Reform Act.' 28
One judge said the SJT was authorized by a District Plan pursuant to the Act.' 29
(c) The Effect of Recent Legislation
and Rule Changes
Although the combination of the passage of the Act and the recent
amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 might lead some to conclude
that clear authority exists for conducting SJTs, the effect of these is too uncertain
and tenuous to warrant such a conclusion.
First, as stated above, Section 473(a)(6) of the Act provides that in
formulating its civil justice expense and delay reduction plan, a district court "shall
consider and may include" the "(6) authorization to refer appropriate cases to
alternative dispute resolution programs that... (B) the court may make available,
including mediation, minitrial and summary jury trial."' The Senate Report to
The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 (which includes the Civil Justice Reform
Act of 1990) states:
The sixth and final binding principle or guideline of litigation
managementpertains to alternative dispute resolution. Section 473(a)(6)
authorizes each district court to refer appropriate cases to ADR
programs that have been designated for use in a district court or that the
court may make available, including mediation, minitrial, and the
summary jury trial.'
This provision is based on the committee's view that activejudicial
case management should encompass the exploration of alternative means
of resolving disputes. Some doubt has been raised as to whether the
Summary Jury Trial is an authorized procedure permissible in the
Federal courts. While the authority for a summary jury trial does
appear to lie in Rules 1 and 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and in the court's "inherent power to manage and control its docket,"
subsection (a)(6) eliminated any doubt that might exist in some
courts.",
Although the above-quoted legislative history seems to indicate that Congress
thought it was clearly authorizing SJTs, there are a number of difficulties with
reaching that conclusion based upon the language of the Act. First, the legislation
itself does not indicate on what basis SJTs may be authorized and does not contain

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id.
Id.
28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(6) (1988).
S. REP. No. 416, supra note 12, at 57.
Id.
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any specific rule or statutory provisions regarding them. Second, the Act merely
states that courts shall consider and may include such a program. Third, and
probably most important, the entire Act sets up a nationwide experiment designed
to reduce cost and delay and contemplates that more permanent, uniform changes
may be made after the Judicial Conference reports back to Congress by the end
of 1995. As stated above,' 33 the Act itself expires on December 1, 1997, and
will not bind district courts after that date. If the intent was to create clear,
permanent authority for conducting SJTs, the intent was not realized.
The other legislative change that occurred quite recently was the December
1, 1993 amendment to FRCP 16. Prior to the amendment, FRCP 16(c)(7) stated:
(c) Subjects to Be Discussed at Pretrial Conferences. The participants
at any conference under this rule may consider and take action with
respect to...
(7) the possibility of settlement or the use of extrajudicial
procedures to resolve the dispute.'34
Upon amendment, this provision became Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
16(c)(9), which now reads as follows:
At any
(c) Subjects for Consideration at Pretrial Conferences.
conference under this rule consideration may be given, and the court
may take appropriate action, with respect to...
(9) settlement and the use of special procedures to assist in
resolving the dispute when authorized by statute or local rule.'
The Advisory Committee Notes state, in pertinent part:
Paragraph (9) is revised to describe more accurately the various
procedures that, in addition to traditional settlement conferences, may
be helpful in settling litigation. Even if a case cannot immediately be
settled, the judge and attorneys can explore possible use of alternative
procedures such as mini-trials, summary jury trials, mediation, neutral
evaluation, and nonbinding arbitration that can lead to consensual
resolution of the dispute without a full trial on the merits. The rule
acknowledges the presence of statutes and local rules or plans that may
authorize use of some of these procedures even when not agreed to by
the parties. See 28 U.S.C. sections 473(a)(6), 473(b)(4), 651-58;
Section 104(b)(2), Pub. L. 101-650. The rule does not attempt to

133.
134.
135.

See Johnston, supra note 5.
FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(7) (1993).
FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(9).
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resolve questions as to the extent a court would be authorized to require
such proceedings as an exercise of its inherent powers.'36
Although this provision does appear to authorize SJTs, that authorization
appears limited to situations in which a statute or local court rule exists on the
subject. As discussed above, the only federal statute concerning SJTs -- Section
473(a)(6) of the Act -- does not provide clear, permanent authority for conducting
them. In addition, if the Act does not authorize SJTs and there is no judicial or
scholarly agreement about any other source of authority, what can the underlying
authority be for local court rules on the subject? And, in any event, since less
than a third of the federal districts have SJT rules, this amendment does not
provide any uniform or permanent authority either.
2. Lack of Authority for Mandating Participation
in SJTs
An additional issue with respect to the authority for conducting SJTs is
whether authority exists for mandating participation in them over the parties'
objections. Based upon the discussion below, it appears that there is no clear,
existing common law, statutory, or rule authority for such compelled participation.
And while there have been a number of law review articles written on the
subject,' 37 nearly all of them were written prior to the recent legislation and rule
changes, and most of them only analyze the first case that decided this issue:
Strandell v. Jackson County.' 8

136.
137.

FED. R. CIv. P. 16 (advisory committee's notes).
See, e.g., William E. Craco, Compelling Alternatives: The Authority of FederalJudges to
Order Summary Jury Trial Participation,57 FORDHAM L. REV. 483 (1988); Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.,
The Future of Summary Jury Trials in Federal Courts: Strandell v. Jackson County, 21 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 455 (1988); Paul Mattingly, Compelled Participation in Summary Jury Trials: A Tale of Two
Cases, 77 KY. L.J. 421 (1988-89); Nina Jill Spiegel, The Mandatory Summary Jury Trial in Federal

Court: Foundationally Flawed, 16 PEPP. L. REV. S251 (1989); Leroy J. Tomquist, The Active Judge
in Pretrial Settlement: Inherent Authority Gone Awry, 25 WaLLAMErrE L. REv. 743 (1989); Charles
F. Webber, Mandatory Summary Jury Trial: Playing by the Rules?, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1495 (1989);
Jennifer O'Hearne, Compelled Participation in Innovative Pretrial Proceedings, 84 NW. U. L. REV.
290 (1989); Anne C. Morgan, Thwarting Judicial Power to Order Summary Jury Trials in Federal
District Court: Strandell v. Jackson County, 40 CASE W. REs. L, REV. 491 (1989-90); Andrea M.

Kuntzman, Incongruity in the Seventh Circuit: Do Federal Courts Have the Authority to Order
Summary Jury Trials?, 6 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 131 (1990); Daniel K. O'Toole, The Catch-22
of Mandatory Summary Jury Trials, 1990 J. DISP. REsOL. 135 (1990); Bobby Marzine Harges, The
Promise of the Mandatory Summary Jury Trial, 63 TEMP. L. REV. 799 (1990); and Molly M.

McNamara, Summary Jury Trials: Is There AuthorityforFederalJudges to Impanel Summary Jurors?,
27 VAL. U. L. REV. 461 (1993).
138.
838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1988).
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(a) Legal Challenges
Of the courts that have fully considered the issue, two Circuit Courts of
Appeals have held that no authority exists for mandating participation in SJTs," 9
and three federal district courts have reached the opposite conclusion. 4 The
U.S. Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue. 4'
In 1988, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit was the first court
to decide the issue of mandated participation in SJTs. In Strandell,"'2 the court
held that FRCP 16 did not authorize mandated participation in SJTs. 43 The
court wrote that, at the trial level, after discovery was closed and the case set for
trial, the district court judge had suggested that the parties consent to a SJT. 44
The plaintiffs' attorney advised the court that he would not be willing to submit
his client's case to a SJT, but that he was ready to proceed to trial
immediately. 45 He claimed that a SJT would require disclosure of 21 privileged
witness statements that he had successfully protected previously under the workproduct doctrine.' 46 The district court rejected this argument and ordered the
parties to participate in a SJT.' 47 When the parties appeared for selection of the
jury for the SJT, plaintiffs' attorney again objected, and the court again overruled
his motion.' 48 The plaintiffs' attorney then declined to proceed with the jury
selection process, and the court consequently held him in criminal contempt for
refusing to proceed with the SJT. 49 At the criminal contempt hearing, the
plaintiffs' attorney reiterated his view that the court lacked the power to compel
a SJT, and argued that his clients' rights would be violated by participating in
The district court entered a criminal contempt judgment
such a proceeding.'
of $500 against the plaintiffs' attorney, and he appealed. 5'

139.
See Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1988); In re NLO, Inc., 5 F.3d 154
(6th Cir. 1993) (discussed infra). The Strandell case was the first decision on this issue, and the In
re NLO case is the most recent decision on it.
140.
See Arabian Am. Oil Co. v. Scarfone, 119 F.R.D. 448 (M.D. Fla. 1988); McKay v. Ashland
Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1988); Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis v. Carey-Canada, Inc.,
123 F.R.D. 603 (D. Minn. 1988) (discussed infra).
141.

See also New Adversarial Model, supra note 13, at 804. While the SJT's creator, Judge

Lambros, wrote in 1989 that compelled participation in SiTs was warranted under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 16 and local court rules, he also indicated his hope that any proposed legislation would
provide trial courts with the discretion to require participation in ADR activities. Id.
142.
838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1988).
143. Id. at 888.
144. Id at 885.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

149.
150.
151.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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The district court in Strandell had justified its decision to order a SJT by
noting that the trial in this case was expected to last five to six weeks, that the
parties were "poles apart in terms of settlement," and that SJTs had been used with
great success in such situations.52 The district court argued that it had the
power to mandate participation in a SJT based upon: (1) a resolution adopted in
1984 by the Judicial Conference of the United States which originally endorsed
SJTs "with the voluntary consent of the parties" but omitted this phrase in the final
draft;'5 3 (2) FRCP 16(a), which authorizes a court in its discretion to require
attorneys "to appear before it for a conference or conferences before trial for such
purposes as (1) expediting the disposition of the action... and... (5) facilitating
the settlement of the case" and 16(c), which provides that "[tihe participants at any
conference under this rule may consider and take action with respect to ... (7) the
possibility of settlement or the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve the
dispute... and... (11) such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the
action" (although acknowledging that "its discretion in this context is not
unbridled"); and (3) its obligations under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. Section
2072, noting that the Southern District of Illinois ranked second in the Seventh
Circuit and fourteenth in the country for case filings per judgeship.' 54
The Seventh Circuit in Strandell narrowly defined the issue on appeal as:
Whether a trial judge may require a litigant to participate in a SJT to promote
settlement of the case.'55 It did not specifically consider the issue of whether
authority exists generally for SJTs. The court first noted that a lower court's
power to control and manage its docket must be exercised in a manner that is in
harmony with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (created through the process
set forth in the Rules Enabling Act).' 56 It added: "Therefore, in those areas of
trial practice where the Supreme Court and the Congress, acting together, have
addressed the appropriate balance between the needs for judicial efficiency and the
rights of the individual litigant, innovation by the individual judicial officer must
conform to that balance."' 57 The court then reviewed the sections of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure cited by the lower court and concluded that they could
not be read as authorizing a mandatory SJT."' It stated: "In our view, while
the pretrial conference of Rule 16 was intended to foster settlement through the
use of extrajudicial procedures, it was not intended to require that an unwilling

152.

Id. (citing the district court's memorandum opinion, Strandell v. Jackson County, 115

F.R.D. 333, 334 (S.D. 111. 1987)).

153. Strandell, 838 F.2d at 885 (citing Strandell v. Jackson County, 115 F.R.D. 333, 335 (S.D.
I11. 1987) (quoting REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, COMMITEE ON THE OPERATION OF THE
JURY SYSTEM AGENDA G-13, at 4 (Sept. 1984) and REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 88 (Sept. 1984)).
154.
Strandell, 838 F.2d at 885-86 (citing Strandell v. Jackson County, 115 F.R.D. 333 (S.D.
I11. 1987), at 334-36).
155.
Strandell, 838 F.2d at 886.
156.
Id.
157.
Id. at 886-87.

158.

Id. at 887.
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litigant be sidetracked from the normal course of litigation.' 15 9 The court relied
upon advisory committee notes on these and other portions of FRCP 16, and noted

that their interpretation was consistent with two Seventh Circuit decisions decided
prior to the 1983 amendments affecting FRCP 16(c)(7),(11). "°
The Seventh Circuit also noted that the use of a mandatory SJT as a pretrial
settlement device would affect seriously the well-established rules concerning
discovery and work-product privilege.'61 It concluded that the Supreme Court
and the Congress could not have intended to allow the carefully-crafted balance
reflected in the discovery and work-product rules to be radically altered by a
mandatory SJT not even specifically mentioned in FRCP 16.162 It concluded by
stating: "If such radical surgery is to be performed, we can expect that the
national rule-making process outlined in the Rules Enabling Act will undertake it
in quite an explicit fashion."' 63 The court finally noted that crushing caseloads
of
and the Speedy Trial Act do "not permit the court to avoid the adjudication
64
cases properly within its congressionally-mandatedjurisdiction.'
The Seventh Circuit vacated the contempt judgment of the district court, on
the grounds that "the parameters of Rule65 16 do not permit courts to compel parties
to participate in summary jury trials.'

But three federal district courts have reached the opposite conclusion, holding
that authority exists for mandating participation in SJTs. The first of these
decisions was Arabian American Oil Co. v. Scarfone,166 decided less than three

159. Id.
160.
Id.at 887-88 (citing J.F. Edwards Constr. Co. v. Anderson Safeway Guard Rail Corp., 542
F.2d 1318 (7th Cir. 1976), holding that a district court could not use Rule 16 to compel parties to
stipulate facts to which they could not voluntarily agree); Identiseal Corp. v. Positive Identification
Sys., 560 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1977), holding that district courts lacked the power under Rule 16 to order
that a party undertake further discovery).
161.

Id. at 888 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3) and Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947)).

162.
Strandell, 838 F.2d at 888.
Id. (citing n.5 that legislation has been offered in Congress that would allow district courts
163.
to convene mandatory summary jury trials, citing H.R. REP. No. 473, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987),
133 CONG. REC. H157 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 1987) ('ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLLTION PROMOTION ACT

OF 1987'); SEN REP. No. 2038, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), 132 CONG. REC. S848 (daily ed. Feb.
3, 1986) ("ALTERNATIVE DIsP'TE RESOLUTION PROMOTION AT OF 1986")).
Strandell,838 F.2d at 888 (referring to Thermtron Prods. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336,
164.

344 (1976)). The court did not address the district court's argument that the 1984 Judicial Conference
resolution on SJTs gave it power to compel a SIT.
165. Id.; see also GOLDBERG, supra note 2. As stated in the teacher's manual:
One is led to wonder why the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit insisted on
a general ruling that mandatory summary jury trials are impermissible, when a far more
limited ruling geared to the specific facts of the case would have been available. The court
might have held that in this case where it had rejected the defendant's attempt to obtain
the 21 statements of witnesses secured by the plaintiffs on the ground that these
constituted work-product, it would reverse the judge's mandatory submission of the case
to a summary jury trial, since that would amount to an indirect way of giving the
defendant what the court had concluded it was not directly entitled to.
Id.at 140.
166.

119 F.R.D. 448 (M.D. Fla. 1988).
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months after Strandell. In Arabian American Oil Co., Defendant Robert Work
moved to excuse his participation in the SJT set by the court, alleging that there
was no possibility of settlement in the case, that even if settlement were possible
the settlement had to occur between the plaintiff and defendant, and that he wished
to avoid the expenditure of time and money that participation in the SJT would
require, relying upon the Strandell decision. 6
Another defendant, Jerry
Konidaris, filed a similar motion eight days later, adding that he was an individual
with limited financial resources who lives and works in Greece and that it would
be "absolutely meaningless and highly expensive for Konidaris to have to attend
a Summary Jury Trial through himself or through his counsel."' 68 The district
court denied the motions to be excused from participation in the SJT insofar as the
motions were based upon a suggestion that the court cannot require that parties
participate in such proceedings, rejecting Strandellas unpersuasive and not binding
precedent to that court.' 69
The court in ArabianAmerican Oil Co. based its decision upon its conclusion
that: "The obvious purpose and aim of Rule 16[(a)(1) and (5) and (c)(1 1)] is to
allow courts the discretion and processes necessary for intelligent and effective
case management and disposition. Whatever name the judge may give to these
proceedings their purposes are the same and are sanctioned by Rule 16. 07' ° The
court also pointed to the congested docket of the Middle District of Florida,
adding that that court had effectively utilized SJTs since 1985 and without it,
"opportunity for resolution is delayed, and, justice is denied."''
It also stated
that a SJT in this case would be a two-day investment on a real trial projected by
the parties to consume 210 courtroom hours, or seven courtroom weeks, and said:
"[1litigants are entitled to their day in court, but not, to somebody else's day."' 72
It noted the court's responsibility under Article Three of the United States
Constitution to promptly administer justice and its inherent jurisdiction to
determine, set, and use managementpolicies, and the benefits of the SJT procedure
in securing to civil litigants the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
their claims.'
The court concluded by finding the SJT to be a "legitimate
device to be used to implement the policy of this Court to provide litigants with
the most expeditious and just case resolution."' 74 (Like the Strandell case, this
case did not involve a local court rule expressly authorizing the use of SJTs.).

167.
168.
169.

Id. at 448 (citing Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1988)).
Arabian Am. Oil Co., 119 F.R.D. at 448 (quotes in original).
Id. at 449. (Note: it added that any contention that individual defendants should be

excused from participation based on reasons, such as inability to appear for financial reasons, should
be addressed by the magistrate before whom the summary trial is scheduled.).
170.

Id. at 448.

171.
172.

Id. at 448-49.
Id. at 449.

173.
174.

Id.
Id.
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In McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc.,"' decided just four days after Arabian
American Oil Co., the court overruled the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration
of the setting of a SJT over the plaintiffs' objection. The motion for
reconsideration had been filed promptly after the Seventh Circuit's Strandell
decision. In this case the SJT was to be limited to five days, and if it failed, the
trial was set to last six weeks.' 76 The court first held that, unlike the Strandell
case, a valid local rule existed here which allowed trial judges to require
participation in SJTs. 1 ' It quoted the applicable rule, Local Rule ("LR") 23 of
the Joint Local Rules for the United States District Courts of the Eastern and
Western Districts of Kentucky, as follows: "A judge may, in his discretion, set any
civil case for summary jury trial or other alternative method of dispute
resolution." 7 8
In a footnote, the judge pointed out that although some argument might be
made that this rule is ambiguous with regard to whether a SJT may be mandatory,
he was the drafter and, therefore, had personal knowledge that the intent was to
afford trial judges full authority to employ SJTs and other methods of alternate
dispute resolution.'79
The court then discussed the issue of whether the adoption of this local rule
fell within the authority of FRCP 83, which allows district courts to "make and
8
It stated
amend rules governing its practice not inconsistent with these rules."'
that there could be no doubt that LR 23 is valid under FRCP 83, since far greater
intrusions into the autonomy of trial lawyers and parties have been upheld under
the aegis of FRCP 83, and that the Supreme Court has recently commented that
district courts have the power to enact local rules necessary for the courts to
82
conduct their business.' 8 ' The court cited examples of local rules upheld,'
including those authorizing district judges to refer certain cases to mandatory
mediation and impose costs if the party did not better the evaluation of the
mediators by ten percent after trial; 8 ' those providing for routine reference of
cases to mandatory nonbinding arbitration; 4 those providing for the imposition
of costs as a sanction for last-minute settlements entered into after the taxpayers
have incurred the expense of bringing in the jury;' 85 and a local rule providing

175.

120 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1988).

176.

Id. at 44.

177.
178.
179.

Id. at 46.
Id. at 44.
Id. at n.3.

180.

Id. at 44.

Id. at 45 (citing Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641, 645 (1987)).
181.
182. McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 45-46.
Rhea v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 767 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1985).
183.
184. See, e.g. Davison v. Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore, Inc., 462 F. Supp. 788 (D.Md. 1978), aff'd,
617 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980); See also New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Hughes, 556 F. Supp.
712 (E.D.Pa. 1983); Kimbrough v. Holiday Inn, 478 F. Supp. 566 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
185. White v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 783 F.2d 1175 (4th Cir. 1986); Eash v. Riggins Trucking,
Inc., 757 F.2d 557 (3rd Cir. 1985).
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for civil jury trials by juries of six, at a time when this was an innovation.'86
The court concluded by stating:
A summary jury trial is far less intrusive into the independence of the
trial lawyer or litigant than the local rules upheld by the above
authorities. No presumption of correctness attaches to the verdict of the
summary jury, nor is any sanction imposed for failure to accept its
advisory verdict. It is merely a useful settlement device. It may require
an expenditure of time and preparation but so do pretrial orders,
memoranda, conferences, marking of exhibits, etc. In no way is the
summary jury trial 'outcome-determinative' under the Supreme Court's
Colgrove test."'
Therefore, the court in McKay concluded that the local rule in effect was
valid. '8
Despite this conclusion, the court went on to analyze the issue under the
inherent power and FRCP strands of the Strandell decision. The court in McKay
stated that in its opinion, the trial court opinion in Strandell expresses the better
view.'89 It pointed out that a trial court's requiring participation in a SJT is all
but expressly authorized by FRCP 16(a)(5), (c)(7), (10), (11). 190 It added that
certainly the SJT procedure is not in conflict with these provisions, which
authorize the trial court to "take action" with regard to "the use of extrajudicial
procedures," special procedures for complex cases, and "such other matters as may
aid in the disposition of the action."' 9' Further, the court stated, FRCP 16(f)
authorizes the court to compel attendance at pretrial conferences, and this has been
held to apply to settlement conferences.192 In addition, FRCP 83 provides in its
last sentence: "In all cases not provided for by rule, the district judges and
magistrates may regulate their practice in any manner not inconsistent with these
rules or those of the district in which they act."' 93 The court added that SJTs
may be used as an extended pretrial conference to clarify the issues for the trial
judge, with laymen sitting in and giving their reactions.'94
What the court in McKay found most persuasive, however, is the fact that the
Judicial Conference of the United States had passed a formal resolution endorsing
the experimental use of SJTs as a potentially effective means of promoting
settlements.' 95 It stated that the Judicial Conference was well aware that SJTs

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973).
McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 46.
Id.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 48.
Id.
Id. at 48 n.15 (citing Lockhart v. Patel, 115 F.R.D. 44 (E.D. Ky. (1987)).
McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 48.
Id.
Id.
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were not expressly authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and
language limiting the resolution to SJTs held "only with the voluntary consent of
the parties" had purposely been deleted from a previous draft.' 96 The court
concluded that it was apparent that the Judicial Conference believed that
mandatory SJTs were authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 97
Finally, the court in McKay concluded that the Seventh Circuit's concern (in
Strandell)with violation of privilege or protection of work product also seemed
misplaced since "it is hard to see how anything would be disclosed by a SJT that
would not be disclosed at the real trial and would not already be contained in the
pretrial order, which is also an overview of the real trial."' 98 The court also
concluded that mandatory SJTs would seem to be within the inherent power of the
court,' 99 making reference to the scholarly discussion of the court's inherent
powers in Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc.2"'
The court in McKay therefore held that participation in a SJT "may be
mandated by trial courts in their discretion even aside from the existence of a local
rule," and that where a local rule exists the power of the court is even clearer.2 '
In Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis v. Carey-Canada, Inc.,202 the
magistrate also overruled the parties' objections to participation in a court-ordered
SJT.20 3 It concluded, that in light of the court's inherent power to manage and
control its docket, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 1 and 16, and Local Rule 3
of that court, that the court possessed the authority to compel participation and
attendance in a SJT.2 4
In FederalReserve Bank, the parties objected to the setting of a three-day
SJT on the following grounds: (1) the process was too expensive, as it would cost
each party approximately $50,000; (2) the SJT would not be an accurate synopsis
of a jury trial because several major evidentiary rulings would not be made by the
trial judge until the last week in December, whereas the SJT was to take place
December 12-14; (3) the parties were truly at loggerheads and the possibility of
settlement was extremely remote and advancement to trial definite; and (4) the SJT
process would use valuable trial preparationtime without contributing significantly
to clarification of issues or attorney preparation for trial.2"5
The opinion first points out that the Supreme Court has long acknowledged
the inherent power of the court to control and manage its docket, a power not
dependent upon any express statute or rule conferring it.2"6 After listing the

196.

Id.

197.

Id.

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id.
Id. at 48 n.17.
757 F.2d 557 (3rd Cir. 1985).
McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 49.
123 F.R.D. 603 (D.Minn. 1988).
Id. at 608.

204.

Id. at 604.

205.
206.

Id.
Id. (citing Link v. Wabash, 370 U.S. 626 (1962)).
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benefits of SJTs in eliminating barriers to settlement, the magistrate discussed the
existing authority outside its jurisdiction on whether courts can mandate SJTs.2" 7
The magistrate adopted the reasoning of the courts in McKay and Arabian
American Oil Co., and disagreed with that in the Strandell decision. It pointed out
that contrary to the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Strandell that compelled

participation would result in litigants' loss of their right to proceed to trial and
forced courthouse settlements, the parties in that case were not denied their right
to trial altogether or informed that a SJT was the only allowable mechanism of
adjudication for resolution of their dispute.2"8 In addition, the Seventh Circuit's
concern about the violation of privilege or work product was misplaced since
anything that would be disclosed at a SJT would ultimately be disclosed at the
10
as
actual trial.20 9 The magistrate also rejected the Heileman decision
inapplicable to this case since LR 3 specifically allows the court to order parties
to attend pretrial conferences (as opposed to only attorneys and unrepresented
parties), and as premature since the panel opinion had been withdrawn, and the
matter reheard en banc with the disposition yet pending.2 '
In addition, the magistrate relied upon FRCPs 1, 16(a)(1), (5), (c)(7), (11),
and its own LR 3(A), which provides that "eachjudge may prescribe such pretrial
and discovery procedures as the judge may determine appropriate," and LR 3(C),
which provides that "each judge, on their own initiative, on motion of any party
to an action, or by stipulation of the parties, may order the attorneys and the
parties to appear for a pretrial conference to consider the subjects specified in

Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 123 F.R.D. 603, 605 (D.Minn.
207.
1988) (citing McKay v. Ashland Oil Co., 120 F.R.D. 43 (E.D.Ky. 1988)); Arabian Am. Oil Co. v.
Scarfone, 119 F.R.D. 448 (M.D.Fla. 1988); cf Rhea v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 767 F.2d 266 (6th Cir.
1985); Strandell v. Jackson County, Illinois, 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1987); G. Heileman Brewing Co.
v. Joseph Oat Corp., 848 F.2d 1415, reh'g granted (7th Cir. 1988).
208. Id. at 605-06.
209. Id. at 606.
210. G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 848 F.2d 1415 (7th Cir. 1988) (reversing
the lower court's decision sanctioning the corporate defendant for failing to send a representative
besides its attorney to a settlement conference as ordered).
FederalReserve Bank of Minnesota, 123 F.R.D. at 606. Upon rehearing en banc, the
211.
Seventh Circuit held, in G. Heileman Brewing Co, 871 F.2d at 656-57, that the district court was
entitled to order a represented litigant to appear before it in person at a pretrial conference for the
purpose of discussing settlement of the case, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
imposing sanctions upon the corporation for failing to comply with such order.
Cf.FED. R. Civ. P. 16 (after the G. Heileman Brewing Co. decision, FED. R. CIv. P. 16 was
amended to specifically allow such an order). The last paragraph of FED R. Civ. P. 16(c) now states:
At least one of the attorneys for each party participating in any conference before trial
shall have authority to enter into stipulations and to make admissions regarding all matters
that the participants may reasonably anticipate may be discussed. If appropriate, the court
may require that a party or its representative be present or reasonably available by
telephone in order to consider possible settlement of the dispute.
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FRCP 16, or other matters determined by the judge."2" 2 The magistrate added
that SJTs are consistent with FRCP 39(c) and 83.213 It pointed out that the 1983
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were intended to promote
case management, of which settlement is a valuable tool, and that the Judicial
Conference of the United States had passed a formal resolution endorsing the use
of the SJT as a potentially effective means of promoting settlement (knowing there
was no specific authorization for them in the rules, and deliberately deleting the
consent language). 2 4 Therefore, the magistrate concluded that compelled
attendance and participation in SJTs was consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 1 5
Finally, the magistrate addressed the parties' concerns as follows: (1) an
investment of time and money for a three-day SJT when compared to a potential
real jury trial lasting four-to-six courtroom weeks is reasonably proportionate; (2)
even if the SJT procedure does not lead to settlement, it will be of substantial
benefit in this case by clarifying issues for trial, both for the parties and the court;
(3) the pending evidentiary motions will have no effect since because of the
nonbinding nature of the SJT procedure, evidentiary rules are more flexible than
in an actual jury trial -- and, in any event, this court could decide crucial
evidentiary issues for the purpose of the SJT proceeding; (4) any concerns about
the potential for premature publicity and public disclosure as a result of the SJT
21 6
can be alleviated by this court's agreement to close the SJT to the public.
21
Therefore, the parties' objections to participation in the SJT were overruled.
21 8
In 1993, in the In re NLO, Inc. case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit granted a petition for writ of mandamus vacating a district court
order requiring a SJT.219 This case was a class action brought against NLO on
behalf of all NLO employees, subcontractors and employees of sub-contractors,
who were present for a specific period of time at the Feed Materials Production
Center in Fernald, Ohio, a uranium processing facility owned by the United States
and managed by NLO. 22' The plaintiff class claimed that NLO had intentionally
or negligently exposed them to hazardous levels of radioactive materials,

212.

Federal Reserve Bank of Minnesota, 123 F.R.D. at 606-07. See also FED. R. CIV. P. 1,

16(a)(1), (5), (c)(7), (11); 7th Cir. R. 3(A).
213. Federal Reserve Bank of Minnesota, 123 F.R.D. at 607.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216.

Id.

217.

Id. at 608. See also Home Owners Funding Corp. of Am. v. Century Bank, 695 F. Supp.

1343, 1347 n.3 (D.Mass. 1988). (The court, without discussion, stated that it had the power to order
a SJT pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 16 (citing McKay v. Ashland Oil Co., 120 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky.
1988); Arabian Am. Oil Co. v. Scarfone, 119 F.R.D. 448 (M.D. Fla. 1988); but see Strandell v.
Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884, 888 (7th Cir. 1988)).
5 F.3d 154 (6th Cir. 1993).
218.
219.

Id. at 160.

220.

Id. at 155.
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increasing their risk of cancer and subjecting them to emotional distress.2"' The
district court ordered all parties to participate in a SJT, which would be open to
the media and the public, and enforceable by sanctions against counsel for
anything less than full participation.222 NLO moved for a reconsideration of this
ruling or, in the alternative, for interlocutory appeal, and the district court denied
this motion.2 3 NLO filed a petition for mandamus in the Sixth Circuit,224
seeking emergency review of the court's order denying its motion for
225
An emergency panel granted a stay and set the case for oral
reconsideration.
226
argument.
In vacating the SJT order, the Sixth Circuit rejected several previouslyasserted bases of authority for SJTs. The Court first noted that although the
district court had relied upon Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co.,227 as permitting
the power to compel
compulsory SJTs in the Sixth Circuit, the issue 22of
8
case.
that
in
addressed
squarely
not
was
participation
Second, the court stated that while district courts "unquestionably have
substantial inherent power to manage their dockets," that power "must be exercised
229
in a manner that is in harmony with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." 20
The Court focused on FRCP 16 and, relying upon the decision in Strandell,
as well as the language of FRCP 16 and the corresponding Advisory Committee
Notes, held that Rule 16 does not permit compulsory participation in settlement
proceedings such as SJTs.23 It added that requiring participation in a SJT,
where such compulsion is not permitted by the Federal Rules, is "an unwarranted
extension of the judicial power., 212 (Note, however, that the version of FRCP

Id.
221.
222. Id.at 156.
Id. at 155.
223.
224. Id. The petition for writ of mandamus also sought a writ vacating the district court's order
certifying a class under FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2), and the Sixth Circuit denied that portion of the
petition. Id. at 159-60.
Id. at 155.
225.
226. Id.
854 F.2d 900 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033 (1989).
227.
228. In re NLO, 5 F.3d at 156-57.
229. Id.at 157.
838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1987).
230.
231. In re NLO, 5 F.3d at 157.
232. Id. at 157-58 (footnotes omitted). At the time of this decision, September 17, 1993, the
applicable portions of Rule 16(c) were:
The participants at any conference under this rule may consider and take action with
respect to .. .(7) the possibility of settlement or the use of extrajudicial procedures to
resolve the dispute; .. .(10) the need for adopting special procedures for managing
potentially difficult or protracted actions that may involve complex issues, multiple
parties, difficult legal questions, or unusual proof problems ....
Id. at 157.
See also FED. R. CIv. P. 16(c)(12); FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(9). In the amendments taking effect
December 1, 1993, however, while FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(10) remains the same (although it has been
renumbered and is now (c)(12)), FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(7) has been altered. It is now FED. R. CIv. P.
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16(c) in effect at the time of this decision was altered several months later when
the most recent amendments to the federal rules took effect on December 1,
1993.).233 The court added, in a footnote, that Congress has considered on

several occasions a specific grant of such compulsory authority to district courts,
none of which has passed."' It stated that Section 473(a) of the Civil Justice
Reform Act of 1990 permits district courts to consider "'principles and guidelines
of litigation management and cost and delay reduction,' including referral of

appropriate cases to alternative dispute resolution programs that 'the court may
23

make available,' such as summary jury trials, Section 473(a)(6)(B). 1
However, it pointed out that in Section 473(b), the court is authorized to require
participation in several techniques developed from these principles and guidelines
and SJTs are not mentioned.236 It noted that an alternate bill23 7 would have
amended 28 U.S.C. Section 473(a) to permit courts to mandate such alternative
dispute resolution techniques as SITs, but this bill did not pass.23 8 In addition,
the court pointed out that several recent bills have encouraged use of alternative

16(c)(9) and it reads: "(9) settlement and the use of special procedures to assist in resolving the dispute
when authorized by statute or local rule; .
FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(9).
233. See supra note 228.
234. In re NLO, 5 F.3d at 158 n.1 (6th Cir. 1993) (citing Strandell, 838 F.2d at 888 n.5).
235. Id.
236. Id. See also The Civil Justice Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 473(b) (1988). Section 473(b)
states:
(b) In formulating the provisions of its civil justice expense and delay reduction plan, each
United States district court, in consultation with an advisory group appointed under
section 478 of this title, shall consider and may include the following litigation
management and cost and delay reduction techniques:
(1) a requirement that counsel for each party to a case jointly present a discoverycase management plan for the case at the initial pretrial conference, or explain the reasons
for their failure to do so;
(2) a requirement that each party be represented at each pretrial conference by an
attorney who has the authority to bind that party regarding all matters previously
identified by the court for discussion at the conference and all reasonably related matters;
(3) a requirement that all requests for extensions of deadlines for completion of
discovery or for postponement of the trial be signed by the attorney and the party making
the request;
(4) a neutral evaluation program for the presentation of the legal and factual basis
of a case to a neutral court representative selected by the court at a nonbinding conference
conducted early in the litigation;
(5) a requirement that, upon notice by the court, representatives of the parties with
authority to bind them in settlement discussions be present or available by telephone
during any settlement conference; and
(6) such other features as the district court considers appropriate after considering
the recommendations of the advisory group referred to in section 472(a) of this title.
237.
S.2027, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (1990).
238. In re NLO, 5 F.3d at 158 n.l.
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dispute resolution and all of them have referred to SJTs as an option available to
willing litigants.239
Third, the court held that mandatory participation in SJTs cannot be based
on the pure inherent authority of the court, rejecting the reliance upon this
rationale by the court in McKay,24 and by Judge Lambros in his writings.24
Some of the cases mentioned above have relied, at least in part, upon the 1984
resolution adopted by the Judicial Conference, in which it endorsed the
experimental use of SJTs. However, it is unclear whether the approval extended
to mandated participation in them.242
Finally, there have also been legal challenges in state courts in analogous
circumstances, such as the mandatory use of other ADR devices in courthouse
settings. In a state case decided in the same month as In re NLO, Inc., Twitty v.
Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co.,243 the court reached the opposite
conclusion. It held that the court has inherent power to order the parties to
participate in a non-binding SJT.244 The court stated:

239. Id. (referring to H.R. 4150, 2306(b)(6) 102nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); S. 2217, 2306(b)(6)
102nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); H.R. 4155, 7(b)(6) 102nd Cong. 2d Sess (1992); S. 2180, 7(b)(6) 102nd
Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). (No action was taken on S. 2180, which was introduced on February 4, 1992,
as the Access to Justice Act of 1992. It'was reintroduced on March 16, 1993, as S. 585 and no action
had been taken as of September 2, 1994.).
240.
120 F.R.D. 43, 48 (E.D. Ky. 1988).
241.
In re NLO, 5 F.3d at 158 (referring to Thomas D. Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial, and
Other Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution: A Report to the Judicial Conference of the United
States, 103 F.R.D. 461, 469 (1984)).
242. See McNamara, supra note 23, at 477 n. 116:
The initial draft of the 1984 Judicial Conference Resolution provided: "RESOLVED, the
Judicial Conference endorses the use of summary jury trial, only with the voluntary
consent of the parties, as a potentially effective means of promoting the fair and equitable
settlement of lengthy civil jury trials." REP. OF JUDICIAL CONF. COMM. ON THE
OPERATION OF THE JURY SYsTEM AGENDA 6-13, Sept. 1984, at 4.

The final draft,

however, omitted the language regarding voluntary consent and stated: "RESOLVED, that
the Judicial Conference endorses the experimental use of summary jury trials as a
potentially effective way of promoting the fair and equitable settlement of potentially
lengthy civil trials." REP. OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONF. OF THE UNITED

STATES, Sept. 1984, at 88. But see infra note 122 (arguing that the change in language
did not change the meaning of the resolution) ....
Id. See also Id. at 478 n.122:
The term "experimental use" includes the notion of voluntariness, as is emphasized by the
conference's refusal to include the word "mandatory" in its final resolution. [citing Nina
J. Spiegel, Mandatory Summary Jury Trial in Federal Court: Foundationally Flawed, 16
PEPP. L. REV. S251, at S263 (1989).] But cf [DISPUTE RESOLUTION DEVICES IN A
DEMOCRATIC SocwET, 6 (Roscoe Pound Foundation), at 43] (arguing that by endorsing
the experimental use of SJT, the Conference rejected the suggestion that SJT be used only
when the parties voluntarily agree to it).
Id.
243.
16 Pa. D. & C. 4th 458 (C.P. of Philadelphia County 1993).
244. Id. at 459. The Court relied primarily on broad and analogous Pennsylvania statutes and
procedural rules, but also referred to the then pending amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
16(c). Id. at 464-67. (See the discussion below.).
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Conducting a summary jury trial using jurors in the service of the
Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas does not constitute an obstruction
of justice, the misuse of a jury, or the deprivation of Mr. Twitty's right
to a jury trial. In fact, the overwhelming use and commendation of the
summary jury trial as a tool for dispute resolution -- both on the federal
and state levels -- points the other way.245

In a situation that is arguably analogous, such as mandatory nonbinding

arbitration,246 many cases have upheld required participation.247
(b) What Judges Have Relied Upon

It would appear from the responses of many of the surveyed judges, that their
lack of comfort in ordering lawyers to participate in a SJT in the face of opposing
case law and less than clear authority for doing so has'led to the under-utilization
of this settlement device.248
A number of the surveyed judges have not conducted any SJTs at all because
they have been unable to convince lawyers to consent to the process.2 49 Of
those judges who hlave conducted SJTs, very few of them have ever ordered one
over the parties' objections.250 The judges are clearly concerned about the
controversial nature of such a decision in light of the lack of clear authority for
"
Some of the reasons judges gave for refusing to compel
'
doing so. 25

Id. at 467.
245.
See McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 45 (describing a SJT as "essentially nonbinding arbitration with
246.
an advisory jury instead of arbitrators").
247. See, e.g., Davison v. Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore, Inc., 462 F. Supp. 778 (D.Md. 1978), aff'd,
617 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980).
See also New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Hughes, 556 F. Supp. 712 (E.D. Pa. 1983);
Kimbrough v. Holiday Inn, 478 F. Supp. 566 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Mckay, 120 F.R.D. at 45; cf also Rhea
v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 767 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1985) (upholding a local rule authorizing district
court judges to refer certain cases to mandatory mediation and impose sanctions if a party does not
better the evaluation of the mediators by ten percent after trial).
248. See Judicial Survey Responses, supra note 24.
249. Id., Question 16, at 21-22; Question 18, at 24.
250. Id., Question 14, at 19. (Only four of nineteen judges said they had ordered a SJT over
the parties' objections.).
251.
Id., Question 14, at 19; Question 35, at 58. One judge wrote that when his district first
began experimenting with SJTs parties were ordered to participate so the court could get a feel for the
process. Id., Question 14, at 19. This was done under the court's inherent authority to manage its
caseload. Id. Now it would be rare for him to order an objecting party to participate. Id. But, he
added, in the circumstances of a lengthy trial, with relatively simple facts, and parties whose settlement
postures are quite disparate, he would seriously consider doing so. Id.
Another judge who has compelled participation in SJTs wrote that after the Civil Justice Reform
Act of 1990, mandating participation may be less controversial. He added that an attorney might be
more likely to challenge it in a district where the trial judge did not create it. He also stated that it does
not help to challenge the SJT order and annoy the judge unless the attorney is willing to go to the
Court of Appeals. Id.
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participation in SJTs were: it would cause the process to lose its psychological
impact and credibility; you need willing participants for it to work; and since it
is only a settlement vehicle it cannot be forced on parties.252 Of those judges
who have compelled participation, one said that there was very little question of
it, and another stated that upon completion of the SJT, the objecting parties
endorsed the SJT as "the greatest thing since sliced bread."25
However, largely due to the impetus provided by the Civil Justice Reform
Act of 1990, a number of jurisdictions now have adopted rules -- or provisions in
their Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan -- with respect to SiTs.254
Of the twenty-five district courts with rules merely allowing SJTs to occur (and
not providing any detailed procedures for conducting them), fifteen allow the court
to order the SJT over the parties' objections.255 Of the five district courts with
detailed SJT rules, three of them allow mandated participation in SJTs.256
(c) The Effect of Recent Legislation
and Rule Changes
The issue of authority for mandated participation in SJTS has not been settled
by the passage of The Civil Justice Reform Act or the December 1, 1993
amendment of FRCP 16.
Section 473(a)(6) of The Civil Justice Reform Ac2 cannot be viewed as
providing authorization for mandated participation in SJTs for at least five reasons.
First, the language itself does not explicitly address this issue. Section 473(a)(6)
provides only that any civil justice delay reduction plan must consider and may
include authorization to refer appropriate cases to ADR programs that the court
may make available, specifically mentioning SJTs.258 This section does not

252.
253.

Id., Question 14, at 19.
Id.

254.

See supra note 124.

255.

See S.D. CAL.R. 37.1(0; S.D. ILL. R. 34; E.D. KY. R. 23, W.D. KY. R. 23; E.D. LA.

PLAN, Art. 4; W.D. Mo. EARLY ASSESSMENT PROGRAM, VII.B.5; D. NEV. R. 185; S.D. OHiO R. 53.1;
N.D. OKLA. R. 16.3(l); W.D. OKLA. R. 17(J); M. D. PA. R. 1010; W.D. TENN. R. 15(c); S.D. TEX.

R. 20(B); W.D. TEX. R. CV-88(h) (15 districts with local rules allowing mandated participation in
SITs). See also N.D. ALA. PLAN, § IV.A; D. CoNN. R. 36; C.D. ILL. R. 1.4 (re: magistrate judges);
N.D. IND. R. 53.2; S.D. IND. R. 16.1(d)(2)(J); D. KAN. R. 214; W.D. LA. PLAN, § II.B.4; N.D. MISS.
PLAN, 5; S.D. MISS. PLAN, 5; E.D. TEX. PLAN, Pt. 1, Art. 6 (7) (remaining local rules in this category
either require the parties' consent, merely require the parties to consider the possibility, or are unclear).
256. See D. MASS. R. 16.4(C)(3); W.D. Micii. R. 44; N.D. OHIo R. 7:1.1 - 7:5.3.; but cf M.D.
TENN. R. 602; W.D. WASH. R. CR 39.1(e) (remaining two districts' local rules do not allow mandated
participation in SJTs). (Three state statutes or rules authorize mandated participation in SJTs, five do
not, and another statute is unclear. Those authorizing mandated participation include: Cochise County,
ARIZ. SUPER. CT. R. 12; N.H. SuPER. CT. R. 171; and WIS. CODE § 802.12.

Those allowing SJTs

only with the consent of the parties include: N.C. SUPER. CT. R. 23; N.C. DIST. CT. R. 23; VA. CODE
§ 8.01-576.1; WYO. R. CIV. P. 40; MINN. CODE § 604.11 (medical malpractice); MICH. SUP. CT.

ADMIN. ORDER 1988-2. The statute that is unclear on this issue is TEX. CODE § 154.026.).
257. See The Civil Justice Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(6) (1988).
258.
Id.
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clearly state whether participation in SJTs can be mandated over the parties'
objections and contains no specific rule or statutory provisions regarding SJTs.259
Second, the available legislative history of the statute does not support an
interpretation that mandatory participation is authorized. According to an ADR
practice book, the Senate Judiciary Committee did not take a specific stand on a
court's power to compel a summary jury trial in its report on The Civil Justice
Reform Act (as part of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990).260 The book
notes, however, that perhaps it is significant that the Committee did specifically
"
approve the majority decision in Heileman,26
' quoting from the Senate Report
as follows:
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit [in Heileman] affirmed en banc by a 6to-5 vote, relying on the "inherent authority" of the district court to
manage its docket. The majority acknowledged that the district court
could not compel settlement, but found it could compel the parties to
discuss settlement at a neutral conference.
By specifically authorizing this technique for use by district courts,
it is the committee's intent to acknowledge agreement with the majority
in Heileman.262
The effect of Congress singling out Heileman for specific approval is
discussed further in the teacher's manual for an ADR textbook.263 The manual
states:
Given the fact that Congress was well aware of the Strandell case at the
time it passed the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, the ambiguity of
the statute is puzzling. Does the phrase "authorization to refer
appropriate cases to alternative dispute resolution programs that ... the
court may make available, including . . . summary jury trial" mean
simply encouragement of voluntary referral or does this cryptic phrase
overrule the Strandell case? The legislative history is not helpful,
which is all the more puzzling in view of the fact that it specifically

259. Id.; see also DONOVAN LEISURE, supranote 63, at 41. It refers to the mention of SJTs in
Section 473 of The Civil Justice Reform Act (as part of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990), and
then comments: "Whether this will be interpreted as an authorization to compel summary jury trials,
however, is not entirely clear." Id.
260.
See id.

261.
See supra note 207 (stating that in G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 848 F.2d
1415 (7th Cir. 1988), the Seventh Circuit reversed the lower court's decision sanctioning the corporate
defendant for failing to send a corporate representative to a settlement conference as ordered); but see
G. HeilemanBrewing Co., 871 F.2d at 656-57. Upon rehearing, en banc, the Seventh Circuit held that

the district court was entitled to order a represented litigant to appear before it in person at a pretrial
conference for the purpose of discussing settlement of the case, and that the district court did not abuse
its discretion by imposing sanctions upon the corporation for failing to comply with such order. Id.
262.
263.

See DONOVAN LEISURE, supra note 63, at 42 (citing S. REP. NO. 416).
See GOLDBERo, ssupra note 2, at 141.
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addressed the analogous Heileman issue. With respect to the latter, the
Senate Committee Report specifically states that an analogous provision
in the Act was intended to affirm statutorily the Heileman decision.
Perhaps, in that light, the ambiguous language relating to Strandell
should be interpreted similarly to the ambiguous language pertaining to
Heileman (i.e., that as regards Strandell, Congress intended to overrule
that case when it used the term "authorization"). Conversely, it might
be contended that in light of the specific reference to Heileman in the
the absence of a similar reference to Strandell is
Committee 26Report,
4

significant.

Third, as explained in In re NLO,2 65 The Civil Justice Reform Act does
contain authorization to require participation in several techniques, but SJTs are
not included. In In re NLO, the Sixth Circuit stated that Section 473(a) of the Act
permits district courts to consider "principles and guidelines of litigation
management and cost and delay reduction," including referral of appropriate cases
to alternative dispute resolution programs that "the court may make available,"
such as summary jury trials, Section 473(a)(6)(B).266 The court pointed out,
however, that in Section 473(b) of the Act, the court is authorized to require
participation in several techniques developed from these principles and guidelines
and SJTs are not mentioned.267

264. Id. (internal page references omitted).
265.
5 F.3d 154 (6th Cir. 1993).
266. Id. at 158 n.1.
267. Id. See The Civil Justice Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 473(b)(1988). Section 473(b) of the
Act states:
(b) In formulating the provisions of its civil justice expense and delay reduction plan, each
United States district court, in consultation with an advisory group appointed under
section 478 of this title, shall consider and may include the following litigation
management and cost and delay reduction techniques:
(1) a requirement that counsel for each party to a case jointly present a discoverycase management plan for the case at the initial pretrial conference, or explain the reasons
for their failure to do so;
(2) a requirement that each party be represented at each pretrial conference by an
attorney who has the authority to bind that party regarding all matters previously
identified by the court for discussion at the conference and all reasonably related matters;
(3) a requirement that all requests for extensions of deadlines for completion of
discovery or for postponement of the trial be signed by the attorney and the party making
the request;
(4) a neutral evaluation program for the presentation of the legal and factual basis
of a case to a neutral court representative selected by the court at a nonbinding conference
conducted early in the litigation;
(5) a requirement that, upon notice by the court, representatives of the parties with
authority to bind them in settlement discussions be present or available by telephone during any
settlement conference; and
(6) such other features as the district court considers appropriate after considering
the recommendations of the advisory group referred to in section 472(a) of this title.
Id. (Notably, the fifth principle mentioned above does involve the holding in the Heileman case.).
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Fourth, as noted by the court in In re NLO, an alternate bill 268 would have
amended 28 U.S.C. Section 473(a) to permit courts to mandate such alternative
dispute resolution techniques as SJTs, but this bill did not pass. Several recent
bills have encouraged use of alternative dispute resolution and all of them have
referred to SJTs as an option available to willing litigants.269
Fifth, and probably most important, The Civil Justice Reform Act sets up a
nationwide experiment designed to reduce cost and delay and contemplates that
more permanent, uniform changes may be made after the Judicial Conference
reports back to Congress by the end of 1995. As stated above, the Act itself
expires on December 1, 1997,270 and will not bind district courts after that date.
If the intent was to create clear, permanent authority for mandating participation
in SJTs, the intent was not realized.
The other, very recent, change affecting the issue of authority for mandated
participation in SJTs was the December 1, 1993 amendment to FRCP 16.
Although it appears to provide some authority for mandated participation, the
authority is quite limited.
As indicated above, prior to the amendment, FRCP 16(c)(7) stated: "(c)
Subjects to Be Discussed at Pretrial Conferences. The participants at any
conference under this rule may consider and take action with respect to ... (7) the
possibility of settlement or the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve the
dispute. t271
After the amendment was adopted in December 1, 1993, this provision
"(c) Subjects for
became FRCP 16(c)(9), which now reads as follows:
Consideration at Pretrial Conferences. At any conference under this rule
consideration may be given, and the court may take appropriate action, with
to assist in
respect to . . . (9) settlement and the use of special procedures
272
resolving the dispute when authorized by statute or local rule.'1
The Advisory Committee Notes state, in pertinent part:
Paragraph (9) is revised to describe more accurately the various
procedures that, in addition to traditional settlement conferences, may
be helpful in settling litigation. Even if a case cannot immediately be
settled, the judge and attorneys can explore possible use of alternative
procedures such as mini-trials, summary jury trials, mediation, neutral
evaluation, and nonbinding arbitration that can lead to consensual
resolution of the dispute without a full trial on the merits. The rule

268.

S. 2027, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (1990).

In re NLO, 5 F.3d at 158 n.1 (referring to H.R. 4150, 102nd Cong., 2d Sess. § 2306 (b)(6)
269.
(1992); S. 2217, 102nd Cong., 2d Sess. § 2306(b)(6) (1992); H.R. 4155, 102nd Cong., 2d Sess. §
7(b)(6) (1992); S. 2180, 102nd Cong., 2d Sess., § 7(b)(6) (1992)). (No action was taken on S. 2180,

which was introduced on February 4, 1992, as the Access to Justice Act of 1992. It was reintroduced
on March 16, 1993, as S. 585, and no action had been taken as of September 2, 1994.).

270.
271.
272.

See supra note 9.
FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(7) (1992).
FED. R. CIv. P. 16(c)(9) (1995).
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acknowledges the presence of statutes and local rules or plans that may
authorize use of some of these procedures even when not agreed to by
the parties. See 28 U.S.C. sections 473(a)(6), 473(b)(4), 651-58;
Section 104(b)(2), Pub. L. 101-650. The rule does not attempt to
to require
resolve questions as to the extent a court would be authorized
273
such proceedings as an exercise of its inherent powers.
Although this provision appears to authorize mandated participation in SJTs,
that authorization is clearly limited to situations in which a statute or local court
rule exists on the subject. As discussed above, the only federal statute concerning
SJTs -- Section 473(a)(6) of The Civil Justice Reform Act -- does not provide
clear or permanent authority for mandated participation in them. In addition, if
the Act does not authorize mandated participation in SJTs and there is no judicial

or scholarly agreement about any other source of such authority, there is a
question as to the existence of any underlying authority for a local court rules on
the subject. And, in any event, since less than a third of the federal districts have
SJT rules (and not all of those provide for mandated participation), this
amendment does not provide any uniform or permanent authority for mandated
participation either.274

273. See also Twitty v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 16 Pa. D. & C.4th 458 (C.P. of
Philadelphia County) (1993). In that case, the state court, although of course not bound by federal
rules, referred to the then proposed amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(c) which took
effect on December 1, 1993, as support for its general statement that the SIT has gained national
acceptance. Id. at 464. The court quoted the above-mentioned "Committee Notes" following the
proposed amendment (which were not altered in the final version), and said that it was worthy to note
that the comment provides that a court may authorize, through statutes and local rules the "use of some
of these procedures even when not agreed to by the parties." Id. at 465. It added that as noted in the
Committee Note to the proposed amended Rule 16, the Conference rejected a suggestion that the
summary jury trial should only be conducted when all parties voluntarily agree. Id. at 466 (referring
to S. GOLDBERG El AL, DIsPuTE RESOLUTION 282-83 (1985)).
274. See Grubbs, supranote 7, at 29 n.2 1. The commentator noted that the continued vitality
of the decisions in In re NLO, Inc., 5 F.3d 154 (6th Cir. 1993) and Strandell v. Jackson County, 838
F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1988), both of which held that the parties could not, under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 16, be compelled to participate in a SJT, may be in doubt given the amendment to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 16(c) effective December 1, 1993. Id. He added that Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 16(c) now authorizes consideration and "appropriate action" regarding "settlement and use
of special procedures to assist in resolving the dispute when authorized by statute or local rule." Id.
The Committee Comment (with respect to the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990) expressly notes that
"the judge and attorneys can explore possible use of alternative procedures such as mini trials,
summary jury trials, mediation and non-binding arbitration." id. (Of course, the key word here is
"doubt." At this point in the history of the SJT we can ill afford any further doubt as to the authority
for requiring participation in them. Such doubt engenders future lawsuits and confusion.).
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3. Clarifying the Authority for SJTs and Creating
Authority for Mandated Participation in Them
It is quite clear that there is a need to both clarify the authority for SJTs in
general, and create authority for mandated participation in them. These issues will
be addressed separately in the two sections below.
(a) Authority for SJTs in General
Since the purpose of SJTs is to reduce the costs and delays involved in
litigation, allowing the current uncertainty as to their authority to continue will
only lead to more confusion, debate, and possible litigation. But since it is unlikely
that there will be many direct challenges to consensual SJTs, waiting until the
issue reaches the United States Supreme Court does not appear to be a wise course
of action. Therefore, to preserve the SJT, its authority must be clarified through
appropriate legislative and/or rule changes.
Although the surveyed judges did not give an overwhelmingly positive
response to the question of whether the authority for (consensual) SJTs needs to
be created or clarified, 2" that response is understandable. Parties are unlikely
to challenge procedures to which they have assented. But that does not eradicate
the necessity of clarifying the situation. Of the surveyed judges who thought that
the authority should be created or clarified, one judge stated that obviously not all
courts agree that the authority exists now,276 and another stated that it would
make it more clear that authority does exist.277 One judge merely commented
'
Three of those judges
that it helps if the procedures are "approved."278
responding negatively indicated that The Civil Justice Reform Act had taken care
of the problem (although one of them pointed out that at least two Courts of
Appeals have not caught on).2 9
The first issue that must be resolved is where such changes should appear.
Some of the surveyed judges thought the language should be in the FRCPs.2"0
One of these judges explained that using a local court rule or standing order
instead might not provide satisfactory authority for some judges.2 8' Another

275.
See JudicialSurvey Responses, supra note 24, Question 35, at 58-60. (When the surveyed
judges were asked whether the authority for (consensual) SJTs needs to be created or clarified,
approximately one-third responded in the affirmative: ten judges said yes; twenty-one said no; and one
did not answer directly.).
276.
Id. at 58. (at the time some of the initial judicial responses were received, the Biden
legislation had not yet been adopted).
277.
Id.
278.
Id., Question 35b, at 59.
279.

Id. at 58.

280.
Id., Questions 35a, 35b, at 59; see also.Atforney Survey Responses, supranote 25, Question
22a, at 16 (where the same suggestion was made by a surveyed attorney).
281.
JudicialSurvey Responses, supra note 24, Questions 35a, 35b at 59.
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such judge suggested that the language appear either in the FRCPs or a federal
statute since either has greater weight than local rule or standing orders. 2"
It appears that a federal statute on SJTs would be the most appropriate
choice. First, adding language to the federal rules concerning SJTs would appear
to be unnecessary in light of the recent amendment to FRCP 16. As stated above,
as of December 1, 1993, one of the subsections of FRCP 16(c) (Subjects for
Consideration at Pretrial Conferences) is "(9) settlement and the use of special
procedures to assist in resolving the dispute when authorized by statute or local
rule . . . ." However, this alone is not sufficient. While some federal courts
already have local rules on SJTs,2" 3 there is no uniform treatment of this issue
and a great deal of uncertainty exists as to the basis for such authorization.
Therefore, a new federal statute
clearly authorizing SJTs seems to be the
2 84
appropriate course of action.
When the surveyedjudges were asked, in the context of whether the authority
for SJTs needs to be created or clarified, what language should be used, several
judges said that it should provide that the court may require participation in
them.25 One judge suggested the following language: "Summary jury trials are
authorized by these civil rules and the parties shall attend as directed by the
'
court."286
Another judge suggested the language of (former) LR 513, from the
Middle District of Pennsylvania: "Summary Jury Trials. A judge may in his
discretion set any civil case for summary jury trial, provided, however, he gives
consideration to any reasons advanced by the parties as to why such a trial would
'
not be in the best interests of justice."287
Finally, another judge attached to his
response a copy of a Nebraska state statute authorizing SJTs (but not providing for
mandated participation) in state district courts, which he described as a "weak
attempt. ' 88 One judge suggested that language be included concerning a time

282.
Id.
283. See supra note 24.
284. See JudicialSurvey Responses, supra note 24, Question 35b, at 59 (where several judges
suggested that such authorization should appear in a federal statute).
285. Id., Question 35a, at 58-59.
286. Id. at 58.
287. Id. at 59; see also M.D. PA. R. 1010. As of January 1, 1994, this rule became Local Rule
1010, Local Rules for the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, and the
language has been revised slightly. The rule states:
A judge may in his or her discretion set a civil case for an alternative method of dispute
resolution approved by the court's Civil Justice Reform Act Expense and Delay Reduction
Plan: the Mediation Plan, the Settlement Officer Program, or the Summary Jury Trial
Program, provided, however, that he or she gives consideration to any reasons advanced
by the parties as to why such particular alternative method of dispute resolution would not
be in the best interests of justice.
Id.
288. Judicial Survey Responses, supra note 24, Question 35a, at 58 (attachment including
Nebraska law sections 25-1154 through 25-1157 (effective August 30, 1987)); see also NEB. REV.
STAT. § 25-1154 (1987). (The Nebraska state legislature passed four statutes with respect to summary
jury trials that took effect August 30, 1987. They authorize summary jury trials, but do not allow
courts to order mandatory participation in them.) The first statute, NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1154, states:
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either litigants and/or the court to indicate that a SJT request is
upon the above suggestions, it would appear that a federal statute
SJTs and specifically authorizing mandated participation in them -- at
discretion -- would be in order.
(b) Authority for Mandated Participation in SJTs

The danger in leaving the issue of mandated participation unresolved is even
greater than that involved in maintaining the status quo with respect to the
uncertainty about the authority for SJTs in general. If parties are forced to
participate in SJTs -- when the court's authority for doing so is so unclear-- they
are much more likely to challenge such an order. Such challenges lead to the ill
effects that threaten the very existence of the SJT.
Judges clearly support the notion that they should be able to compel parties
to participate in a SJT when they think it is appropriate to do so. When the
surveyed judges were specifically asked whether authority creating or clarifying
SJTs should also provide that federal judges and magistrate judges may compel
parties to participate in a SJT, most of the responding judges said yes.2 90 When
asked for general suggestions about improving the SJT process, one judge wrote
that there should be approval of mandatory SJTs in the civil rules or statutes,29'
and another judge wrote that the rules should be amended to allow judges to order
SJTs despite parties' objections.292
Those judges who thought SJT authority should provide for mandated
participation gave the following reasons: parties seldom agree; most lawyers resist
change; if the procedure is in place, the judicial officer should be able to order it;
some district court decisions have already upheld mandatory participation; the

25-1154. Legislative purpose and findings. The purpose of sections 25-1154 to 25-1157
is to provide an alternate dispute resolution technique, to be known as the summary jury
trial, for use by the parties to civil court actions. The Legislature finds that the
procedures set forth in such sections will save valuable court and juror resources, promote
prompt resolution of disputes, and increase settlement of disputed actions prior to a jury
trial. The Legislature declares that courts should liberally construe such sections and
employ summary jury trials in appropriate civil actions to effectuate the purposes and
Id.

findings set forth in this section.
See also NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1155 (1987). The second statute, § 25-1155, states:
25-1155. Motion; when granted; contents. In any civil action, the disirict court may
grant a summary jury trial upon the written motion of all parties or their oral motion in
court entered upon the record. The motion for summary jury trial may contain a
stipulation of the parties concerning the use or effect of the summary jury verdict.

Id.
Judicial Survey Responses, supra note 24, Question 35a, at 58.
Id., Question 35c, at 59-60. (Seven of nine judges responding to this question answered
290.
in the affrmative.).
Id., Question 24, at 34.
291.
289.

292.

Id.
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parties should not be bound by the results, but the court should be allowed to
require parties to try and resolve disputes short of trial; it saves the parties
thousands of dollars and the court's time; and the SJT is an effective settlement
tool and federal judges should have the right to compel parties to submit to it.293
In McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc.,294 the judge wrote his own explanation for
why mandated participation in SJTs should be allowed. The judge wrote:
In my own experience summary jury trials have netted me a savings in
time of about 60 days and I have only used the procedure five times.
It settled two of these cases that were set for 30-day trials. It is true
that I cannot prove scientifically that the cases would not have settled
anyway but my experience tells me they would not. I do know that but
for my making summary jury trials mandatory in these cases, they
would not have occurred. I know also that the attorney who obiected
to the first summary jury trial he was required to participate in is now
the biggest local fan of the procedure. In the case at bar I am gambling
a five-day summary jury trial against a six-week real trial. Six to one
is pretty good odds.295
For the reasons stated above, a federal statute both authorizing SJTs in
general and providing that a judge may compel the parties to participate in one
seems to be the best approach to take. One good source of ideas for statutory
language is, of course, the existing federal court local rules on the subject.
Federal district courts that have adopted local court rules allowing judges to
mandate participation in SJTs have taken slightly different approaches. 296 Nearly
all of the rules clearly make the judge's decision a discretionary one, but some of
them give the judge additional guidance. For example, one local rule allows
mandated participation only if the presiding judicial officer determines at any time
that the case will benefit from alternative dispute resolution. 297 Another rule
adds that the judge must give consideration to any reasons advanced by the parties
as to why such particular alternative method of dispute resolution would not be in

293. Id., Question 35c, at 59-60; see also Attorney Survey Responses, supra note 25, Question
22c, at 16. One surveyed attorney said that such authority should provide that parties' participation
can be compelled. Id. He wrote that in order for any rule to be effective, the judge must have the
ability to compel what the rule seeks to accomplish. Id. He noted, however, that the Sixth Circuit
recently ruled that a SJT cannot be imposed upon the parties. Id. (presumably referring to In re NLO,
Inc., 5 F.3d 154 (6th Cir. 1993)).
294.
120 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1988).
295. Id. at 49 (in a section of the opinion entitled "Some Personal Observations") (footnotes
omitted; emphasis added).
296. See S.D. ILL. R. 34; N.D. IND. R. 53.2; M.D. LA. PLAN, Art. 4 (on Alternative Dispute
Resolution); E.D. LA. PLAN, Art. 4 (on Alternative Dispute Resolution); D. MASS. R. 16.4(C)(3); M.D.
PA. R. 1010 (effective January 1, 1994); W.D. MIca. R. 44; N.D. OHIO R. 7:1.1; N.D. OHIO R. 7:1.2;
N.D. Oio R. 7:5.1; N.D. O-o R. 7:5.2; W.D. OKLA. PLAN, § 6.4; W.D. OKLA. R. 17(J); W.D. TEx.
R. CV-88(h); S.D. CAL. R. 37.1(f).
297. See E.D. LA. PLAN, Art. 4; M.D. LA. PLAN, Art. 4 (on Alternative Dispute Resolution).
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the best interests of justice.298 One court plan provides that a summary jury trial
may be ordered by the court where the expense is reasonably justified by the
circumstances, or by the potential for resolution of the case. 2 99 Another rule
allows a court to conduct a summary jury trial in cases "where alternative dispute
resolution procedures have proved unsuccessful and a complex and lengthy trial
is anticipated. . provided that the court finds that a summary jury trial may
produce settlement of all or a significant part of the issues and thereby effect a
saving in time, effort and expense for all concerned."3 ° Another rule provides
that a judge can order a SJT where the judge finds -- after a hearing with an
opportunity to be heard -- that "(1) the potential judgment does not exceed
$250,000 and (2) that the use of this procedure will probably resolve the
case."301 The same rule indicates that the judge must consider "the costs of the
trial"
a non-binding
procedure and the costs that may be saved by ordering such 30
2
and that the judge may consider "any other relevant factors.
The uncertainties outlined above could be remedied by a federal SJT statute
addressing the issues of clarifying the authority for SJTs in general and of creating
in them. I propose the following statutory
authority for mandated participation
3
language for this purpose:
(a) A "summary jury trial" (SJT) is a court-annexed process in which
the parties' attorneys summarize their case to a six-person jury with a
judge or magistratejudge presiding and then use the decision of the jury
and information about the jurors' reaction to the legal and factual
arguments as an aid to settlement negotiations. Unless the parties
stipulate otherwise, the SJT verdict is non-binding.
(b) A judge or magistrate judge may order a SJT:
(1) with the agreement of all parties, either by written motion or
their oral motion in court entered upon the record, or
(2) upon the judge or magistrate judge's determination that a SJT
would be appropriate, even in the absence of the agreement of all the
parties.
(c) In exercising his or her discretion under subsection (b)(2), the judge
or magistrate shall give consideration to the costs of the procedure, the
costs that may be saved by ordering the SJT, the potential for resolution
of the case, and any reasons advanced by the parties as to why a SJT
would not be in the best interests of justice.

298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
4'303.

See
See
See
See
Id.

M.D. PA. R. 1010 (took effect Jan. 1, 1994).
W.D. OKLA. PLAN, § 6.4 (re: summary jury trials).
W.D. TEX. R. CV-88(h).
S.D. CAL. R. 37.1(t).

See infra part IV (incorporating this language into a proposed, comprehensive federal SIT

statute).
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B. Lack of Authority for Summoning SIT Jurors

The lack of authority for summoning SJT jurors seems clear, although there
are only two short scholarly pieces and decisions in two cases (by the
same judge) on this issue."a 4
1. Legal Challenges
The only cases addressing this issue were decided by the late U.S. District
Court Judge Battisti, while he was sitting on the same court as Judge Lambros -the originator of the SJT. 3 °5
In February of 1990, Judge Battisti30 6 held in Hume v. M & C
Management"' that federal district court judges have no authority to summon
persons to serve as summary jurors. The court denied the parties' joint motion for
a summary jury trial, finding that since there is no authority in law for using
persons as summary jurors, summoned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1866(a) (1982),
such a procedure is not permissible in the federal courts.30 8

304. See Charles W. Hatfield, The Summary Jury Trial: Who Will Speak For the Jurors?:Hume
v. M& C Management, 1991 J. DIsp. RESOL 151 (1991); McNamara, supra note 23; Hume v. M &
C Management, 129 F.R.D. 506 (N.D. Ohio 1990); United States v. Exum, 744 F. Supp. 803 (N.D.
Ohio 1990); United States v. Exum, 748 F. Supp. 512 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
305. See Hume v. M & C Management, 129 F.R.D. 506 (N.D. Ohio 1990); United States v.
Exum, 744 F. Supp. 803 (N.D. Ohio 1990); United States v. Exum, 748 F. Supp. 512 (N.D. Ohio
1990).
306. Judge Battisti was a U.S. District Court Judge in the Northern District of Ohio. He passed
away in October of 1994.
307.
129 F.R.D. 506 (N.D. Ohio 1990); see also Karen E. Henderson, Battisti Contests Process:
Halts Firearm Case Over Jury System, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, June 14, 1980, at B-1 (stating that
on or about June 12, 1990, Judge Battisti issued an order in the United States v. Exum criminal case,
halting jury selection on the morning it was to begin, to challenge the system of selecting jurors for
summary jury trials). Judge Battisti issued his order as jury selection was to begin in the second trial
of Willie E. Exum, a 57-year-old Cleveland man being retried on a charge of possession of a firearm
by a convicted felon. Id. Exum's first trial ended June 6 in a mistrial because of a hung jury. Since
this was to be Battisti's first jury trial since his Hume decision [information from his law clerk], Battisti
issued his order to challenge the process that allows those who serve as summary jury trial jurors to
be drawn from the same pool as those who serve on petit juries. Id. Battisti said the system reduced
the number of people available for petit juries by about 30%, which is the number of jurors set aside
to serve on summary jury trials. Battisti said that after already facing a mistrial for failure to reach a
verdict in this case, he did not want to face a void verdict at the end of this trial. Id. Citing his
decision in Hume, Battisti said federal judges have no authority to summon people for service as
summary jury trial jurors. He also said that the method of empaneling jurors in the Northern District
of Ohio "is not in accordance with the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 or with the Jury
Selection Plan for the Northern District of Ohio adopted June 6, 1989, and approved by the Sixth
Circuit Judicial Council." Id. Battisti ordered lawyers in the case to look into the process of selecting
potential jurors and to report to him in 10 days. Id. He scheduled a hearing on the issue at 10 a.m.
June 27. Id.
308. Hume, 129 F.R.D. at 507.
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The court states that the Congress has spoken clearly and definitively: except
for advisory juries, the only purpose for which a citizen may be required to serve
as a juror, and thus the only authority vested in the federal district courts to
summon a juror, is to sit on a "grand" or "petit" jury.0 9 The court quotes from
the first section of the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968,' in pertinent
part, as follows: "It is further the policy of the United States that all citizens shall
have the opportunity to be considered for service on grand and petit juries in the
district courts of the United States, and
shall have an obligation to serve as jurors
11
when summoned for that purpose. 1
The court adds that the statute imposes no obligation on citizens of the
United States to serve as summary jurors and to imagine that Congress meant the
phrase "petit juries" to include a summary jury is to disregard the fundamental
distinctions between these bodies." 2 It pointed out that while a petit jury is
"[tlhe ordinary jury for the trial of a civil or criminal action...,,"1 a summary
jury is "assembled for settlement purposes only."3" 4 It added that due largely to
this distinction, the Sixth Circuit held that the First Amendment right of public
access does not apply to SJTs"' The court also notes:
In addition to the difference in purpose between a Summary Jury Trial
and a real trial, a summary juror hears no direct testimony, and,
therefore, does not pass on the credibility of witnesses, one of the
primary functions of a present-day petit jury. A summary jury listens
only to lawyers' arguments, which, unless corroborated, are never to be
regarded as trial evidence. In addition to the lack of live witnesses,
evidentiary objections are discouraged, thus further increasing the
likelihood that evidence disclosed to the summary jury would be
inadmissible at a real trial. Most importantly, unlike
an ordinary jury
31 6
verdict, a summary jury "verdict" is not binding.
The court states that these distinctions are "so sharp and tear so deeply into
the legitimate functions of today's juries that a summary jury cannot possibly fall
within the meaning of the phrase 'petit juries."" The court concluded that:

309. Id. at 508. The court also rejects Judge Lambros' opinion that Rule 39(c), with respect to
advisory juries, provides the theoretical underpinnings for the use ofjurors on a summary jury, stating
that his interpretation of Rule 39(c) is overbroad. Id. at 508 n.5.
310. 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1982)
311.
Hume, 129 F.R.D. at 508-09 (footnote omitted).
312. Id. at 509.
313. Id. (quoting BLACK's LAW DIcTIONARY 768 (5th ed. 1979)).
314. Id. at 509.
315. Id. at n.8-9 (citing Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co., 854 F.2d at 904-05).
316. Id. at 509 (footnotes omitted).
317. Id. at 510.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1995/iss2/1

54

Woodley: Woodley: Saving the Summary Jury Trial:
Saving The Summary Jury Trial

1995]

Federal judges, therefore, have no authority to summon citizens to serve
as settlement advisors, just as they would have no authority to summon
citizens to serve as hand servants for themselves, lawyers or litigants.
Persons should be pressed into service of the United States as summary
jurors, thereby depriving them of their liberty, only by plain,
unambiguous and constitutional enactment of the Congress, not by
inference, or Procrustean application of summary juries into the wellestablished law regarding "petit" and "advisory" juries. Since Congress
has granted no authority to summon citizens for Summary Jury Trials,
questions arising under the Fifth and Thirteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution would also seem to be implicated." 8
In this case, Hume v. M & C Management," 9 the court also points out that
in Judge Lambros' handbook for SJT proceedings, he opines that FRCP 39(c)
320
provides the theoretical underpinning for the use of jurors on a summary jury.
The court states that according to Judge Lambros, "the clear purpose behind the
Rule ... is to give the court and the parties the opportunity to utilize a jury's
particular expertise and perception when a case demands those special
abilities. 3 21 The court in Hume added, however, that Judge Lambros'
interpretation of FRCP 39(c) is overbroad.322 It stated that FRCP 39(c) is an
authorized exceptionto 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1982) for the narrow purpose of aiding"
the judge.323 Thus, FRCP 39(c) allows a judge to have the assistance of a jury
in deciding cases, but it does not provide the basis for giving parties such
assistance in order to reach settlement.124 It concludes that until legislation
similar to FRCP 39(c) is enacted to permit the use of jurors for SJTs, such a
procedure remains unauthorized in law. It noted that although two bills mentioning
SJTs in the context of setting out procedures to promote the use of alternative
dispute resolution devices have been referred to the Committee on the
Judiciary,323 neither bill has been enacted into law. 26
As might be expected, Judge Lambros, the creator of the SJT, reacted
negatively to the Hume decision. In an interview he stated that Judge Battisti's
decision was "out of sync" with the growing popularity of ADR, and that after 10

318.
319.

Id. (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 506.

320.
Id. at 508 n.5 (citing M.D. Jacoubovitch & C. Moore, SummaryJury Trials in the Northern
District of Ohio 23 FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER (1982)).
Id. (emphasis added).
321.

322.
323.
324.
325.

Id. at 509 n.5.
Id. (cites omitted).
Id. at 509 n.5.
H.R. 473, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5, (1987); S. 12038, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3,

(1986).
326.

Hume, 129 F.R.D. at 509. (Of course, as mentioned above, The Civil Justice Reform Act

was enacted in the same year that this case was decided, but it did not mention summoning persons
to serve as SJT jurors.).
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years of successful use, "laches has set in" on the issue of authority to use the
Moreover, Judge Lambros is quoted as saying that a SJT
technique. 2
constitutes a petit jury within the meaning of the federal jury selection statute.3 28
Lambros also said that the 10-year history of successful SJT use, the fact that
ADR is the fastest growing process in the courts, and the approval manifested by
the bench and bar, make Hume a "bah humbug" decision.3 29 It reflects
3°
"dragging feet," Lambros continued, when "we should be moving forward.
"After 10 years, laches has set in for re-examining the authority to use jurors on
"
' He said he believes that "the duties
summary jury trials," Lambros suggested.33
and responsibilities of a trial judge to facilitate dispute resolution are so
abundantly provided for" that the Hume ruling was "not appropriate. 332 He also
noted that in 1983, Judge Battisti joined in adopting the Northern District of
Ohio's local rule that states that the summary jury trial is an appropriate means of
dispute resolution.333
Later in the same year, Judge Battisti published two opinions in the same
case, United States v. Exum, on this subject as well.334 Notably, however, this
was a criminal case and no attempt was made to use a SJT in that proceeding.
The first opinion,3 5 dated August 30, 1990, discusses the two issues raised sua
sponte by Judge Battisti. The court stated:
It must now be determined: (1) whether the use of citizens drawn from
the qualified jury wheel for summary jury service impermissibly alters
the jury selection process in the Northern District of Ohio and thus, the
jury selection in the instant matter; and (2) if so, the most efficient and
least intrusive remedy.336
The court points out that since April 1990, approximately two-hundred
potential jurors have been diverted from petit jury service to summary jury service
and that but for their assignment to summary jury service, these individuals would
have remained in the qualified jury wheel.337 After a review of the applicable
law, focusing largely on his prior decision in Hume, '8 Judge Battisti concluded:

327.

See Ruling Against Use of Jurors in SJT Is "Out of Sync," Judge Lambros Says,

ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION REPORT (BNA) 83 (March 15, 1990).

328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331.
Id.
332.
Id.
Id.
333.
334. See United States v. Exum, 744 F. Supp. 803 (N.D. Ohio 1990); United States v. Exum,
748 F. Supp. 512 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
335. 744 F. Supp. 803 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
336. Id. at 804.
337. Id. at 804-05.
338. 129 F.R.D. 506, 510 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (see discussion in Exum, 744 F. Supp. at 804-06).
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Intentional deviations from the statutory jury selection process cannot

be allowed when they are perceived prior to a trial, before significant
resources have been expended in trying a case. Therefore, the court

cannot in the instant matter condone, prior to trial, the fact that jurors
called to serve in this matter have emerged from a jury selection process

involving a use of jurors, namely for summary jury service, that is
clearly unauthorized by the Act, the Plan, and case law and, although
no opinion is asserted on this issue, may be unauthorized by the
Constitution and violate certain of its provisions. Accordingly, the jury
selection process in the Northern District of Ohio from which the panel

in the instant matter emerged has been impermissibly altered.339
Judge Battisti then instructed the clerk to draw four hundred names from the
master wheel and place them in the qualified jury wheel. 4 ° From this qualified
jury wheel, he ordered jurors to be called before him to try the case and stated that
none of the jurors from the wheel would be used to serve as summary jurors either
before or after a panel for the case was called.34 ' He concluded by suspending
all criminal and civil jury trials pending before him until further order of the
court.

3 42

Questions were raised in the press as to the motivations for Judge Battisti's
action in this case, 4 3 and, twelve days later, at the monthly judges' meeting of
the Northern District of Ohio, Judge Battisti' s colleagues apparently discussed his
opinion in United States v. Exum. At the September 11, 1990 judges' meeting,

339. United States v. Exun, 744 F. Supp. 803, 808 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (referring to The Jury
Selection and Service Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1863(a) and Plan for the Northern District of Ohio).
340. Id.
341.
Id.
342. Id.
343. See Battisti stops alljury trials in his courtroom: Selection process is issue in dispute,
AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, Aug. 31, 1990, at page lB. In reference to Judge Battisti's order, the
article stated that "some observers" say it is "a continuation of the long-standing feud between the
federal judges in Cleveland." Id. It quoted an anonymous Cleveland lawyer as saying that many court
observers will interpret Battisti's order as another shot in the feud, however, he thinks that Battisti
believes that summary jury trials are illegal. Id. The story also points out that Battisti was chiefjudge
of the Northern District of Ohio for more than twenty years and stepped down early this year amid
controversy over an order holding the chief probation officer of the district in contempt of court. Id.
Judge Lambros (the creator of the SJT) replaced Battisti as chief judge. Id.
See also Karen E. Henderson, Battisti halts his civil, criminal trialsoverjury issue, THE PLAIN
DEALER, Sept. 6, 1990, at B2. This story states, in part:
Battisti's order is his latest attack on the summary jury trial, a system devised 10 years
ago by U.S. District Judge Thomas D. Lambros as a way to speed decisions in civil cases.
Battisti has been taking shots at Lambros since Lambros replaced Battisti as chief judge
last January.
Battisti stepped down as chiefjudge last year, thus ending a dispute between Battisti
and his colleagues over how the court should be run. Battisti contended he was in charge
while his colleagues wanted the court administered by majority rule.
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General Order No. 119 was approved by the nine judges attending the meeting
Therefore, Chief Judge
(which constituted more than a majority).344
Lambros, 3 45 for the court, issued this administrative order entitled "Juror
which specifically referred to the calling of jurors for summary jury
Utilization,"
3 46
trials.
Judge Battisti's second United States v. Exum decision 347 is a response to
the issuance of General Order No. 119. In that opinion, he stated that General
Order No. 119 constitutes an unwarranted interference with the Article III powers
of a United States District Judge acting in a case or controversy. 48 He added
that the appropriate course of action would have been to allow the parties to
appeal the August 30, 1990 order.349 He notes that there is no suggestion that
the General Order is meant to be an amendment to the district's jury selectionplan
and concluded:
The judges of this district, acting in an administrative capacity, have no
power to choose by majority action to disregard the laws of the United
States concerning amendment of the jury plan. In addition, they place
the Clerk in a most uncomfortable position. Regardless of the Clerk's
response, however, the order of August 30, 1990 stands. No jury trials
will be conducted in any cases assigned to my docket until a new wheel
is drawn in accordance with the duly enacted laws of the United States.
Due to the mandatory nature of [28 U.S.C. §] 1867 there is no
alternative. The parties are, of course, at liberty to waive their right to
a jury trial if they so desire. Accordingly, all criminal and civil jury
trials pending on my docket remain stayed until further order of this
court, and the government's motion to advance the instant case to trial
is DENIED. As this matter involves an impermissible jury selection
practice, "the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the
best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.350
The United States Attorney's Office in Cleveland then asked the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit to intercede in the dispute between

344.

See United States v. Exum, 744 F. Supp. 803 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (decided on September 28,

1990, and amended on October 3, 1990); see also Karen E. Henderson, Court kills Battistibid to split
jury pools, THE PLAIN DEALER, Sept. 12, 1990, at B7 [hereinafter Court kills bid]. The story stated

that "Battisti, who has been feuding with his colleagues, did not attend the meeting. The judges said
Battisti was fishing in Montana." Id.
345.
As noted above, Judge Lambros is the creator of the summary jury trial.
346. See E-xum, 748 F. Supp. at 513; cf Court kills bid, supra note 342, at B7. In that interview,
Judge Lambros stated that Battisti, as chief judge, had signed the 1983 order approving use of SJTs
by the court. Id. He added, "I don't know why he waited so long to find fault with it." Id.
347. Exum, 748 F. Supp. at 512.
348. Id. at 513.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 513-14 (footnote omitted); see 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A) (1988).
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Judge Battisti and the majority of the remaining judges in the Northern District of
Ohio. 5' According to the newspaper account, U.S. Attorney Joyce J. George
asked the Sixth Circuit to order Judge Battisti to schedule trial dates for seven
352
The
criminal cases "as soon as practical" and to impanel juries at those trials.
motion stated that if the court determined that a valid jury could not be impaneled
under the present jury selection procedure, its alternative request was that the court
exercise its supervisory powers and direct the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio to implement an appropriate jury selection method to allow those
cases to proceed expeditiously.353 However, the Sixth Circuit never ruled on the
motion since the matter became moot on November 7, 1990. On that date, Judge
endorsement of
Battisti removed his stay in the Exum case in light of Congress'
354
Act.
Reform
Justice
Civil
The
in
SJTs
of
use
the experimental
In a recent state court decision, Twitty v. Minnesota Mining and
3
1 the judge gave short shrift to a protest against using
Manufacturing Co.,
regular jurors for a SJT. The total discussion of the issue was as follows: "[tihe
claim of Robert J. Murphy, Esquire, counsel for Twitty, that somehow the rights
of the jurors were violated is without merit, particularly since the Court followed
his suggestion and excused any potential juror who did not want to participate in
the proceeding."356
The author of a student note on the subject of authority to summon jurors for
SJTs concludes that notwithstanding the debate over judicial authority to compel
participation in a SJT, judges do not have express authority to impanel a jury to
357
The author first
sit for a SJT even when the use of the SJT is voluntary.
not authorize
does
1968
of
Act
concludes that The Jury Selection and Service
subject.358
on
the
decision
Battisti's
judges to impanel SJT jurors, citing Judge
She adds that because citizens have no obligation to serve as jurors for a SJT, they
cannot be punished for refusing to do SO.35 However, because SJT jurors are
not told until after the case is decided that they are not serving on a regular jury,
the SJT jurors are unaware that they cannot be punished for noncompliance until
it is too late.36 ° Second, the author concludes that FRCP 39(c) 36(re: advisory
juries) does not expressly authorize the impanelling of SJT jurors. 1

See Appeals court asked to intercede: U.S. Attorney wants Baltisti ordered to begin
351.
criminal trials, THE PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 27, 1990, at B.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 1I, B6.
354. See order in United States v. Exum, 89-CR146 (6th Cir. Nov. 7, 1990).
355. 16 Pa. D. & C.4th 458 (C.P. of Philadelphia County 1993).
356. Id. at 459.
357. See McNamara, supra note 23, at 482.
358. Id. at 482-83 (citing Hume v. M & C Management, 129 F.R.D. 506 (N. D. Ohio 1990)).
359. Twitty, 16 Pa. D. & C.4th at 483.
360. Id.at 484.
Id. at 486. McNamara explains:
361.
Advisory juries were intended to aid the iudge in deciding equity cases. They were not
intended to provide a pretrial settlement tool for the parties. Given the competing

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995

59

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1995, Iss. 2 [1995], Art. 1
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION

[Vol. 1995, No. 2

In the other scholarly piece addressing this issue, the author discusses Judge
Battisti's opinion in Hume v. M & C Management and then states:
The judge in this case obviously opposes the use of the summary jury
trial. Nevertheless, his decision raises a question which the case law
has yet to address. If the federal courts lack authority to summon jurors
for summary jury duty, parties wishing to use the procedure will be
forced to find voluntary, perhaps privately paid, jurors. Such a
development would likely spell the death of the summary jury trial in
federal court. There would be no real economic advantage to electing
the SJT over a regular trial. There would also be many procedural
problems arising from private parties trying to draw a jury, such as how
to ensure that a random sample of the potential jurors is drawn even
when some of them do not respond to requests to serve or refuse to
participate once contacted.362
The author of this piece makes no specific proposal for correcting this
situation, but concludes by stating:,
Everyone agrees that the SJT is a major innovation in dispute
resolution. It will obviously take some time for the judicial system to
work out all the considerations involved. Until such a time, there will
be judges, such as Judge Battisti, who are not comfortable with the SIT.
While it is clearly in the discretion of any judge to deny the use of the
procedure, it is time that Congress considers some of the issues that the
instant decision raises. As long as the current ambiguity in the rules
remains, there will be room for various interpretations and decisions
which certainly lead to disparate results, or even disparate rights,
among, or in this case within, judicial districts. If Congress feels that
the summary jury trial is an important enough innovation to justify the
of citizens for service as jurors, it needs to codify that
conscription
3 63
belief.
Although Section 473(a)(6) of The Civil Justice Reform Act provides that
any civil justice delay reduction plan shall include authorization to refer
appropriate cases to ADR programs that the court may make available, including

objectives behind the use of advisory juries and summary juries, interpreting Rules (sic)
39(c) to authorize the convening of a summary jury trial is tenuous at best.
Id. at 488 (footnotes omitted).
362.
See Hatfield, supra note 304, at 157 (footnotes omitted).
363.
Id. at 159.
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summary jury trials, it makes no mention of any authority for summoning SJT
364

jurors.

2. What Judges Have Relied Upon
Clearly no specific authority exists for summoning SJT jurors, but judges
have justified doing so on a variety of grounds. When the surveyed judges were
asked whether citizens can be compelled to serve as jurors for SJTs, nearly twice
as many of those responding said yes rather than no.36 But when asked -- in
the same question -- under what authority SJT jurors can be compelled, the
answers given were less than compelling. The judges' responses tended to fall
into four categories.
The first category of justifications for summoning SJT jurors was the notion
that they serve similar functions as "real" jurors, so that they fall within the
regular juror statute.3 66 One judge stated that it is jury service and fulfills a
useful civic function which helps dispose of court cases; another judge wrote that
it is a legitimate use of jurors since it unquestionably disposes of cases -- and in
less time than required for conventional trials; and a third judge indicated that the
SJT is just 3one
variety of jury trial, such as the number of jurors, which can, and
67
does, vary.
The second category of justifications was that since citizens can be compelled
to serve as advisory jurors on non-jury issues at trial (an apparent reference to
FRCP 39(c)), it should be permissible to compel them to serve as advisory jurors
in a SJT.3 6' The third category of justifications for summoning SJT jurors was
that it was
authorized by the particular district through a local court rule or court
9
order.

36

The fourth category consisted of more equivocal justifications, such as "why
not?;" "no one has ever objected;" "I believe so (and have been doing it for
years);" and "yes -- but not sure -- never thought of it."'31 One judge stated that
" ' He added
they do it, but the statutory authority may be somewhat ambiguous.37
that his thinking was that it matters not to an individual juror whether he serves

364. Cf.DONOVAN LEISUtE, supra note 63, at 42. As stated in this ADR practice book, the
Hume case was specifically disapproved by the Senate Judiciary Committee in its report on The Civil
Justice Reform Act (as part of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990). Id.Furthermore, the book adds,
the Senate Committee made clear that subsection (a)(6) of the Act "eliminates any doubt that might
exist in some courts" as to "whether the summary jury trial is an authorized procedure permissible in
the federal courts." Id. (citing S.REP. No. 416 (1990)).
365. See JudicialSurvey Responses, supranote 24, Question 36, at 61-62 (seventeen judges said
yes; nine judges said no; and three did not directly answer the question).
366. Id.
367. Id. at 62.
368. Id. at 61.
369. Id. at 61-62.
370. Id.at 61.
371.
Id.
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372
He added that
on a "real" trial or a SJT, so long as the case is resolved.
people who have served in SJT juries have generally liked the procedure and
suggested that it be used more extensively.373 One judge stated that he has never
had a problem, but the circuits appear to be split on this question.37 4 Finally,
another judge, in responding to the question about compelling SJT jurors to serve,
wrote: "Why do that? If one person won't serve, OK, forget it. Otherwise you
'
may get a ruling you can't summon them. ""

3. Creating Clear Authority for Summoning SJT Jurors
Based upon the case law, the scholarly input, and the judicial responses
discussed above, it is clear that if one wants a viable SJT process to exist authority
must be created to summon SJT jurors.
There are several sources of ideas for how to address this problem: several
surveyed judges suggested amending the current juror selection statutes; the failed
amendment to FRCP 16 sought to address the issue; one scholar suggested an
amendment to FRCP 39(c) on advisory juries; and several courts have created
local rules on the subject.
First, when the surveyed judges were asked where language authorizing SJTs
should appear, one judge stated that a statutory change may be necessary to
"clarify" the calling of jurors to serve in an "advisory" capacity; otherwise,
376
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would probably suffice.
When the surveyed attorneys were asked whether citizens can be compelled to
serve as SJT jurors, one wrote that SJT jurors cannot be summoned under existing
statutes, but the statutes could be amended."' Presumably these suggestions are
that The Jury Selection and Services Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. Sections 1861-1878,
should be amended to refer to the summoning of citizens to serve as jurors for
summary jury trials.378
Second, a proposal affecting the calling of SJT jurors was included in a
March 1991 working draft of proposed amendments to the federal rules that had
not been approved by the Advisory Committee but were to be considered at the
Committee's next meeting in May of 199 L"' But that amendment was never
adopted. The proposed amendment would have altered FRCP 16(c)(9) to read:
"(9) the possibility of settlement and the use of special procedures to assist in

372.
373.

Id.
Id.

374.

Id. at 62.

375. Id.
376. Id., Question 35b, at 59.
377. Attorney Survey Responses, supra note 25, Question 23, at 17.
378. See Hume v. M & C Management, 129 F.R.D. 506 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (note suggestion of
Judge Battisti).
See Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Judicial Conference ofthe United States, Proposed
379.
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Federal Rules of Evidence, FED. R. Civ. P.

16 (1991).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1995/iss2/1

62

Woodley: Woodley: Saving the Summary Jury Trial:
Saving The Summary Jury Trial

1995]

resolving the dispute such as the appointment by the court of one or more persons,
who may be persons otherwise summoned for service as jurors, to evaluate claims
and defenses of the parties ....
3o
The Committee Notes describing this amendment stated:
Paragraph (9) is revised to enhance the court's powers in utilizing a
variety of procedures to facilitate settlement, such as through mini-trials,
mediation, and non-binding arbitration. The court may appoint one or
more persons to evaluate the claims or defenses of the parties. Explicit
authorization is provided for use of persons otherwise summoned as
jurors to act as panelists in a "summary jury trial." The selection of
such persons is not governed by Rule 47, nor is a stipulation from the
parties under Rule 48 required for the reception of a non-unanimous
"verdict" from such a panel.
The revision of paragraph (9) should be read in conjunction with
the revision later added to the subdivision, authorizing the court to
direct that the parties or the authorized representatives of parties or their
insurers attend a settlement conference or participate in special
proceedings designed to foster settlement. Parties should not be forced
by the court into settlements, and the disinterest of a party in engaging
in settlement discussions may be a signal that the time and expense
involved in pursuing settlement may be unproductive. Nevertheless, the
court should have the power in appropriate cases to require parties to
participate in proceedings that may indicate to them -- or their
adversaries -- the wisdom of resolving the litigation without resort to a
full trial on the merits. Of course the court should not impose
unreasonable burdens on a party as a device to extract settlement, such
as by requiring officials with broad responsibilities to attend a
settlement conference involving relatively minor matters.'
As stated above, however, when the federal rules were amended (effective
December 1, 1993), the new FRCP 16(c)(9) did not include this reference to
jurors. It merely states: "(9) settlement and the use of special procedures to assist
in resolving the dispute when authorized by statute or local rule.0 82 The part
of subsection (c)(16) referred to above authorizing the court to direct parties or
their representatives or insurers to participate in special proceedings in an effort
to foster settlement was not adopted either. The relevantportion of the December
1, 1993, version of FRCP 16(c)(16) merely states: "If appropriate, the court may
require that a party or its representative be present or reasonably
available by
3 83
telephone in order to consider possible settlement of the dispute.

380.

Id.

381.

Id. (citations omitted).

382.

See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(9).

383.

See FED. R. C1V. P. 16(c)(16).
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Third, the author of one of the two scholarly pieces on this issue3"
proposes an amendment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to add subsection
FRCP 39(d), which would state:
The district court, with the consent of all parties to the suit, may
impanel from the regular jury pool a summary jury to sit for a summary
jury trial, the purpose of which is to render a nonbinding verdict, unless
all parties agree to be bound, in an effort to assist the parties in
settlement negotiations." 5
Finally, several district courts have local rules which mention the summoning
386
of jurors for SJTs, but they do not provide any direct authority for doing SO.
All of these approaches seem to have problems. First, it would be quite
cumbersome to amend every applicable federal juror statute so as to include SJT
jurors. Second, the proposed FRCP 16 amendment failed and FRCP is probably
not the appropriate place for details about one of several ADR/settlement
procedures. Third, amending FRCP 39 makes little sense since that provision deals
with non-jury cases, the suggested amendment seems to create a two-tiered consent
requirement (first for the SJT itself and then for the use of jurors from the regular
jury pool). Additionally, if the SJT jurors are treated comparably to jurors serving
on petit juries, there seems to be a need for a cross-referenceto The Jury Selection
and Service Act of 1968.
Therefore, the best approach would seem to be to create the authorization for
summoning SJT jurors as part of a federal SJT statute, with a cross-reference to
The Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968. The proposed language for this part
of the statute is as follows: "SJT jurors shall be drawn from the regularjuror pool
and entitled to the same rights and subject to the same responsibilities as other

384. See McNamara, supra note 23, at 461.
385. Id. at 493.
386. See D. MAss. R. 16.4(C)(3): "(3) Summary Jury Trial...(b) There shall be six (6) jurors
on the panel, unless the parties agree otherwise .... " See also N.D. OHIO R. 7:5.3:
RULE 7:5.3 PROCEDURAL CONSIDERATIONS .... (e) Size of Jury Panel. Usually
the jury shall consist of six (6) jurors. To accommodate case concerns, the size of the
jury panel may vary. Because the summary jury trial is usually concluded in a day or
less, the judge may choose to use the challenged or unused panel members as a second
jury. This procedure can provide the Court and counsel with additional juror reaction.
Id.

See also N.D. OKLA. R. 47.2:

COMMUNICATION WITH JURORS.
No person shall
LOCAL RULE 47.2
communicate with any juror concerning said juror's service in any trial prior to the juror's
discharge from the case. Upon discharge from service, each juror is free to discuss, or
refuse to discuss, said juror's service with any person if the juror so desires. Attorneys
who are officers of this court and those acting on behalf of such attorneys are prohibited
from approaching jurors in any matter at any time concerning said juror's service, except
on leave of court upon a showing of good cause. This restriction shall not apply to jurors
selected in summary jury trials conducted in connection with a court-supervised settlement
effort.
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jurors summoned pursuant to The Jury Selection and Services Act of 1968, 28
on post-trial communications with
U.S.C. Sections 1861-1878. Any ''restrictions
87
jurors do not apply to SJT jurors. C. UncertaintyAbout the Right of Access
to STs by the
Press and the Public
The issue of access to SJTs by the press and the public has been addressed
directly by one Sixth Circuit case 8 and one district court case,389 and by a
number of articles written about the appellate court case.39 The circuit court
held that the process could be closed to the press and the public, over the
objections of the press, but the district court held that the process could be open
to the press and public, over the objections of the parties.39' And the issue has
not been addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court, by Congress, or by the creators
of the federal rules.
1. Legal Challenges

In 1988, in Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. v. General Electric Co.,392 the
Sixth Circuit decided the issue of whether the press and the public should have
access to SJts.3 93 In that case, the Southern District of Ohio issued an order
requiring the parties to participate in a SJT.3 94 The order included a provision
closing the proceeding to the press and the public.39 Several newspapers then
moved to intervene in the underlying action for the limited purpose of challenging
the order closing the SJT.3 96 According to this opinion, the district court had

387.
388.
(discussion
389.
NLO, Inc.,
390.

See proposed federal SJT statute infra part IV.
See Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 854 F.2d 900 (6th Cir. 1988)
infra).
See Day v. NLO, Inc., 147 F.R.D. 148 (S.D. Ohio 1993), vacated on other grounds, In re
5 F.3d 154 (6th Cir. 1993).
See Summary Jury Trials: Should the PublicHave Access? Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co.

v. General Electric Co., 854 F.2d 900 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nor. Cincinnati Post v.
GeneralElectric Co., 109 S.Ct. 1171 (1989), 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1069 (1989); Cincinnati Gas &

Electric Co. v. GeneralElectric Co.: Extinguishing the Light on Summary Jury Trials, 49 OHIO ST.
L. J. 1453 (Winter, 1989); Summary Jury Trials: A "Settlement Technique" That Places a Shroud of
Secrecy on Our Courtrooms? 23 IND. L. REV. 949 (1990).

391.

See discussion infra.

392.

854 F.2d 900' (6th Cir. 1988).

393.
As stated above, see infra part IIl.A. 1.(a), the court also indicated, in dicta, that SJTs were
authorized either under Rule 16, or as a matter of the court's inherent power, to manage its cases. Id.
at 903 n.4 (citing Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962), and Thomas D. Lambros, The
Summary Jury Trial, A Report to the JudicialConference of the United States, 103 F.R.D. 461, 469

(1984)).
394.

Id. at 901.

395.

Id. at 902.

396.

Id.
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denied the motion, holding that the press had no first amendment right of access
because: (1) there is no tradition of access to summary jury trials or to other
recognized settlement devices; and (2) public access "does not play a particularly
significant positive role" in the functioning of the summary jury trial because "the
proceeding is non-binding and has no effect on the merits of the case, other than
settlement. ""
The precise issue on appeal was whether the first amendment right of access
attaches to the summary jury proceeding in this case, and the appellate court
The court first explained the standard for
concluded that it does not.:'
analyzing a first amendment access claim, as set forth in Press-EnterpriseCo. v.
Superior Court,399 hereinafter Press-EnterpriseII:
In Press Enterprise II, the Court held that. . . the analysis of a first
amendment claim of access involves two "complimentary
considerations." First, the proceeding must be one for which there has
been a "tradition of accessibility." This inquiry requires a court to
determine "whether the place and process [to which access is sought]
has historically been open to the press and general public." Second,
public access must play a "significant positive role in the functioning of
the particular process in question." Moreover, even if these elements
are satisfied, the right of access is a qualified one and must be
outweighed by a strong countervailing interest in maintaining the
confidentiality of the proceedings.0 0
The Sixth Circuit first concurred with the district court that "there is no
historically recognized right of access to summary jury trials in that this
mechanism has been in existence for less than a decade."4 '' It pointed out that
summary jury trials are designed to settle disputes and that historically settlement
techniques have been closed rather than open.4" 2
The court also rejected appellants' argument that SJTs are structurally similar
40 3
to ordinary civil jury trials, which have historically been open to the public.
The court stated: "However, it is clear that while the summary jury trial is a
highly reliable predictor of the likely trial outcome, there are manifold differences
between it and a real trial., 40 4 It listed the differences between the two
processes and then noted: "To emphasize the purely settlement function of the
exercise, the mock jury is often asked to assess damages even if it finds no

397. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co., 854 F.2d at 902 (citing the Joint Appendix at 180, 190)
(footnote omitted).
398. Id. at 902-03.
399. 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
400. 854 F.2d at 903 (citing Press-EnterpriseA, 106 S.Ct. at 2740-41) (citations omitted).
401.
Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co., 854 F.2d at 903 (citing the Joint Appendix at 180).
402. Id.at 903-04 (citations omitted).
403. Id.at 904.
404. Id.
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liability. Also, the court and jurors join the attorneys and parties after the
'verdict' is returned in an informal discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of
each side's case."4 ° It added: "At every turn the summary jury trial is designed
to facilitate pretrial settlement of the litigation, much like a settlement conference.
It is important to note that the summary jury trial does not present any matter for
adjudication by the court."4 °6 Therefore, the court concluded that the "tradition
of accessibility" element had not been met.40
With respect to the second criterion -- whether access "plays a significant
positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question" -- the court
stated that where a party has a legitimate interest in confidentiality, public access
4 8
would be detrimental to the effectiveness of the SJT in facilitating settlement.
Therefore, public access to SJTs over the parties' objections would have
significant adverse effects on the utility of the procedure as a settlement
device.40 9 Allowing access thus would undermine the substantial governmental
410
And,
interest in promoting settlements, and would not meet the standard.
finally, since SJTs do not present any matters for adjudication by the court, they
need not be open to the public.4"' The Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court's
denial of the newspapers' motion to intervene.4" 2
In January of 1993, the district court in Day v. NLO, Inc.,413 ordered a SJT
to be open to the public. 4 The court quoted its earlier decision involving the
same defendant and the same facility 415 on that issue as follows:

405. Id.(citing Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial -- An Alternative Method of Resolving
Disputes, 69 JUDICATURE 286, 289 (Feb.-Mar. 1986)).
406.

Id. at 904.

407.
408.
409.

Id.
Id.
Id.

410.

Id.

Id.at 905.
411.
412. Id.(citations and footnotes omitted). See also United States v. Kentucky Utils. Co., 124
F.R.D. 146 (E.D. Ky. 1989), where the court noted in dicta that courts can maintain the confidentiality
of settlement negotiations and apparently placing SJTs in that category. Id.at 153 n.7. The court stated
that the Sixth Circuit has held that a summary jury trial may be closed to the public. Id. (citing
CincinnatiGas & Elec. Co., 854 F.2d at 903). It added that the Federal Rules of Evidence specifically

prohibit the admissibility of any statement made in the course of settlement negotiations. Id.(citing
FED. R. EvID. 408).
147 F.R.D. 148 (S.D. Ohio 1993).
413.
414. Id. at 151 (the Sixth Circuit later reversed this court's order compelling participation in the
summary jury trial; (see In re NLO, Inc., 5 F.3d 154 (6th Cir. 1993)) but it did not specifically address
the issue of whether the district court could require that it be a public proceeding).

415. See In re Femald, No. C-1-85-149, 1989 WL 267039 (S.D. Ohio, Sept. 29, 1989); see also
Day, 147 F.R.D. at 150. The defendant in both cases, National Lead of Ohio ("NLO"), was involved
in certain aspects of developing and manufacturing nuclear weapons for our country's armed services
at the Feed Materials Production Center ("FMPC") in Femald, Ohio. Id.The first suit (In re Fernald)
was brought against NLO by the residents around the FMPC, alleging that NLO had exposed them to

radiation and other hazardous materials. Id.The next year, the workers and frequenters at the FMPC,
along with their families, brought this lawsuit. Id.
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We conclude that determining whether a summary jury trial should be
open or closed to the press is within our managerial discretion. In the
instant case, we decline to close the summary trial. We agree with
plaintiffs that it would be impracticable to do so given the large number
of plaintiffs involved. Realistically, it is unlikely that developments in
the trial could be kept from the press. Further, this is not a strictly
private dispute.416
It added that these same considerations dictate that this case should not be
closed to the public.4" 7 The court noted that the Sixth Circuit had permitted
federal district courts to close SJTs to the public on the ground that a SJT is a
settlement technique rather than a trial on the merits.41 8 But the court concluded
that if a federal district court holds the greater power to close a SJT, then a federal
district court must have the lesser power to keep open a SJT. 41 9 Closing a SJT
raises First Amendment concerns, the court stated; whereas, opening a SJT does
not. 420
The court also rejected the defendants' argument that an open SJT would
thwart their right to receive a fair trial on the merits since media coverage of it
would pollute the jury pool for the actual trial.42 ' The court stated that recent
history had shown that the defendants could receive a fair trial in that community
despite adverse publicity before trial and that, in any event, if it appeared to the
court during voir dire that the defendants could not obtain a fair trial in Cincinnati,
the court would entertain a motion to try this case in another venue.422 The
court cited several law review articles in support of its decision.2 3
Finally, the court stated that it would be particularly inappropriate to close
the scheduled SJT in this case for two reasons: (1) it is a class action, the

416.

147 F.R.D. at 151 (quoting In re Fernald,No. C-1-85-149 at 2).

417.

Id.

Day v. NLO, Inc., 147 F.R.D. 148, 151 (S.D. Ohio 1993), vacated on other grounds, In
418.
re NLO, Inc. 5 F.3d 154 (6th Cir. 1993) (citing Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co., 854 F.2d at 903-05).
419. Day, 147 F.R.D. at 151.
420. Id.
421.

Id. at 152.

422.

Id.

423.

See 147 F.R.D. at 152 (the court referred to Charles R. Richey, Rule 16: A Survey and

Some Considerationsfor the Bench and the Bar, 126 F.R.D. 599, 609 (Apr. 3, 1989) (Judge Richey
disagreed with the Sixth Circuit's decision in Cincinnati Gas, noting that "the public and the press
should be permitted access to summary jury trial proceedings.")); Susan Tillotson, Note, Constitutional
Law/Alternative Dispute Resolution -- Summary Jury Trials: Should the Public Have Access? -Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. v. General Electric Co., 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1069, 1094 (1989)
(although cited by the Defendants in support of their argument, this commentator actually contends that
the trial court should have discretion in determining whether a summary jury trial should be open or
closed); Judges Should Have the Callon Use, Closure of Proceeding,Lambros Says, 2 ALTERNATIVE
DIsPuTE RESOLtIrON REPORT (BNA) 251, 252-53 (July 21, 1988) (contrary to the Defendants'
assertion, Judge Lambros, the architect of the summary jury trial, holds his summary jury trials in open
court and states that a trial judge "should have the call" in deciding whether to open or close a
summary jury trial).
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settlement of which requires court approval, and class members should have access
to information about the reasonableness of the settlement; and (2) defendants are
being indemnified by the United States government in this case so the nation's
taxpayers would have to pay any judgment and thus have an interest in attending
the SJT.424
The issue of access by the press and public to SJTs was raised again before
On
the Sixth Circuit, but the case settled before it could be decided.425
September 10, 1993, USAir, Inc. filed an "Emergency Application For Writ of
Prohibition" with the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit to
attempt to close to the public the SJTs Judge Lambros had scheduled in eight of
the cases arising out of the March 22, 1992, crash of USAir Flight 405 at
LaGuardia Airport. 426 The suits filed by passengers were consolidated in a
multidistrict litigation and Judge Lambros was presiding over 36 of them.427 On
that same day, the Sixth Circuit granted a temporary stay of all SJTs scheduled in
Multidistrict Litigation Docket No. 936, pending consideration of the petitioner's
motion for a regular three-judge panel of that court.428 However, this order was
terminated when the case was dismissed on October 1, 1993.429
Despite the fact that no final ruling was made on the issue, USAir's
arguments may be instructive. In its emergency application, USAir stated the
issue as follows:
Whether, in light of the clear taint to the jury pool and irreparable harm
to USAir's business reputation which will result, Judge Lambros may
compel USAir, Inc. to participate in the summary jury trial process
without first closing the courtroom to all persons other than the parties,
their representatives, and insurers with an interest in the outcome of the
litigation.430
In its Emergency Application, USAir explained Judge Lambros' denial of its
motion for closure as follows:
On September 1, 1993, Judge Lambros indicated that he intended to
have the summary jury trials open to the public to insure that the
concept of summary jury trials, which are still largely experimental,
would be favorably receivedby the public. Specifically, Judge Lambros
expressed concerns that if the summary jury trials were closed, the

424. Day, 147 F.R.D. at 152.
425.
See Emergency Application For Writ of Prohibition, In Re USAir, Inc., App. No. 93-3973
(6th Cir., Sept. 10, 1993) [hereinafter Emergency Application].
Id.
426.
427.

Emergency Application, supra note 425 at 2-3.

428.
429.

See Sept. 10, 1992 Order in In Re USAir, Inc., App. No. 93-3973 (6th Cir. 1992).
Interview with Sixth Circuit Clerk, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

(Sept. 22, 1994).

430.

Emergency Application, supra note 425, at 2.
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process would receive a reputation as a "Star Chamber." On September
9, 1993, Judge Lambros formally denied USAir's closure motion, noting
as reasons his concern that summary jury trials would get a "bad name"
and that "academia" would take "critical shots" at the procedure if
closed. Further, Judge Lambros refused to grant USAir's motion for a
stay of the summary jury trials pending this Court's review of the
"
foregoing emergency application.43
'
USAir pointed out that the Sixth Circuit had already ruled in CincinnatiGas
& Electric Co. v. General Electric Co.43 that the First Amendment is not
implicated in the summary jury process, and that the public should be barred from
SJTs where one of the parties has a legitimate interest in maintaining
confidentiality.433
It stated that the court in that case examined the summary jury process and
concluded that:
[Wihere a party has a legitimate interest in confidentiality, public access
would be detrimental to the effectiveness of the summary jury trial in
facilitating settlement. Thus public access to summary jury trials over
the parties' objections would have significant adverse effects on the
utility of the procedure as a settlement device. Therefore, allowing
access would undermine the substantial governmental interest in
promoting settlements, and would not play a "significant positive role
in the functioning of the particular process in question."",'
USAir added that unlike many of the matters to which the SIT process is
applied, this matter does not involve a suit by a lone claimant in which there is
little general public interest.43 It noted that this multidistrict litigation involves
thirty-six separate lawsuits arising from a "spectacular air disaster which received
both intensive live television coverage and extensive coverage over the following
months by both the print and broadcast media .... There is, as can be expected
in such a high profile matter, an interest in the outcome of these suits by both the
public and the media."43 6
USAir next argued that the court should keep in mind that since the SIT is
not really an adjudication, but rather a settlement tool, many of the procedural
safeguards of a real trial are absent.4" 7 It concluded: "Given the nature of this
case, the potential jury pool for the thirty-six trials on the merits will be

431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.

Id. at4.
854 F.2d 900 (6th Cir. 1988).
Emergency Application, supra note 425, at 7.
Id.(quoting Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co., 854 F.2d at 904).
Emergency Application, supra note 425, at 9.
Id.
Id.
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irreparably tainted by the inevitable media reports of what are at best 'preliminary'
reports depicting
and at worst 'grossly inequitable' presentations, as well as4 media
38
,
evidence.
inadmissible
clearly
and
inflammatory
highly
USAir added that this unfair prejudice will be further compounded by the
court's scheduling order, which sets the thirty-six trials on the merits to begin less
than six weeks after the beginning of the SJTs.439 It concluded that there would
not be time for the results of the SJTs to fade from the minds of potential jurors
44°
to a sufficient degree to eliminate the threat of unfair prejudice.
USAir also argued that the SJT was created solely as a mechanism to
facilitate settlement and traditionally the settlement process has been closed to the
44
public and has been a matter strictly between the parties at interest. ' USAir
stated that the crash of Flight 405 had attracted nationwide interest and the sheer
number of SJT verdicts alone (five in three days) was likely to attract media
attention.442
Finally, USAir argued that the SJTs on punitive damages alone would be
misleading since the plaintiffs would not have to show facts to legally support
such an award.44 - It stated:
If a summary jury hears evidence on punitive damages based upon the
relaxed standards of proof at the summary jury trial, the reputation of
USAir in the business community and among prospective passengers
will be harmed and settlement efforts will be hindered rather than aided.
This harm will be irreversible, as no amount of subsequent publicity is
impression created by reports of the
likely to blunt the 4erroneous
44
summary jury trials.
USAir concluded that Judge Lambros' order was a clear abuse of discretion,
and requested that the Sixth Circuit issue the requested Writ of Prohibition
Judge Lambros from compelling USAir to participate in open
preventing
445
SITs.

438. Id. at 10. Note that USAir also describes an example of what it referred to as
"inflammatory 'evidence"' which Judge Lambros was going to allow at the SJTs. Id. It is a 15-minute
videotape to be used by plaintiffs as their opening statement, which consists of shots of simulated plane
crashes, explosions and wreckage -- some coming from a network television show "20/20" and some
from a 1989 crash of an Air Ontario flight at Dryden, Ontario. Id. at 10-11. USAir stated: "This
videotape alone, which would not be admissible at a trial on the merits, will certainly receive
sensational coverage by the media, and will severely prejudice USAir." Id.
439. Id. at 11.
440. Id.
Emergency Application, supra note 425, at 13.
441.
442. Id.
443. Id. at 14.
444. Id.
445.

Id. at 14-15.
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2. What Judges Have Relied Upon
The surveyed judges were not asked about this issue, and it unclear what the
usual practice is with respect to the access to SJTs by the press and public.
Although several current local federal court rules provide that the process will be
considered confidential and/or make inadmissible the transcript of a SJT, 446 none
of them appear to specifically mention the ability to close a SJT to the press and
the public.
3. Preserving the Confidentiality of the SJT Process
Again, based upon the discussion above, the issue of whether the press and
public have access to a SJT, and whether the parties or the courts make that
decision, remains unresolved. Although the issue was not directly before it in
Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co.,447 the Sixth Circuit did state that public access
to SJTs over the parties' objections would have significant adverse effects on the
utility of the SJT as a settlement device.448 Without waiting for the precise issue
to be decided by an appellate court or the United States Supreme Court, it seems
appropriate to guarantee that the process remain confidential, unless the parties
agree otherwise.
Therefore, the suggested statutory language to address this issue -- to be
included as part of a fairly comprehensive federal SJT statute -- is as follows:
"Unless all parties agree otherwise, SJTs will not be recorded or reported, will be
Federal Rule of Evidence 408,
treated as confidential settlement proceedings under
449
and will be closed to the press and the public.1

D. UncertaintyAbout the Confidentiality
and Future Use
of SIT Information and Verdicts
There are at least two basic issues with respect to information revealed during
the SJT and the resulting verdict: must they be treated as confidential in future
proceedings, and can they be used as the basis for any post-trial motion by the
losing party.

446.
See, e.g., D. CONN. R. 36(5); D. MAss. R. 16.4(C)(3); N.D. OH-o R. 7:5.3; W.D. WASH
R. CR 39.1(e)(6); see also NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1157 (1987).
447.

854 F.2d 900 (6th Cir. 1988).

448.
449.

Id. at 904.
See infra part IV, for the complete version of the proposed federal SJT statute.
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1. Legal Challenges
The first issue was raised in Russell v. PPG Indus., Inc.,'" in which the
plaintiff's counsel revealed to the Seventh Circuit the SJT verdict it had received,
"
' The Seventh Circuit concluded
in an effort to support its argument on appeal. 45
that:
Courts conduct summary jury trials with the cooperation of the parties.
Given that participation in the procedure is voluntary in this Circuit, we
suggest that those who do so abide by the rules. It is inappropriate to
attempt to bring to this Court's attention information which obviously
was intended to remain within the confines of the summary jury trial
process.452
The court first pointed out that plaintiffs participation in the SJT was
voluntary, adding, "He chose to play the game and, having done so, must live by
the rules."453 The court stated that whatever the merits of the SJT,454 any
potential it might have as a settlement tool will be undermined if the parties who
participate "do not adhere to the basic strictures of the process." 455 It added:
The purpose of the summary jury trial is "to motivate litigants toward
settlement by allowing them to estimate how an actualjury may respond
to their evidence. . ." The potential for risk in this "no-risk" procedure
would increase significantly if confidentiality could be disregarded and
4 6
information gleaned from the process used in later proceedings. "
The Seventh Circuit next stated that SJT in no way mirrors a full trial on the
merits, pointing out that it involves abbreviated procedures and evidentiary

450.
451.
452.
453.

454.

953 F.2d 326 (7th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 333.
Id. at 334.
Id. at 333.
Id. (noting that the reviews are mixed, comparing Richard Posner, The Summary Jury Trial

and OtherMethods ofAlternative Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations,53 U. CHI. L.

REV. 366 (1986) and McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43 (E.D.Ky. 1988)).
455. Russell v. PPG Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 326, 333 (7th Cir. 1992).
456. Id. at 334 (citations omitted). The Court added, in a footnote:
Indeed, commentators have stressed the closed nature of the summary jury trial. See, e.g.,
Spiegel, Summary Jury Trials, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 829, 831 (1986) ("neither the jury

findings nor any statement of counsel during the summary jury trial are admissible in the
trial on the merits or may be construed as judicial admissions."); Tillotson, Note,
Summary Jury Trials: Should the Public Have Access?, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1069,
1073-74 (1989) ("It is viewed solely as a technique for facilitating settlement.

Thus,

neither the jury findings nor any statement by counsel made during the summary jury trial
are admissible in a future trial on the merits.").

Id. at n.6.
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flexibility, lawyers' arguments that would not be evidence in an actual trial,
457
possible assessment of damages even where the jury finds no liability, etc.
Therefore, it should be treated as comparable to settlements, offers to settle, and
settlement negotiations -- which are all inadmissible to prove liability under
Federal Rule of Evidence 408.458 It stated that if parties were allowed to offer
information from a SJT to this court, "its utility as a settlement device would be
significantly undermined459and parties' willingness to participate in the process
substantially decreased.1
This issue was also raised in a district court opinion in the Day v. NLO, Inc.
case deciding plaintiffs' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for
new trial.460 One of the issues plaintiffs raised in their motion was the
admissibility of a SJT verdict and the resulting settlement agreement. 461 After
4 62
involving the same defendant
the parties in a previous case, In re Fernald,
conducted a SJT and then settled the case, it was a topic of "great debate" whether
evidence of the SJT and settlement agreement would be admissible at the statute
of limitations trial in the subsequent Day v. NLO case. 463 Before the statute of
limitations trial, the defendants filed a motion to exclude evidence of the prior SJT
and settlement; plaintiffs opposed the motion.464 This court issued an order
granting in part and denying in part the defendants' motion. 46" Relying upon
Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the court concluded:
[E]vidence of the summary jury trial and the settlement agreement in
the Fernald residents' suit must not be mentioned by either party during
voir dire or in their respective opening statements. However, if such
permissible purpose, any
evidence is offered at trial for an allegedly
46
objections will be ruled upon at that time.
Plaintiffs then moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for new
trial, arguing, in part, that this limitation upon the evidence presented an "artificial

457. Id. at 334.
458. Id.; see also FED. R. EviD. 408:
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering
or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to
compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not admissible
to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount. Evidence of conduct or
statements made in compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible.
Id.
459.
460.
461.
462.
463.
464.
465.
466.

Russell, 953 F.2d at 334.
798 F. Supp. 1322 (S.D. Ohio 1992).
Id. at 1330.
No. C-1-85-149 (S.D. Ohio May 24, 1989).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Day, 798 F. Supp. at 1330.
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situation" and was grounds for the requested relief.4 67 The court quoted from
Federal Rule of Evidence 408, and noted that it barred evidence of both settlement
and settlement negotiations.4 68 However, it added that Rule 408 also provides:
"[tihis rule also does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for
another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a
contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation
or prosecution. ,161
The court also pointed out that Rule 402 provides, "Evidence which is not
relevant is not admissible," and concluded that the Fernald SJT and settlement
were not relevant (and, therefore, were not admissible) to the statute of limitations
trial.47 In addition, the court noted that plaintiffs had not even attempted to
offer evidence of the FernaldSJT and settlement. 47'
Finally, the court stated that even if the evidence could be construed as
relevant, any relevance was outweighed by the danger of prejudice and
confusion.4 72 Here there was great potential for jury confusion since both cases
had received substantial media attention, and unfortunately, media representatives
had frequently referred to both of them by the same name.473 In addition, the
jury in the latter case was to determine only whether the statute of limitations had
run as to the Day v. NLO plaintiffs -- and was not to consider the merits of
plaintiffs' claims. The court denied plaintiffs' motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict or for new trial.474
No case appears to address directly the second issue raised in this context:
whether, when the parties refuse to settle after a SJT and the case is tried, either
party should be able to rely upon the SJT verdict as the basis for a renewed
motion for judgment as a matter of law, or a motion for new trial on the ground
that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, or a motion for a remittitur
of the damages awarded, or a response to any such motion.4 75
The only case which comes close to addressing this issue is Caldwell v. Ohio
Power Co. ,476 a personal injury action decided by Judge Lambros. In that case,
the jury awarded $2.2 million to the plaintiff, and the defendant then filed a
motion for a new trial and/or amendment of judgment. 77 Defendant contended

467.

Id.

468.
469.

Id.
Id.(citing FED. R. EvID. 408).

470.

Id.

471.
472.

Id.
Id. at 1330-31 (citing FED. R. EVID. 403).

473.

Id. at 1331.

474.
475.

Id.
For instance, assume a SiT occurs. The jury renders a "verdict" for the defendant. The

parties, still unable to agree, go to a real trial at which on the basis of substantially the same evidence,
the jury returns a very substantial verdict for the plaintiff. Can the defendant point to the SJT verdict
as evidence that the actual verdict was against the weight of the evidence and should be set aside?
476. 710 F. Supp. 194 (N.D. Ohio 1989).
477. Id. at 195-96.
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"that the verdict was rendered under the influence of passion or prejudice and was
not reasonably based on the evidence. "' Defendant argued "that the jury merely
adopted the calculation of future damages of Dr. Burke, an economist called by
plaintiff, and that Dr. Burke's testimony was speculative. '"" 9 Among other
arguments, defendant also suggested that the jury's decision was influenced by the
visible emotion displayed "by plaintiff's mother during the trial, and by the time
of year (shortly before Christmas). 4 80
Judge Lambros responded to these (and other) arguments and then finally
noted that the result in this case was "remarkably consistent" with the verdict
reached in a SJT conducted on November 24.4"1 The court continued:
The [summary] jury reached an advisory, non-binding verdict in favor
of plaintiff in the amount of $2.5 million. The jury instructions used
during the SJT were substantially the same as those used during the
trial. The SJT was not conducted during the holidays. Also, neither
plaintiffs mother nor an economist testified. This would seem to
support the Court's finding, based on the evidence presented at trial,
that the verdict was not influenced by passion or preiudice. The Court
is not inclined to conclude that two separate panels evaluating the same
case would return verdicts based on passion or prejudice. 4"
Although it is unclear whether the plaintiff based part of its response to
defendant's motion for new trial on the SJT result, the court clearly took it into
account in this case. Such conduct certainly raises the issue as to whether
limitations on such use of SJT verdicts should be in place.
2. What Judges Have Relied Upon
The surveyed judges provided their views with respect to the two issues
mentioned above concerning the confidentiality and future use of SJT information
and verdicts.
When the surveyed judges were asked whether information, strategies, and
evidence revealed in the SJT (as well as the outcome thereof) should be admissible
in the actual trial, approximately three times as many judges said no as said
yes.483 Of those responding negatively, there were several bases for this opinion.

478.

Id. at 196.

479.

Id.

480.
481.

Id.
Id. at 202.

482.
Id. (emphasis added).
See JudicialSurvey Responses, supra note 24, Question 31, at 50-5 1. (Twenty-two judges
483.
said no in response to this question; eight judges said yes; and three judges made some other type of

response. One of these judges said yes in part and no in part.); see also Attorney Survey Responses,
supranote 25, Question 19, at 15. The question asked of the surveyed attorneys was slightly different.
Id. It stated (with emphasis added): "Should information, strategy, and evidence revealed in the
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Most of the judges likened this to disclosing settlement discussions. 84 For
example, one judge wrote that a SJT is simply a settlement negotiating procedure
and should not be mentioned during the actual trial; nor should it affect the
conduct of the actual trial.485 Another judge stated that a SJT is only a
settlement technique and that otherwise parties will be too guarded as to what they
will do in these negotiations.486 Another said that a SJT is a settlement device,
not a trial; what happens there should not be used in a trial unless it is proper
evidence from a witness or exhibit.4 7
Responding judges also said that the case should be retried in its entirety, and
that the parties should "start fresh."488 Others said that such use would destroy
the effectiveness of the SJT as a settlement tool, would defeat the purpose of the
SJT, would not be fair, and would be highly prejudicial.489 One judge
specifically stated that the SJT verdict should not be admissible in the actual trial,
under Federal Rule of Evidence 408.490 Another added that anything revealed
at the SJT should not be admissible and the outcome should not be revealed since
it is not probative.4 9' Finally, one judge stated that the fact that there was a SJT
should never be disclosed to the regular sitting jury.492Most of the judges that
said SJT information, strategies, and evidence should be revealed in the actual trial
based this on the assumption that evidence should be admissible if consistent with
the rules of evidence.493
The second issue deals with post-trial use of a SJT verdict for strategic
advantage by a losing party. When the judges were asked whether a party, after
a SJT and a trial, should be able to use a SJT verdict as the basis for a JNOV
motion (now, renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law), or a motion for
new trial on the ground that the verdict was against the weighi of the evidence,

summary jury trial (as well as the outcome thereof) be admissible in the actual trial (e.g., if the actual
trial differs significantly?)? Why or why not?" Id. One attorney responded negatively to this question
but indicated that this problem might be avoided if the judge or magistrate obtained trial briefs in
advance of the SJT that will govern the actual trial. Id.
484. See JudicialSurvey Responses, supra note 24, Question 31, at 50-51.
485. Id.at 50.
486. Id. at 51.
487. Id.
488. Id.
489. Id.at 50; see also Attorney Survey Responses, supra note 25, Question 19, at 15. One of
the surveyed lawyers who responded negatively explained: "First, it defeats the purpose of an
inexpensive, streamlined summary jury trial, and, second, it would be impossible to monitor. It would
make phony Rule II claims and motions to disqualify counsel look like child's play." Id. Other
lawyers responding negatively said that it would discourage use of the process and that SJTs are
artificial mechanisms that should have no binding effect in any way. Id.
490. JudicialSurvey Responses, supra note 24, Question 31, at 51.
491. Id.
492. Id.; see also Attorney Survey Responses, supra note 25, Question 19, at 15. A surveyed
lawyer said that the SiT is a settlement-promoting mechanism and that even a reference to it in a real
trial would be extremely prejudicial. Id.
493. Judicial Survey Responses, supra note 24, Question 31, at 50.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995

77

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1995, Iss. 2 [1995], Art. 1
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION

[Vol. 1995, No. 2

or a motion for a remittitur of the damages awarded, or a response to any such
motion, all but one judge responded negatively. 94
The judges thought these options should not be available for a variety of
reasons: a SJT is merely a settlement device; attorneys will not agree to participate
in SJTs, or will be less willing to do so if these options exist; they would
undermine the value and effect of a SJT; and too many variables can affect the
decision to settle, and it would be an improper deterrent to the exercise of the
right to trial.495
A number of the judges also justified their responses by pointing out the
following differences between SJTs and actual trials: the regular trial might have
differed because of the demeanor and credibility of live witnesses; different
evidentiary problems may exist; the same exact standards are not used in both
proceedings; the rules of evidence are not followed in SJTs, so nothing at a SJT
should serve as a basis for subsequent motions; and the SJT has no protections
which would protect a party's due process rights.496
3. Preserving the Confidentiality, and Limiting the Future
Use, of SJT Information and Verdicts
Based upon the discussion above, it is clear that judges generally do not favor
the admissibility of SJT information, SJT strategies or the SJT verdict (unless
otherwise admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence) or the future use of
such as the basis for a post-trial motion. Since such use would appear to cause
additional problems and controversy, the limitations on it should be clarified.
Local federal court rules address these issues in slightly different ways.49 7
Some specifically provide that no statement made or document produced as part
of the SJT, or the SJT verdict itself, shall be admissible at trial, unless otherwise
admissible under the rules of evidence. 498 Others merely state that unless the

494. Id., Question 34, at 56. Of the 31 judges responding to this question, only one said yes.
Id. The judge responding in the affirmative did not explain his answer. Id. In fact, one judge stated
that the SJT verdict should have no validity for other purposes. Id. at 57.
495. Id., Question 34, at 56-57. One judge commented, "No one will participate ifthey imagine
such a scenario." Id. at 56. Another judge added that the SJT is a settlement device and as soon as

it is something more, no one will use it. Id.; see also Attorney Survey Responses, supra note 25,
Question 20, at 15. When the attorneys were asked this same question, one stated that this would
discourage use of the SJT process, and another said that SJTs are artificial mechanisms that should
have no binding effect in any way. Id. Another attorney responding negatively stated that "The real
thing and summary jury trials are like night and day. No comparison!" Id.
496.

See JudicialSurvey Responses, supra note 24, Question 34, at pages 56-57. One judge

added that the SJT is designed to help parties see the case through an outsider's unbiased sight of a
summary trial -- not the actual trial. Id. at 57.
497. See discussion infra.
498. See, e.g., D. CoNN. R. 36(5); D. MASS. R. 16.4(C)(3); N.D. OHO R. 7:5.3; see also NEB.
REV. STAT. § 25-1157 (1987); see also the magistrate judge's SJT order attached to judicial survey
response #27 (D. Neb.), Professor Ann E. Woodley's Summary Jury Trials ("SJTs") Questionnaire
Responses (1994) (on file with Professor Woodley, The University of Akron School of Law). It states:
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parties agree otherwise, the proceedings will not be reported or recorded, and will
remain confidential.499
After a review of these statutes, the proposed statutory language to address
this problem is as follows:
(a) Unless all parties agree otherwise, SJTs will not be recorded or
reported, will be treated as confidential settlement proceedings under
Federal Rule of Evidence 408, and will be closed to the press and the
public. 00
(b) In the event that no settlement is reached following the SJT, and
the case is returned to the trial docket:
(1) No statement made or document produced as part of the SJT,
not otherwise discoverable or obtainable, shall be subject to discovery.
(2) A judge or magistrate judge shall not admit at a subsequent
trial, or any other legal proceeding, any evidence that there has been a
SJT, the nature or amount of any SJT verdict, any statement made or
document produced in the SJT, or any other matter concerning the
conduct of the SJT, the discussions with the jurors or negotiations
related to it, unless:
(i) The evidence would otherwise be admissible under the
Federal Rules of Evidence; or
(ii) The parties have otherwise stipulated.
(c) A non-binding SJT verdict shall not be appealable."'

7 .... In the absence of agreement to the contrary, the following procedures will be
applicable ...
f) Unless specifically ordered by the court, the proceedings will not be recorded.
g) Counsel may stipulate that a consensus verdict by the jury will be deemed a
final determination on the merits and that judgment be entered thereon by the court, or
may stipulate to any other use of the verdict that will aid in resolution of the case. Unless
such a stipulation is entered, the jury's verdict will be advisory only, not to be used in any
future court proceedings. Immediately following the summary jury trial, counsel and the
parties shall remain for a settlement conference with the court.
8. These rules shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive conclusion
of the summary jury trial procedure.
9. Neither the statements of counsel during the summary jury trial, nor any statements
made by participants at the settlement conference following the summary jury trial, shall
be used by any party with respect to any aspect of the litigation or trial of this case.
Id.
499.
specifically
500.
to SJTs by
501.

See, e.g., W.D. WASR R. CR 39.1 (e)(6); see also D. CONN. R. 36(5), which does both (and
refers to the protections of FED. R. EviD. 408 and FED. R. Civ. P. 68).
See infra part IV, the same language is proposed for use in dealing with the issue of access
the press and the public.
See infra part IV, for the complete proposed federal SJT statute.
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E. UncertaintyAbout the Appropriatenessof
and the Authorityfor
Awarding Sanctions in the SIT Context
The final primary issue threatening the use and effectiveness of SJTs is the
uncertainty about the appropriateness of, and the authority for, awarding sanctions
in the SJT context.
1. Potential Legal Challenges
Although there have been no challenges to SJT sanctions in reported
decisions, issues concerning the award of sanctions in analogous contexts have
been litigated -- with mixed results.

For example, some appellate courts have upheld local rules providing for the
imposition of costs as a sanction for last-minute settlements entered into after the
taxpayers have incurred the expense of bringing in the jury.50 2 But in Kothe v.
Smith,5"3 the appellate court reached the opposite conclusion.
In the Kothe v. Smith case, the appellate court vacated a judgment directing
a defendant to pay $1,000 to plaintiffs attorney, $1,000 to plaintiff's medical
witness, and $480 to the Clerk of the Court as a sanction for settling the case for
$20,000 after one day of trial when the court had recommenddd that the case be
settled for between $20,000 and $30,000 during the pretrial conference held three
weeks prior to the trial." 4 The lower court judge had directed the parties to
conduct settlement negotiations at that time and had warned them that "if they
settled for a comparable figure after the trial had begun, he would impose
sanctions against the dilatory party." 5 The appellate court stated that "although
the law favors the voluntary settlement of civil suits, it does not sanction efforts
by trial judges to effect settlements through coercion. 50 6 It added that FRCP
16 "was not designed as a means for clubbing the parties -- or one of them -- into

an involuntary compromise.""' 1 Although subsection (c)(7) of FRCP 16, "added
in the 1983 amendments of the Rule, was designed to encouragepretrial settlement
discussions, it was not its purpose to 'impose settlement negotiations on unwilling
litigants. '"'08 Although SJTs were not at issue in this case, some of the court's
language might be persuasive since SJTs are often likened to settlement
negotiations.) °

502.
See McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 45 (citing White v. Raymark Indus. Inc., 783 F.2d 1175 (4th
Cir. 1986); Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d 557 (3rd Cir. 1985)).
503.
771 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1985).
504.
505.

Id. at 669.
Id. at 668-69.

506.

Id. at 669.

507.

Id.

508.

Id. (quoting Advisory Committee Note, 97 F.R.D. 205, 210 (1983)).

509.

See, e.g., U.S. v. Kentucky Utils. Co., 124 F.R.D. 146, 153 n.7 (E.D. Ky. 1989).
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And in JF. Edwards Construction Co. v. Anderson Safeway Guard Rail
Corp.,"' involving a fact pattern that could be considered analogous to failure
to participate in a SJT in good faith, the appellate court reversed the award of
sanctions under FRCP 16.5" In that case, when one of the parties, Anderson,
would not agree to a stipulation of facts for the purpose of trial, the district court
entered an order striking Anderson's pleadings, dismissing Anderson's complaint
against Westinghouse, enteringjudgment against Anderson on Edwards' complaint
"subject to jury verdict on the dollar amount of damages proven in ex parte
proceedings," and dismissing Westinghouse's complaint against Anderson as
moot."' The appellate court reversed, holding that FRCP 16 does not compel
53
a stipulation of facts, so that sanctions for failure to file one are not available.
The appellate court noted that obviously a trial court has the power to make
effective a pre-trial order within the four comers of FRCP 16, but an order forcing
parties to stipulate facts is not authorized by that rule.514 It also quoted the
reporter of the United States Supreme Court's Advisory Committee on the Rules
of Civil Procedure as follows:
So the proper function of pre-trial is not to club the parties -- or one of
Pre-trial, in purpose and in its most
them -- into submission ....
successful use, is informational and factual, rather than legal and
coercive. It may well lead to settlement as the parties come to know
their case better, but that must remain an uncoerced by-product. 5
The court also rejected Rule 41(b) and the inherent power of the court as
support for the sanctions imposed.5"6 The court noted that:
Behind the face of Rule 16, a narrowly circumscribed area of power has
developed which the judge may employ to compel obedience to his
requests and demands relating to the pre-trial conference. This power
may be founded either upon Rule 41(b) or upon the inherent power of
courts to manage their calendars to have an orderly and expeditious
disposition of their cases. Whatever the exact genesis of this power to
compel obedience, the key is a failure to prosecute, whether styled as
a failure to appear at a pre-trial conference, failure to file a pre-trial
statement, failure to prepare for the conference or failure to comply
with the pre-trial order. Therefore Rule 41 (b), dealing with involuntary

510.
511.
512.
513.

542 F.2d 1318 (7th Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
Id. at 1322, 1325.
Id.at 1320-21.
Id. at 1322, 1325.

514.

Id.

515.
516.

Id.at 1325 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1323.
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dismissals, and the inherent power of district courts do not support the
sanctions imposed." 7
And because the party that would not agree to a stipulation of facts was clearly
not attempting to avoid trial, the district court's order dismissing its case was
reversed.518
In Identiseal Corp. of Wisconsin v. Positive Identification Systems, Inc., 19
the appellate court held that the district court lacked authority under FRCP 16 to
compel involuntary discovery, and thus reversed the court's order dismissing the
complaint for failure to conduct such discovery.520 The court stated:
In our judgment this appeal is controlledby JF.Edwards [Construction
Co. v. Anderson Safeway Guard Rail Corp., 542 F.2d 1318 (7th Cir.
1976) (per curiam)]. Like the appellant in J.F.Edwards, plaintiff in the
case at bar did not engage in conduct that could be characterized as a
failure to prosecute. Plaintiff was ready to go to trial, and simply
disagreed with the district court about the desirability of eliminating the
need to develop all of the facts at trial. Although we recognize that its
order was based on a commendable desire to simplify the lawsuit, the
court had no more authority under Rule 16 to command discovery than
the district court in JF.Edwards had to require a stipulation of facts.
The limit of the court's power was to compel plaintiff to consider the
possibility of conducting discovery, and there is no evidence in the
record that plaintiff's attorney rejected the district court's preferred
method of litigating the action without giving it serious consideration.
Our decision is predicated on more than the absence of express
authority in Rule 16 authorizing compulsory discovery. It is also based
on the traditional principle that the parties, rather than the court, should
determine litigation strategy. It was the judgment of plaintiff s attorney
that his client's chances of prevailing would be maximized if he did not
conduct discovery but instead developed his entire case at trial. We
cannot say whether this decision was correct. We can say, however, that
the decision
was for plaintiff's attorney, and not the district court, to
52
make. 1

517.
518.
519.
520.
521.

Id. (citations and footnotes omitted).
Id. at 1325.
560 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1977).
Id.at 299.
Id. at 302 (citations and footnotes omitted).
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The court noted that its resolution of this issue was in conflict with the Third
Circuit's decision in Buffington v. Wood,522 but stated that a majority of the
court did not favor a rehearing en banc on the question of this conflict.523
In Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc.,S24 the issue before the Third Circuit was
whether a district court could order an attorney to pay to the government the cost
of impanelling a jury for one day as a sanction for the attorney's abuse of the
judicial process. 25 One of the grounds for challenging this order was that the
district court did not have the inherent power to impose such a sanction.52 6 The
court held that a district court does have the inherent authority to impose such a
sanction,"' overruling its previous decision in Gamble v. Pope & Talbot,
Inc.528 It went on to suggest that while529a local court rule on sanctions was not
It stated:
necessary, it might be a beneficial idea.
The rulemaking power of the district courts is now codified at 28
U.S.C. § 2071 (1982), which provides that the district courts may make
rules prescribing the conduct of court business. The only statutory
requirement is that the local rules promulgated be consistent with acts
of Congress and the rules prescribed by the Supreme Court. The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit the district courts to make and
amend rules governing their practice not at variance with the other
Federal Rules. We agree with the Second, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits
that the district courts have the power, absent a statute or rule
promulgated by the Supreme Court to the contrary, to make local rules
that impose reasonable sanctions where an attorney conducts himself in
a manner unbecoming a member of the bar, fails to comply with30any
rule of court, including local rules, or takes actions in bad faith.1
Finally, several cases have held that sanctions were appropriate under FRCP
16(f) for being "substantially unprepared to participate" in a pretrial conference,
where a party had failed to obey a court order to bring to the conference a
representative with authority to settle the case.5"'

522.

351 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1965).

523.

Identiseal Corp. of Wisconsin, 560 F.2d at 302, n.7.

524.
525.
526.
527.
528.

757 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc).
Id. at 559.
Id. at 560.
Id. at 568.
307 F.2d 729 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 888 (1962).

529.

Eash, 757 F.2d at 569.

530. Id. (citations omitted) (Note, however, that the Third Circuit did find in this case that the
imposition of a monetary sanction by the district court without affording the attorney prior notice and
an opportunity to be heard violated due process. Id. at 570).

531.

See, e.g., Divorak v. Shibata, 123 F.R.D. 608 (D. Neb. 1988); G. Heileman Brewing Co.,

Inc. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc). In Divorak, the court awarded the

plaintiff:
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2. What Judges Have Relied Upon
Although the surveyed judges were asked several questions about under what
specific circumstances sanctions might be appropriate in the SJT context,532 they
were not asked directly whether sanctions are ever appropriate and under what
authority they might be awarded.
3. Creating Authority for Awarding Sanctions
in the SJT Context
Based upon the discussion above, uncertainty exists as the general
appropriateness of sanctions in the SJT context and the authority for such
sanctions. Clearly sanctions may become appropriate -- and thus authority for
them is necessary -- once participation in a SJT can be mandated. At that point,
it will be necessary for judges to have tools to enforce compliance with SJT
rules.533
One example of a current local federal district court rule on this subject is
from the Western District of Texas,534 which states: "The sanctions available
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(f) shall apply to any violation of this
'
rule."535
This concept is amplified somewhat in the following suggested
proposed language for the federal SJT statute: "The sanctions available under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(f) shall apply to any violation by parties'5 or
6
attorneys of this statute or any local court rule setting forth SJT procedures. 0
IV.

SPECIFIC LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL

Below is the proposed, comprehensive federal SJT statute that includes
provisions resolving all of the issues raised in this article: authorization for SJTs;
authorization for mandated participation in SJTs; authorization for use of regular
jurors for SJTs; access to SJTs by the press and public; confidentiality and future

the expenses he incurred in travelling to Lincoln, Nebraska for his attendance at the
settlement conference scheduled November 30, 1988, including mileage, lodging, lost
wages, if applicable, and other out-of-pocket expenses, and further, his attomeys' fees
incurred for the portion of the conference, two-thirds hour, devoted to the discussion of
settlement.
Divorak 123 F.R.D. at 611.
532. See Woodley, supra note 20 (in which these issues are addressed).
533.
See also Judicial Survey Responses, supra note 24, Question 35a, at 58. When the
surveyed judges were asked, in the context of whether the authority for SJTs needs to be created or
clarified, what language should be used, one judge volunteered the necessity for sanction
provisions.
534. W.D. TEX. R. C.V. 88().
535. Id.
536. See infra part IV, for the complete version of the proposed federal SJT statute.
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use of SJT information and verdicts; and authority for sanctions in the SJT
context.537
V.

PROPOSED SUMMARY JURY TRIAL STATUTE

(a) A "summary jury trial" (SJT) is a court-annexed process in which the parties'
attorneys summarize their case to a six-person jury with a judge or magistrate
judge presiding and then use the decision of the jury and information about the
jurors' reaction to the legal and factual arguments as an aid to settlement
negotiations. Unless the parties stipulate otherwise, the SJT verdict is nonbinding.
(b) A judge or magistrate judge may order a SJT:
(1) with the agreement of all parties, either by written motion or their oral
motion in court entered upon the record, or
(2) upon the judge or magistrate judge's determination that a SJT would be
appropriate, even in the absence of the agreement of all the parties.
(c) In exercising his or her discretion under subsection (b)(2), the judge or
magistrate shall give consideration to the costs of the procedure, the costs that may
be saved by ordering the SJT, the potential for resolution of the case, and any
reasons advancedby the parties as to why a SJT would not be in the best interests
of justice.
(d) SJT jurors shall be drawn from the regular juror pool and entitled to the same
rights and subject to the same responsibilities as other jurors summoned pursuant
to The Jury Selection and Services Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. Sections 1861-1878.
Any restrictions on post-trial communications with jurors do not apply to SJT
jurors.
(e) Unless all parties agree otherwise, SJTs will not be recorded or reported, will
be treated as confidential settlement proceedings under Federal Rule of Evidence
408, and will be closed to the press and the public.
(f) In the event that no settlement is reached following the SJT, and the case is
returned to the trial docket:
(1) No statement made or document produced as part of the SJT, not
otherwise discoverable or obtainable, shall be subject to discovery.
(2) A judge or magistrate judge shall not admit at a subsequent trial, or any
other legal proceeding, any evidence that there has been a SJT, the nature or
amount of any SJT verdict, any statement made or document produced in the
SJT, or any other matter concerning the conduct of the SJT, the discussions
with the jurors or negotiations related to it, unless:
(i) The evidence would otherwise be admissible under the Federal Rules
of Evidence; or
(ii) The parties have otherwise stipulated.

537. Sources of ideas for this statute include: N.D. OFHIO R. 7:1.2; D. MASS. R. 16.4(C)(3);
MiD.D. PA. R. 1010; W.D. MICH. R. 44; N.D. OKLA. R. 47.2; W.D. TEX. R. CV-88(j); W.D. WASH.
R. CR 39.1(e)(6); N.D. OHo R. 7:5.3; D. CONN. R. 36(5); and N.H. SUP. CT. R. 171.
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() A non-binding SJT verdict shall not be appealable.
(h) The specific procedures for a SJT will be controlled by local court rule.
(i) The sanctions available under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(f) shall
apply to any violation by parties or attorneys of this statute or any local court rule
setting forth SJT procedures.
VI. CONCLUSION
The use and effectiveness of the SJT, a beneficial, court-annexed settlement
device, is being threatened by the litigated issues and basic uncertainties described
above. The general authority for SJTs is uncertain and no authority appears to
exist for mandating participation in them; no authority exists for summoning jurors
from the regular jury pool to serve as SJT jurors; uncertainty exists about the right
of access to SJTs by the press and the public; uncertainty exists about the
confidentiality, and future use, of SIT information and verdicts; and uncertainty
exists about the appropriateness of, and the authority for, awarding sanctions in the
SJT context. All of these issues are addressed in the proposed federal SJT
statute.538
If the proposed federal SIT statute is adopted by Congress, SJTs can achieve
the result that was intended by their creation: the reduction of time and cost
involved in litigation by fostering settlement. As one commentator noted:
While ADR is not without its detractors, the trend will be toward more,
not less, ADR in our courts. This will result, at least in part, from
consumer demand... Moreover, the Civil Justice Reform Act and the
proliferation of commissions and task forces around the country indicate
widespread belief among public policy makers -- legislators, governors
and courts -- that ADR offers some hope for a civil justice system in
which many people have lost faith.53 9
Now is the time to restore faith in the summary jury trial and assure its
continued success by the adoption of the proposed federal SJT statute.

538.
539.

See supra part IV.
See Grubbs, supra note 7, at 25.
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